Hello everyone On Sun, Nov 27, 2011 at 10:11 AM, X Acto <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> Robert Pirsig: >> >> "This is the usual argument against the philosophic idealism >> that is part of the MOQ so it had better be answered here. >> It is similar to the question, “If a tree falls in the forest and >> nobody hears it, does it make a sound?” The historic >> answer of the idealists is, “What tree?” >> "In order to ask this question you have to presuppose the existence >> of the falling tree and then ask whether this presupposed tree would >> vanish if nobody were there. Of course, it wouldn’t vanish! It has >> already been presupposed. >> "This presupposition is a standard logical fallacy known as a >> hypothesis contrary to fact. It is the “hypothetical question” that is >> always thrown out of court as inadmissible." [LILA'S CHILD annotation 80] >> >> Ron comments: >> In the context of "the historical response of the Idealists" (of which is >> part >> of the MoQ)it is to be clear about the context of the conversation, since >> a hypothosis always deals with presuppositions it only makes sense to follow >> through >> in the logical consistancy within the context and that they only work as >> hypothisis if >> they are taken to follow the patterns observed in experience. >> The people throwing out hypothisis based on the fact that they are >> hypothisis are positivists >> the aggressive sort which tends to take the tack that if it is not directly >> observed >> that it does not exist. Pirsig is saying that the type of question is thrown >> out not hypothetical >> questions in general. >> >> According to Pirsig that which has value exists. In that order, if a >> hypothisis has value >> (the sort of value that is consistent with experience) and has been tested >> in experience >> ie. trees make sounds when they fall and dog dishes continue to exist , then >> the hypothisis >> certainly IS admissable because it also holds the power to make accurate >> predictions in >> experience. >> >> Positing that trees dont make sounds and dog dishes vanish run contrary to >> patterns observed >> in experience it is the logical fallacy which is the "hypothisis contrary to >> fact" it is also a positivist >> position. >> >> ..Which begs the question as to why , exactly, Dan brings this into the >> discussion with Matt to >> support his contention. Unless Dan is saying that Pirsig is supporting a >> positivist point of view >> in regard to biography and historical context. > > Dan: > > You have misunderstood the discussion, Ron. I didn't say that trees > don't make sounds and dog dishes disappear. I asked what did Robert > Pirsig mean by: what trees? I asked how to empirically verify the > existence of trees or dog dishes when we don't experience them... when > they are imaginary. You have miscontrued what I said. We are on > completely different pages so far as I can tell. > > Thanks anyway, > > Ron: > Yea, we are always on different pages when we disagree about anything.
Dan: If you're going to disagree with me, it would be proper to understand what it is you're disagreeing with... wouldn't you agree? >Ron: > Asking how to verify, as I stated before, and what I believe Pirsig means, > empirically, presupposed hypothetical trees, is " a standard logical fallacy > known as a > hypothesis contrary to fact. " Dan: So you're saying we're not asking proper questions? What would a proper question be? Ron: > Eliminating all hypotheisis because it can not be empirically verified > (observed) is the > position known as positivism. Dan: I don't think that's right. All hypotheses are imaginary: hy·poth·e·sis/hīˈpäTHəsis/ Noun: 1. A supposition or proposed explanation made on the basis of limited evidence as a starting point for further investigation. 2. A proposition made as a basis for reasoning, without any assumption of its truth. Dan: I'm not suggesting the MOQ would say that we throw out all hypotheses or that it is aligned with positivism. Ron: > Steven Weinburg, a noted Quantum Physicist said this > about positivism: > "Wave functions are "real" for the same reasons quarks and symmetries are - > because > it is useful to include them in our theories". Dan: But he is not saying to throw out all hypotheses... in fact, he is saying they are useful. >Ron: > Pirsig says something similar: > "In order to ask this question you have to presuppose the existence > of the falling tree and then ask whether this presupposed tree would > vanish if nobody were there. Of course, it wouldn’t vanish! It has > already been presupposed." > > In this light asking how to empirically verify presupposed trees is the > problem > it is a logical fallacy to even ask the question. Dan: Well, yes... that's been my position all along. However, the question has evolved over the course of the discussion to include Don's dog dish and New York City. Is New York City presupposed? And if so, can it be empirically verified without experiencing it? How about Don's dog dish? If Chris goes into the kitchen, sees the dog dish, and calls out to Don that it is still there, is that a method of empirical verification? Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
