Hello everyone On Thu, Jun 13, 2013 at 7:37 AM, Paul Turner <[email protected]>wrote:
> Hi Dan, > > Dan: > > So context 2 is from within the context of the framework of the MOQ? If > > this is so, then how is it that such 'things' as inorganic and biological > > patterns, including gravity, predate human experience? Doesn't the MOQ > > begin with experience? > > > > (I note that you use experience and human experience interchangeably, which > is the source of much of the argument here, more on that later. Also, > patterns aren't things, things are patterns.) > Dan: Perhaps you didn't notice the quotes around 'things.' That was the reason. > > To answer your questions, in context (1), the MOQ, which is an intellectual > pattern, begins with human experience. In context (2), the universe, as > understood within that intellectual pattern, begins with inorganic patterns > emerging from Dynnamic Quality > Dan: Are you equating the MOQ with reality in context 1? That is how I read it. And if in context 2 the universe (as understood within the MOQ?) begins with inorganic patterns, then why does Robert Pirsig make the claim that ideas come before matter within the MOQ? Wouldn't it be far simpler to say matter comes before ideas and leave it at that? > > > Look at this paragraph as an example: > > > > > > Now when we come to the chemistry professor, and see him studying his > > > empirically gathered data, trying to figure out what it means, this > > person > > > makes more sense. He's not just some impartial visitor from outer space > > > looking in on all this with no purpose other than to observe. Neither > is > > he > > > some static, molecular, objective, biological machine, doing all this > for > > > absolutely no purpose whatsoever. We see that he's conducting his > > > experiments for exactly the same purpose as the subatomic forces had > when > > > they first began to create him billions of years ago. He's looking for > > > information that will expand the static patterns of evolution itself > and > > > give both greater versatility and greater stability against hostile > > static > > > forces of nature. > > > > > > Also, see chapter 24 of LILA where it is stated that “Gravitation is an > > > inorganic pattern of values.” > > > > > > > Dan: > > What I see Robert Pirsig doing here is developing the context of the MOQ > > from the framework of the mythos, or the subject/object metaphysics > > prevalent in our culture. This sentence sets up your quote above: > > > > "Why, for example, should a group of simple, stable compounds of carbon, > > hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen struggle for billions of years to organize > > themselves into a professor of chemistry?" > > > > The author is stating that the world exists for billions of years because > > it is a common sense notion. He is seeking agreement from readers who are > > used to thinking of the world as billions of years old. He cannot simply > > come out and say that the MOQ begins with experience without introducing > a > > solid backing from the mythos was we know it. I guess he could but would > > anyone take it seriously? > > > > I'm a little surprised at this, Dan. You think Pirsig is just buttering > his readers up by talking about cosmological evolution, only to tell them > it's really a load of unverifiable nonsense? Dan: I actually hoped for better from you, Paul. Where does the nonsense creep into what I wrote? No, I do not think there is any "buttering up" going on. As I said, I think in introducing a more expanded way of viewing reality--the MOQ--that it is necessary to start with a common sense approach. If you see that as buttering up the reader, then I doubt we will ever find any common ground here. It almost seems as if you are looking for reasons to insult me. > Aside from rendering LILA a > rather pointless book, that interpretation doesn't make sense if you look > at the structure of the book. By the time he gets to context (2) and into > its evolutionary element in Ch 11 he has already put his cards on the table > in Ch 8 regarding the epistemological basis of the MOQ. Not to mention > ZMM. He does the opposite of what you are saying. That's what my paper is > supposed to bring out. > Dan: Chapter 8 begins: "The idea that the world is composed of nothing but moral value sounds impossible at first. Only objects are supposed to be real. "Quality" is supposed to be just a vague fringe word that tells what we think about objects. The whole idea that Quality can create objects seems very wrong. But we see subjects and objects as reality for the same reason we see the world right-side up although the lenses of our eyes actually present it to our brains upside down. We get so used to certain patterns of interpretation we forget the patterns are there." Dan comments: He starts out by saying his idea that the world