On Monday, June 26, 2011 at 9:55 PM, "Joseph Maurer" <jh...@comcast.net>
wrote:
Hi Ham and all,
Pirsig proposes a metaphysics of DQ/SQ. DQ is indefinable not
unknowable. The independent agent is DQ/SQ. There is something
in our actions that enable the indefinable. Free will enables action
and an evolutionary scenario limits free will. I can't jump on my horse
and ride off in all directions! Predetermination denies a DQ/SQ
metaphysics. I know the indefinable and can act on it through
analogy and metaphor.
I wish I could say that your response answers my questions. I had asked:
1) How can free will exist without an independent agent?
2) How can we be morally responsible if our values (and consequent actions)
are predetermined?
Instead of addressing moral responsibility or the subjective agent, you talk
about "our actions" relative to an indefinable source. "Something" in our
actions, you say, "enables this indefinable". If DQ is indefinable, and
goes about its course independently, why do we have to enable it? I take
it that the MoQ denies determinism. But if you can't define either the
source or the enabler, of what use or meaning is this metaphysics? (Analogy
and metaphor aren't very helpful when we don't know the entities or forces
we are trying to expound.)
You can't "ride off in all directions" on your horse because it would
violate the laws of nature which support the design and dynamics of
existence. These laws afford us a consistent, logical, and predictable
ground for cooperative effort and rational decisions. And, while you may
not "ride off in all directions" on horseback, you can ride off in any
single direction you choose, because you are a free agent.
Thanks anyway, Joe.
Regards,
Ham
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