G'day, Mark --
On Mon, 8/22/2011 at 12:53 AM, "118" <[email protected]> wrote:
I have no idea how you can say that a world free of s/o has no
free will. It is all free will in such a world. Of course there is a
free
agent, anybody who uses the word "I" has immediately agreed to
such a thing. Else-wise they would be referring to themselves as
"this servant" like some kind of misguided monk.
At least we concur that there is a free agent which we can call the Self.
What I'm saying is that without a conscious subject (self) no value is
realized, hence free will is meaningless. (The reality of physical
"objects" is another matter; however, regardless of how these are
constructed, they are an essential part of our existential reality.)
[Ham, previously]:
I don't quite follow the logic of reversing the Protagoras axiom
"Man is the measure of all things" to "Things are the measure of man."
The fact that man's world is "provided to him" does not make the
world a measure of his values or behavior. On the other hand,
eliminating the agency of value denies man the sensible realization
on which morality is based and IMO makes life meaningless.
[Mark]:
I have railed against Protagoras for many an eon. That two trees
are separated by some distance, is not a creation of Man. Those
trees are there, and man experiences them. What Protagoras is
stuck in, is complete subjectivism. Kind of like the "brain in the vat"
idea that leaves very little room for free will. Does man measure
that something is Hot? Or is it hot and he experiences it? Your
sensible agent must be given something measurable. Such a thing
must therefore already have measurements. We cannot create
these things.
Okay, that brings up the "other matter" I referred to above. Those trees
are there BECAUSE man experiences them. This is the objectivization of
otherness that I call "actualization". All the empirical data for anything
in the experienced universe are derived from Essential Value. When we
differentiate this value by sensing it, we construct the objects that
represent it. Experiential reality is proprietary to each self as is the
value realized from experience.
<snip>
[Mark]
The Self is a free agent, the body/brain is not. Have you ever tried
to hold your breath forever? There is very little that is free about
our thoughts occurring. What we do have freedom with is assigning
an importance to those thoughts. Such a thing occurs outside of the
physical. The self can absolutely act outside of causal criteria. We
do it all the time. Ever change your mind for no reason what-so-ever?
Glad to hear you say that. I even agree that "little is free about our
thoughts OCCURRING". However, since our experiential construct of realty is
valuistic and proprietary to each self, as a qualitative precept, each
self's reality is different from every other's. In other words, the
relation of a particular self (value-sensibility) to the essent (otherness)
is a unique experience.
This may be an issue for another time. I'm more interested right now in the
"free agent" concept and the Pirsigians' opposition to it. It would appear
that I have your agreement that the agent itself is free to "assign
importance" (relative value) to what it apprehends. Causal criteria
notwithstanding, valuation is what Protagoras meant by "the measure of all
things".
Give that some contemplation, Mark, and see if it doesn't make sense in the
context of
an essential ontogeny actualized (differentated) by free agents. (I'll be
happy to entertain any alternative concepts you may wish to offer.)
Valuistically speaking,
Ham
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