Sent from my iPad >>>> >>> >>> Carl: >>> To disagree for the sake of argument, we have the concept of "red" as a >>> part of our consensual reality. Within that, the concept of "red" is >>> different. If someone describes their car as "red" it will mean different >>> things to different people. To you, it might be a fire-engine red, to >>> someone else, it may be a darker, more maroon color. i.e. specific >>> information is NOT shared with the descriptor of "red." Using that as a >>> basis of argument, I think it is located specifically in the external >>> world. Like Don's dog dish, the concept of "red", much like the concept of >>> "dog dish" exists as a thought form, not as a reality. Does it change when >>> we experience it directly? Our concept of it might. We might see that the >>> car is in fact of the shade we describe as "fire-engine red" rather than as >>> "daker, more maroon." Is that important? I don't know. We have to deal >>> with each other directly, if we correspond, and meaning is important in >>> that context. i.e. is Don's dog dish r o >> und or square? Is it's physical manifestation even relevant? >>> >>> I specifically disagree with Wallace's assertion that the images we see >>> lack physical attibutes. In fact, that may be all they have. The color >>> red is a real concept, whether we perceive it or not. The first four >>> people who experience it agree that it's the color red. The fifth is >>> blind, and can't see it at all. Does that mean it's no longer red? I >>> don't think so. As you say, the concrete and abstract patterns must come >>> from pure experience to have any real meaning. The color red has meaning >>> to the first four, but is meaningless to the blind guy. Now, would Pirsig >>> say that the color "red" has value, or would the value inherent in the >>> color be that which it invokes in the person experiencing it? >> >> >> What first four people? What red? What blind guy? > > The point would be the first four were sighted, and able to experience the > color directly through their senses, and the blind guy couldn't. The > specific red is irrelevant. The first four would be able to arrive at an > intellectual consensus that the color was indeed red, while the blind guy > could never be certain. Would the blind guy experience the same "value" as > the other four?
Carl, If you are looking for a conventional answer, my only answer could be: I don't know. Marsha Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
