Hi DMB
I have a surprise for you in a box, here it is, wonder what is in
it? -something that
no one is experiencing so sadly my present in the box can't exist for you so
it
must be nothing! Everyone else in the world with any wit will find a nice
present in the box, something of value! So MOQ agrees with Rorty and
post modernism, how things have changed from when Matt was here.
If you can explain the status of the contents of a box in terms of your
version of MOQ I would be happily surprised, especially if it made
any sense. I wait expectantly, good luck! Or is it evasion time again,
and barking at SOM windmills that are not there. This makes me laugh
very hard I have to say! So thanks for the giggles.
All the best, enjoy your present of nothing!
David M
-----Original Message-----
From: david buchanan
Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2013 11:39 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [MD] Putting SOM back into the MOQ by excluding SQ, let's not
do that say some of us
D Morey said:
... Some people round here seem to have got very confused about SQ, they
seem to think that SQ is not experienced, that SQ is about objects and
therefore can't be part of experience... When you really get the MOQ you
see that SQ is part of experience and you do not have to exclude it from
experience and try to turn experience back into boring old SOM subjectivity.
Once we see the SQ and DQ of primary experience we can recognise and make
sense of the patterns that make sense of a world that exists over and above
what we experience,... The Dan/DMB error about SQ returns the MOQ to
Kantian idealism, accepts the SOM division that Kant created between
experience and the things-themselves and then thinks that if there are
patterns these have to belong to things-in-themselves and therefore cannot
be experienced, so accepting the SOM division and destroying the way the MOQ
puts DQ and SQ back together again, where MOQ recognises patterns as part of
experience.
dmb says:
I think you're arguing against a position that nobody holds. You're arguing
against a misconception but you're said nothing at all about the actual
distinction in question. Pirsig and James are making a distinction between
concepts and pure experience (or pre-conceptual experience) - but you
mistakenly take this as a claim that concepts are not experienced or that
static patterns cannot be experienced. Not only did I never say such a
thing, I think that claim is absurd. To distinguish concepts from reality is
to distinguish intellect from Quality , is to distinguish static quality
from the undivided empirical flux of reality, is to distinguish primary,
unsorted, as yet unconceptualized experience from secondary, sorted,
conceptualized experience. In the MOQ there is nothing outside of experience
and everything within experience is real in some sense. There no substance
behind experience. There are no Kantian things-in-themselves beyond
experience. There are no Platonic realit
ies beyond appearances. And that's the big difference between Pirsig MOST
philosophers. Radical Empiricism rules out all such metaphysical fictions,
all such trans-experiential entities, "trans-experiential" simply means
"outside of experience".)
I'd be quite surprised if this explanation had any positive effect on you
whatsoever, David. I like surprises.
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