Hello Carl, Sent from my iPad
On Nov 22, 2011, at 5:33 AM, "Carl Thames" <[email protected]> wrote: >> Marsha: >> Can you consider this when discussing empirical reasons: >> >> "Philosophers and scientists have long recognized the illusory nature of >> perceptual appearance. When we observe the world around us, we see images, >> such as shapes and colors, that lack physical attributes. The visual image >> of the color red, for instance, doesn't have any mass or atomic structure. >> It isn't located in the external world, for it arises partly in dependence >> upon our visual sense faculty, including the eye, the optic nerve, the >> visual cortex. There are clearly brain functions that contribute to the >> generation of red images, but no evidence that those neural correlates of >> perception are actually _identical_ to those images. So there is no >> compelling reason to believe that the images are located inside our heads. >> Since visual images, or qualia, are not located either outside or inside our >> heads, they don't seem to have any spatial location at all. The same is >> true of all other kinds of sensory qualia, including sounds, smells, tastes, >> and tactile sensations >> ." >> >> (Wallace, B. Alan, 'Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and >> Consciousness',p.50) >> >> Seems to me both "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from the >> pure experience. > > Carl: > To disagree for the sake of argument, we have the concept of "red" as a part > of our consensual reality. Within that, the concept of "red" is different. > If someone describes their car as "red" it will mean different things to > different people. To you, it might be a fire-engine red, to someone else, it > may be a darker, more maroon color. i.e. specific information is NOT shared > with the descriptor of "red." Using that as a basis of argument, I think it > is located specifically in the external world. Like Don's dog dish, the > concept of "red", much like the concept of "dog dish" exists as a thought > form, not as a reality. Does it change when we experience it directly? Our > concept of it might. We might see that the car is in fact of the shade we > describe as "fire-engine red" rather than as "daker, more maroon." Is that > important? I don't know. We have to deal with each other directly, if we > correspond, and meaning is important in that context. i.e. is Don's dog dish > ro und or square? Is it's physical manifestation even relevant? > > I specifically disagree with Wallace's assertion that the images we see lack > physical attibutes. In fact, that may be all they have. The color red is a > real concept, whether we perceive it or not. The first four people who > experience it agree that it's the color red. The fifth is blind, and can't > see it at all. Does that mean it's no longer red? I don't think so. As you > say, the concrete and abstract patterns must come from pure experience to > have any real meaning. The color red has meaning to the first four, but is > meaningless to the blind guy. Now, would Pirsig say that the color "red" has > value, or would the value inherent in the color be that which it invokes in > the person experiencing it? What first four people? What red? What blind guy? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