is composed of moral values sounds impossible. Of course it does. He goes on to say how Quality creating objects flies in the face of common sense. However, he uses this as a springboard to delve more deeply into the MOQ vs how we normally see subjects and objects (the mythos). Far from being the opposite of what I say, it appears it is the opposite of what you claim. > > > > Dan: > > If as you say earlier that context 2 is from within the framework of the > > MOQ (I leave the "static mythos" aside for the moment) then you are > > basically saying there are objects that exist independently and prior to > > experience, or human imagination. > > > OK, here's the equivocation again. In context (2) experience and human > experience are not one and the same. Dan: So you are ignoring most of what Robert Pirsig says in Lila's Child? > So it is correct to say that in > context (2) objects and organisms (as a name for inorganic patterns and > biological patterns) exist (i.e. emerge from Dynamic Quality) independently > and prior to human experience (specifically social and intellectual > patterns). Dan: I think it might be better to say this is a high quality idea... an assumption, but correct? I guess that depends on your definition of 'correct' doesn't it? Hence your context 2 assumption... > It is not correct to say they exist independently and prior to > experience. > Dan: According to context 1? > > Within the framework of the MOQ the world > > is composed of static quality patterns emerging from Dynamic Quality, > seen > > as synonymous with experience. Therefore to say these patterns exist > prior > > to human imagination is going against the grain of the MOQ. > > > > It is going against the grain of context (1) but is true within context > (2). Now you want know which is really true, right? > Dan: All right, Paul. Play your games. > > > > Now, within the static mythos, if we can call it that, objects DO exist > > prior to and independently of experience. > > > No, that's true within SOM, not in the MOQ in either context. > Dan: Exactly. > > > > Paul: I define > > > experience as “the ongoing emergence of static patterns of value from > > > Dynamic Quality,” therefore, in context (2), inorganic and biological > > > patterns are not excluded from this emergence by the absence of humans. > > > > > > Dan: > > Ah. Here we differ. Within the framework of the MOQ we cannot define > > experience by what it is, but by what it is not. These patterns emerging > > from Dynamic Quality are memories of experience, not experience itself. > > This "ongoing emergence of static patterns of value" refers to the > process > > of definition which is continually occurring. > > > I see you have latched on to Pirsig's statement that Dynamic Quality and > experience "become synonymous" but I suggest this is with reference to the > first emergence of the static concept of time independently of matter. He > qualifies his statement with the term "Dynamic experience" in the next > sentence. He's describing the same as in the excerpt I quoted about the > baby in my paper. I tend to think of the experience being the emergent > relationship between static and Dynamic Quality and awareness as something > which moves between the two. It starts out very Dynamic and becomes more > static over time unless adjusted through meditation, art or other such > endeavours. > Dan: "In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a preexisting object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or object. Experience and Dynamic Quality become synonymous. Change is probably the first concept emerging from this Dynamic experience. Time is a primitive intellectual index of this change. Substance was postulated by Aristotle as that which does not change. Scientific “matter” is derived from the concept of substance. Subjects and objects are intellectual terms referring to matter and nonmatter. So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, is not really so pure. I hope this explains what is said above, “In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a deduction from experience.” [Robert Pirsig, Lila's Child] Dan comments: So the MOQ does not subscribe to pure empiricism? This is just a qualification? What you seem to be saying is that experience is intellectual in nature, a relationship. This seems counter to what Robert Pirsig is saying but perhaps it is on account of my having latched onto his statement and I am wrong to do so. > > > > It is perhaps good to > > remember that within the MOQ, ideas come before matter. > > > > Yes, this is context (1). > Dan: No, this is within the MOQ. I said nothing about context 1. > > > Paul: In > > > context (1) experience is limited to the emergence of intellectual > > patterns > > > which contain “every last bit” of the world. This definition of > > experience > > > retains the