Hello everyone On Tue, Nov 29, 2011 at 7:27 PM, X Acto <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Hello everyone > >> >> >> Ron: >>> Eliminating all hypotheisis because it can not be empirically verified >>> (observed) is the >>> position known as positivism. >> >> Dan: >> I don't think that's right. All hypotheses are imaginary: >> >> hy·poth·e·sis/hīˈpäTHəsis/ >> Noun: >> >> 1. A supposition or proposed explanation made on the basis of >> limited evidence as a starting point for further investigation. >> 2. A proposition made as a basis for reasoning, without any >> assumption of its truth. >> >> Ron replies: >> That is what is being stated. Positivism states >> that Hypothisis have no value because they are not a direct observation, it >> is imaginary. > > Dan: > > Perhaps we're using different definitions of positivism... > > positivism (ˈpɒzɪtɪˌvɪzəm) [Click for IPA pronunciation guide] > > — n > 1. See also logical positivism a strong form of empiricism, esp as > established in the philosophical system of Auguste Comte, that rejects > metaphysics and theology as seeking knowledge beyond the scope of > experience, and holds that experimental investigation and observation > are the only sources of substantial knowledge > > Dan comments: > > It would appear (to me) that hypothesis definition #1 falls under > experimental investigation and so a positivist would allow it has > value. > > > Ron: > If Hypothisis are imaginary, then they may not be observed or directly > experienced. It is seeking knowledge beyond the scope of experience > thus all your associations with flying pigs. It seems you are being > purposly inconsistant to try to spin this conversation with rhetorical > slights of > hand. Not working. For someone who claims not to be a philosopher or know > much about philosophy you sure act smug in your assumptions about it.
Dan: So once you're backed into a corner you bring out the insults... again... I am not the one who brought up flying pigs, Robert Pirsig brought them up. > > Ron: >> Hypothisis have value and as Pirsig would say, that which has value >> is "real". New York, dog dishes and trees that are pre-supposed, like quarks >> and symmetries >> are "real" in the same way because they have value. > > Dan: > > For a minute I thought we were making progress but no... if I > presuppose flying pigs do they have value? > > Ron: > Well Dan if they have value within the context of a conversation, yes. Dan: I see there is little use in continuing our discussion. You are either a fool or playing at being one, or both. >> >>>Ron: >>> Pirsig says something similar: >>> "In order to ask this question you have to presuppose the existence >>> of the falling tree and then ask whether this presupposed tree would >>> vanish if nobody were there. Of course, it wouldn’t vanish! It has >>> already been presupposed." >>> >>> In this light asking how to empirically verify presupposed trees is the >>> problem >>> it is a logical fallacy to even ask the question. >> >> Dan: >> >> Well, yes... that's been my position all along. However, the question >> has evolved over the course of the discussion to include Don's dog >> dish and New York City. Is New York City presupposed? And if so, can >> it be empirically verified without experiencing it? How about Don's >> dog dish? If Chris goes into the kitchen, sees the dog dish, and calls >> out to Don that it is still there, is that a method of empirical >> verification? >> >> Ron replies: >> Again all variations of the same theme, Pirsig would say that the >> presuppositions of NewYork >> are "real" because it has value and value is the empirical groundstuff of >> experience. > > Dan: > > By this reasoning flying pigs have value and are the empirical > groundstuff of experience. I don't think that's right. Instead, I > would say (and have) that presuppositions supporting the existence of > New York City are grounded in overwhelming circumstantial evidence. > > Ron: > What circumstancial evidence? If you have not or not currently experiencing > "New York City" then it still remains as "imaginary" by your contention as a > flying > pig. Dan: Again, you are playing the fool here and any response from me seems rather useless. > > Ron: > Matt was saying >> that the kind of question you asked above about the kinds of empirical >> methods of verification >> are the kinds of questions a Positivist point of view would wrestle with not >> subscribers of a value >> centered reality. > > Dan: > > But I didn't ask them... Matt did. I thought I made that clear... > > Ron: > There is not much you are making clear except your lack of consistency within > a conversation. Dan: Then let us end it now. > >> Ron: >> Thats why it is being said that the problem lies in the kinds of questions >> that are being asked. > > Dan: > > What better questions would you suggest? > > Ron: > In other words Dan an MoQist wouldnt ask those questions if he understood the > MoQ. Dan: That is not what you said... you said the problem is in the kind of questions being asked. So you're now saying no questions should be asked. That is your position. It seems odd to me but so be it. See ya Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
