dmb said to Steve:
...So then the most basic definition - from the first paragraph of Stanford's
article - says that free will is a particular sort of capacity to choose. ...
The Stanford quote doesn't say anything at all about free will being agency
"plus something else". Since my question is about this "something else", the
quote does nothing to answer it.
Steve replied:
That something else is some way of defining freedom in this context. ..What
exactly is required above and beyond the fact that we make choices to say that
we make _free_ choices is not a settled matter. ... it _is_ "SOME KIND of
capacity to choose." There is no question there. The question is, which kind is
the free kind? ...We know that we have the experience of willing certain of our
acts. The presence of choices (of willings) is a given. The question is whether
choices (or willings) are free or determined. The Stanford article agrees on
this point..."The majority view, however, is that we can readily conceive
willings that are not free. Indeed, much of the debate about free will centers
around whether we human beings have it, yet virtually no one doubts that we
will to do this and that." You see? Far from being "wildly incoherent" on the
matter, I am rather taking the majority view.
dmb says:
I guess you don't understand the question. In any case, I'm sure you didn't
answer it.
I mean, of course the debate is about whether or not we have free will. Those
who deny it will say our will is not free, that it is determined. If you take
the latter view, then people have no choice but to act as they do. But that
does NOT address my question.
Let's say the question is about the capacity to fly. As I see it, you'd be
saying "well it is SOME KIND of capacity to leave the ground and move through
the air. There is no question there. The question is, which kind of flight is
the flying kind? We know that we have the experience of seeing birds and bees
fly. The presence of these flying things is a given. The question is whether
these flying things can fly or not."
Which kind of free will is the free kind? What kind of flight is the flying
kind? These questions make no sense. The issue is just about whether there is
such a thing. And so I can't make any sense of the idea that free will is this
capacity PLUS SOMETHING ELSE. To assert a PARTICULAR version of this capacity
is NOT a matter of adding something else to it. It's just a matter of being
specific about the nature of that capacity.
Then, if you go back to the flight analogy, you can ask a question that does
make sense. You can ask if the apparent capacity to fly is an illusion. If you
think it is, then you're making a case against flight. If you think it's not an
illusion, you can ask about the PARTICULAR SORT of flight that it might be.
Bees, bats, birds, jets and helicopter have different SORTS of flying capacity,
for example, whereas domestic turkeys can barely walk, let alone get off the
ground. In other words, we can have various PARTICULAR versions of the capacity
to fly. We can deny the capacity to fly as an illusion. But to say that flight
is the capacity to fly PLUS SOMETHING ELSE just doesn't make any sense to me.
That's what's asking about.
Why does free will have to be free will plus something else? I can't make any
sense of that notion. As I've said, it's a weirdly redundant and recursive knot
of an idea. It's like saying that vision is the capacity to see plus something
else. Sure, we can hear sounds but the question is whether we can hear the
sound of the listening? I can't help but think this is just the intellectual
equivalent of a freak-show contortionist. I don't see how ideas can be bent
like that without tearing a ligament or something.
The funny thing is, when it comes to Pirsig's PARTICULAR SORT of free will
(freedom), you have nothing but questions. I mean, Pirsig says that one is free
to the extent that one follows DQ. At this point you suppose there is a shift
FROM free will to the perception of DQ. But it's not a rejection of this
capacity so much as a qualification, a specific and particular version of HUMAN
freedom, of our free will. Yes, this human capacity is best understood in
relation and comparison to the less evolved capacities at other levels but that
doesn't mean that your capacity should be reduced to an atom's or equated with
an ape's. We can talk about the sort of freedom that humans have without also
claiming that freedom for creatures without culture or language. We can talk
about what it means for a human being to follow DQ without contradicting the
larger framework of the MOQ.
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