precedence of Dynamic Quality over emergent static patterns > > > (which is discussed in your dialogue with Pirsig on Annotation #57 in > LC) > > > while avoiding the distractive debate about whether experience is > > *either* > > > static *or* Dynamic. > > > > > > Dan: > > If the MOQ states that Dynamic Quality is synonymous with experience then > > it is neither static or 'Dynamic' since these are both intellectual terms > > referring to that which is beyond definition. > > > > When something is beyond definition, why bother with creating synonyms? > That's why I said identifying experience solely with Dynamic Quality has > little intellectual value on its own. > Dan: Why bother with speaking about Dynamic Quality at all? We throw intellectual terms at 'it' but that is all we may do. In creating synonyms and analogies we might better delineate what we are on about even if it cannot be described. > > > > If on the other hand "experience is limited to the emergence of > > intellectual patterns > > which contain “every last bit” of the world" then context 1 seems to > refer > > to an individual (subject) defining the world (object). > > > > I don't follow this argument. In context (1) both the individual and the > object are intellectual patterns emerging from Dynamic Quality which is > neither. > > Dan: "experience (subject) is limited to the emergence of intellectual patterns which contain “every last bit” of the world (object)" > > > > > > > Paul: In the “context” of enlightenment, or the world of > > > the buddhas, one can identify pure experience solely with Dynamic > Quality > > > but this identification, which excludes consideration of static > patterns, > > > defies further explanation and as such has limited intellectual value > on > > > its own, in my opinion. > > > > > > > Dan: > > This is one reason why it seems better to me to identify experience as > > being synonymous with Dynamic Quality rather than stating "pure > experience" > > being identified with Dynamic Quality. Within the MOQ experience is prior > > to static quality patterns. There is no intellectual value here. > > > > I think I've responded to that above. > > Dan: > > To me the mythos is composed of basic attitudes of > > people transmitted over time. We may not always be aware of where our > > beliefs arise but for the most part Western culture sees the world as > > composed of objects we experience as subjects. This assumption is so > > entrenched into the scientific method that when the quantum world began > to > > show cracks in it, researchers called such results weird and spooky. > > > > What you seem to be saying is from context 1 we automatically make the > jump > > from the prevalence of subject/object metaphysics to a metaphysics of > > value, or the MOQ. If this is so, then there seems to be no need for a > book > > like Lila. > > > > In context (1), it is stated that the mythos has, in fact, always been > created and sustained by value. Dan: Then why the prevalence of subject/object metaphysics? > Context (2) is working out what the mythos > would consist of if it was based on the assumption that everything in it > was actually patterns of value. > Dan: Yet you seem to be backtracking with your context 2 rather than expanding rationality. > > > > > Paul: However, I do agree with your observation > > > insofar as the distinction between subject and object exists within the > > > static mythos, even as reconstructed by the MOQ. This distinction is > > very > > > valuable, if it wasn’t it would never have been made and wouldn’t now > be > > > assumed to exist by so many people. > > > > > > > Dan: > > I don't know that I would go so far. I think the MOQ expands upon and > > encapsulates subject/object metaphysics but if we begin to form an > > understanding with it, then it becomes clear that objects as such cannot > > exist independently and prior to experience. > > > > Again, I assume you mean human experience. As above, it is correct to say > that in context (2) objects and organisms (as a name for inorganic patterns > and biological patterns) exist independently and prior to human experience. > It is not correct to say they exist independently and prior to experience. > Dan: Which experience do you mean? > > > > > > Dan said: We have to remember that in the MOQ the pre-existence of > static > > > quality is a good idea but there is no way to verify this one way or > the > > > other. > > > > > > > > > Paul: It’s not clear if you mean pre-existence as “prior to > experience” > > or > > > as “prior to humans.” > > > > > > Dan: > > What difference does it make? > > > > As above, in context (2) experience and human experience are not one and > the same. > Dan: In the MOQ, they are the same. > > > > > Paul: If the former, I’ve addressed that above. If the > > > latter, then, first of all I agree, this “remembering” that