> dmb says: > > No one takes the word "cause" to mean events unfold in a mechanical law-like > way? Right, no one except me, Pirsig, James, Siegfried, the Stanford > Encyclopedia and the dictionary.
Steve: "Cause" CAN be used in that way, but it doesn't necessarily mean that in a given usage. If it did, it would be quite unnecessary and redundant to talk about mechanistic cause and effect relationships. No such qualifying would ever be needed. dmb: Also, you cannot possibly believe that the word "because" is necessarily related to the metaphysical word "causality". Steve: I don't. And I don't think that there is anything necessarily metaphysical about the word "cause." Causality in the MOQ is an intellectual pattern of value used to describe rather than to point out an existing prescriptive rule written into the fabric of the cosmos. dmb: If I say, for example, that I can't accept your point of view BECAUSE it is predicated on a logically impossible use of the terms, this has nothing to do with causality. The word "because" is about reasons and logical relations, not causal relations. Steve: It is perfectly standard usage to talk about the logic of an explanation causing belief in the conclusion. In fact, people even talk about "compelling" arguments. dmb: Reason and logic may or may not convince and persuade but there is no maybe about causal relations, wherein A causes B every single time without exception. The idea that Pirsig accepts the metaphysics of causality BECAUSE he uses the word "because" might just be the dumbest thing you've ever said. Again, you are not using the operative terms properly and so your position is just impossible nonsense. Steve: Pirsig does not only use the word "because" regularly. He also uses the words "cause," "caused," and "causes" quite frequently. He has not REPLACED these terms in his vocabulary, as you keep insisting. All you have to do it do a "find" in your word doc versions of his writings. > Steve said to dmb: > But what does your whole rant about "cause" have to do with this debate? > Neither one of us subscribes to the notion that human beings or anything else > for that matter follows prescriptive rules mechanistically. Again, for the > umpteenth time, we both deny determinism. > > dmb says: > Your denial is contradicted by your stated claims. And you have deleted my > explanation - literally dismissing it as a "rant". Have you NOT said > repeatedly that we cannot choose our values and haven't you repeatedly denied > free will? Steve: Obviously I deny the claim that the MOQ supports the traditional notion of free will but that is not equivalent to accepting determinism. We do not choose our values if, as Pirsig says, we ARE our values. That in no way is the same as saying we are DETERMINED by our values. That's why your whole rant was off the mark. dmb: Yes, I've duplicated your statements in my replies so you know exactly what claims I'm talking about. And you haven't even begun to answer my main question about your claims, namely "how are they NOT asserting a form of determinism?" Steve: Because Pirsig re-describes causality as a stable pattern of value. dmb: Doesn't YOUR reading of Pirsig's replacement simply convert values into a different set of determining factors? Steve: If we ARE our values, it doesn't make any more sense to say that we are determined by our values than it does to say we choose our values. Again, both horns of the debate are denied. dmb: The issue is whether it makes sense to replace causality with causality by another name. Instead of replacing causality with values, you've converted values into a causal force, one that determines our preferences. This makes our values into something that is beyond our control and external to our will. For the tenth time, how do you figure this does not count as a form of determinism? Just for the record, you ended this post by once again claiming that the MOQ denies freedom of the will. That's what the term "determinism" means. Steve: A denial of free will would only cash out as acceptance of determinism if we accepted the premise behind the dilemma. The MOQ denies the premise that that control of behavior (and Quality) is in either in the subject or the object. It simply doesn't make any MOQ sense to ask about causes that are either internal/external to the will. This is just the classic SOM Platypus in another form. > Steve said: > ... I think that is a big stretch, and if you claim to the uninformed that > the MOQ supports "free will" you will be taken to mean something that the MOQ > does not support, but knock yourself out. > > > dmb says: > > You deny determinism (even though you also say we are determined by values) > and then immediately follow that denial by making a statement denying free > will. Steve: But I don't say we are determined by our values. I say with Pirsig that we ARE our values. dmb: And yet you do not see any problems with these blatant contradictions. How can you deny freedom and constraint at the same time? Steve: I don't deny freedom and contraint. I deny free will and determinism because the MOQ denies the premise upon which it could possibly make sense to ask, is the Quality in the subject or the object? Is the cause of human behavior ultimately external or internal? It's one more flavor of the same poop. 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