Marsha:
Can you consider this when discussing empirical reasons:
"Philosophers and scientists have long recognized the illusory nature of
perceptual appearance. When we observe the world around us, we see images,
such as shapes and colors, that lack physical attributes. The visual
image of the color red, for instance, doesn't have any mass or atomic
structure. It isn't located in the external world, for it arises partly
in dependence upon our visual sense faculty, including the eye, the optic
nerve, the visual cortex. There are clearly brain functions that
contribute to the generation of red images, but no evidence that those
neural correlates of perception are actually _identical_ to those images.
So there is no compelling reason to believe that the images are located
inside our heads. Since visual images, or qualia, are not located either
outside or inside our heads, they don't seem to have any spatial location
at all. The same is true of all other kinds of sensory qualia, including
sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations
."
(Wallace, B. Alan, 'Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and
Consciousness',p.50)
Seems to me both "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from
the pure experience.
Carl:
To disagree for the sake of argument, we have the concept of "red" as a part
of our consensual reality. Within that, the concept of "red" is different.
If someone describes their car as "red" it will mean different things to
different people. To you, it might be a fire-engine red, to someone else,
it may be a darker, more maroon color. i.e. specific information is NOT
shared with the descriptor of "red." Using that as a basis of argument, I
think it is located specifically in the external world. Like Don's dog
dish, the concept of "red", much like the concept of "dog dish" exists as a
thought form, not as a reality. Does it change when we experience it
directly? Our concept of it might. We might see that the car is in fact of
the shade we describe as "fire-engine red" rather than as "daker, more
maroon." Is that important? I don't know. We have to deal with each other
directly, if we correspond, and meaning is important in that context. i.e.
is Don's dog dish round or square? Is it's physical manifestation even
relevant?
I specifically disagree with Wallace's assertion that the images we see lack
physical attibutes. In fact, that may be all they have. The color red is a
real concept, whether we perceive it or not. The first four people who
experience it agree that it's the color red. The fifth is blind, and can't
see it at all. Does that mean it's no longer red? I don't think so. As
you say, the concrete and abstract patterns must come from pure experience
to have any real meaning. The color red has meaning to the first four, but
is meaningless to the blind guy. Now, would Pirsig say that the color "red"
has value, or would the value inherent in the color be that which it invokes
in the person experiencing it?
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