we must do > is > > > the value of context (1). But further to that, the point of context > (1) > > > is that our reality of distinguishable things consists of nothing but > > “good > > > ideas”. > > > > > > Dan: > > This seems too restrictive; so from context 1 we are purely dealing with > > idealism? > > > > No, context (1) does not assume that intellectual patterns are produced by > some form of fundamental mind, they are patterns of value. > Dan: Emerging from Dynamic Quality? > > > > > Paul: By stating that there is no way to verify them I assume you mean > > > there is no way to check if ideas correspond to something real > > > > > > Dan: > > Not exactly. If within the framework of the MOQ static quality patterns > > emerge from Dynamic Quality (seen as synonymous with experience) then the > > assumption these patterns exist prior to experience cannot be verified > one > > way or the other. There is nothing at all we can say of them prior to > > experience. > > > > Again, I assume you mean prior to human experience. The high quality of > the assumption that inorganic and biological patterns exist (i.e. emerge > from Dynamic Quality) before humans and continue to exist independently of > us is verified on a daily basis. > Dan: Verified how? By experience? > > > > > Dan: > > "In most cases, with respect to going about daily life, it is most > valuable > > to assume, as per context (2), that static patterns, and the things > > contained within them, are real (and follow the laws and rules > appropriate > > to the level in which they reside). In fact, most people do so without > any > > conscious assumptions needing to be made, as noted by the earlier excerpt > > describing the development of a baby's static awareness. On the other > > hand, if dealing with new data which shatter the current set of dominant > > intellectual patterns, e.g. when challenging the existence of a > fundamental > > particle or assimilating a mystic experience, then context (1) may be > more > > valuable." > > > > Dan: > > What I see you saying here is that the common sense notion of objects > > existing prior to and independently of subjective experience works well > in > > most situations. I know you name them static patterns but from the gist > of > > this paragraph it appears to me that you are using subject/object > > metaphysics even by cloaking your words. > > > > I think you can't see the difference between the useful subject-object > distinction and subject-object metaphysics. Dan: That may well be. > In the former no *ontological* > claim is being made any more than in the useful distinction between say, > liquid and gas. In the latter, one, the other, or a combination of the two > are claimed to be the ontological basis of existence itself. This is a > huge difference, not semantics. For example, I did not say that inorganic > patterns are the basis of existence itself. > Dan: Did I claim you did? I don't think so. I believe you asked me to clarify a statement though I am too tired now to go back and see what it was. Let us just say that I understand the difference you are referring to and that is not the point I wanted to make. > > > > > > You also seem to be equating mystic experience with context 1 which is > why > > I began my post by disputing this. > > > > OK, hopefully I've cleared that up, equating the two was not my intention. > I said "assimilating a mystic experience" by which I mean something like, > having temporarily "left the mythos" one should not see the shattering of > intellectual patterns as some kind of permanent destruction of "reality." > Dan: Okay. > > > Paul: Moreover, I’m suggesting that the > > > MOQ provides the basis of a reconstructed mythos, not a means of escape > > > from it. And to reiterate - this reconstructed mythos does contain > > > subjects and objects but they become taxonomical instead of ontological > > or > > > epistemological terms, simply referring to types (i.e. levels) of > value, > > as > > > you know. > > > > > > > Dan: > > Yes it is helpful in leading those who are unaware of the framework of > the > > MOQ into a more expanded understanding of it by using the terms subject > and > > object as reference points. > > > > Dan: > > I would say parts of Lila are written from the perspective of the MOQ > while > > parts are written from the perspective of the everyday world, or what I > > might call subject/object metaphysics. What you are saying is quite > > valuable, however, and I am sure I need more time to assimilate it. > > > > If there is something for you to assimilate, it is just that the everyday > perspective of context (2) is just as true as context (1) which is all I > think you see the MOQ as consisting of. > Dan: Huh. Well I suppose I will have to work on that. Thank you for your time and patience. Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
