----- Original Message -----
From: "MarshaV" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2011 4:51 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] The Color of Perception
Hello Carl,
Sent from my iPad
On Nov 22, 2011, at 5:33 AM, "Carl Thames" <[email protected]> wrote:
Marsha:
Can you consider this when discussing empirical reasons:
"Philosophers and scientists have long recognized the illusory nature
of perceptual appearance. When we observe the world around us, we see
images, such as shapes and colors, that lack physical attributes. The
visual image of the color red, for instance, doesn't have any mass or
atomic structure. It isn't located in the external world, for it arises
partly in dependence upon our visual sense faculty, including the eye,
the optic nerve, the visual cortex. There are clearly brain functions
that contribute to the generation of red images, but no evidence that
those neural correlates of perception are actually _identical_ to those
images. So there is no compelling reason to believe that the images are
located inside our heads. Since visual images, or qualia, are not
located either outside or inside our heads, they don't seem to have any
spatial location at all. The same is true of all other kinds of sensory
qualia, including sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations
."
(Wallace, B. Alan, 'Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and
Consciousness',p.50)
Seems to me both "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from
the pure experience.
Carl:
To disagree for the sake of argument, we have the concept of "red" as a
part of our consensual reality. Within that, the concept of "red" is
different. If someone describes their car as "red" it will mean different
things to different people. To you, it might be a fire-engine red, to
someone else, it may be a darker, more maroon color. i.e. specific
information is NOT shared with the descriptor of "red." Using that as a
basis of argument, I think it is located specifically in the external
world. Like Don's dog dish, the concept of "red", much like the concept
of "dog dish" exists as a thought form, not as a reality. Does it change
when we experience it directly? Our concept of it might. We might see
that the car is in fact of the shade we describe as "fire-engine red"
rather than as "daker, more maroon." Is that important? I don't know.
We have to deal with each other directly, if we correspond, and meaning
is important in that context. i.e. is Don's dog dish ro
und or square? Is it's physical manifestation even relevant?
I specifically disagree with Wallace's assertion that the images we see
lack physical attibutes. In fact, that may be all they have. The color
red is a real concept, whether we perceive it or not. The first four
people who experience it agree that it's the color red. The fifth is
blind, and can't see it at all. Does that mean it's no longer red? I
don't think so. As you say, the concrete and abstract patterns must come
from pure experience to have any real meaning. The color red has meaning
to the first four, but is meaningless to the blind guy. Now, would
Pirsig say that the color "red" has value, or would the value inherent in
the color be that which it invokes in the person experiencing it?
What first four people? What red? What blind guy?
The point would be the first four were sighted, and able to experience the
color directly through their senses, and the blind guy couldn't. The
specific red is irrelevant. The first four would be able to arrive at an
intellectual consensus that the color was indeed red, while the blind guy
could never be certain. Would the blind guy experience the same "value" as
the other four?
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