Hi Dan, First off, my intention is never to insult or in any way disrespect you, or anyone here. I apologise if I made you feel insulted.
> > > To answer your questions, in context (1), the MOQ, which is an > intellectual > > pattern, begins with human experience. In context (2), the universe, as > > understood within that intellectual pattern, begins with inorganic > patterns > > emerging from Dynnamic Quality > > > > Dan: > Are you equating the MOQ with reality in context 1? That is how I read it. > The short answer is no, but perhaps not for the reason you may think. I suggest we have to intellectually subordinate EVERYTHING to value, including reality, so that we immediately avoid the Parmenidean/Platonic split between Reality and Appearance, Truth and Opinion. What I mean is that we shouldn't start with a notion of a Reality and try to find something that fulfills its role. This, I suggest, is the enormous problem created by the Ancient Greeks, not so much the candidates they came up with. If we do this inversion, reality becomes a term for that which is of the highest quality. So the question "Is the MOQ reality?" becomes "Is the MOQ of the highest quality?" This is a more useful question, I think. I know that a more conventional MOQ answer would be that Dynamic Quality is reality and the MOQ is a static pattern so is not equivalent to reality and I think that's a good enough answer in most cases but can't help feeling it puts a little toe onto the Yellow Brick Road back to Athens.... > And if in context 2 the universe (as understood within the MOQ?) begins > with inorganic patterns, then why does Robert Pirsig make the claim that > ideas come before matter within the MOQ? Wouldn't it be far simpler to say > matter comes before ideas and leave it at that? > Simpler perhaps, but both positions are true in different contexts. Certainly I suggest it is simpler to assume that inorganic patterns came first within an evolving universe of static patterns when reading LILA from Ch 11 onwards. The whole basis of morality collapses without that assumption. Dan: > I actually hoped for better from you, Paul. Where does the nonsense creep > into what I wrote? > > No, I do not think there is any "buttering up" going on. As I said, I think > in introducing a more expanded way of viewing reality--the MOQ--that it is > necessary to start with a common sense approach. If you see that as > buttering up the reader, then I doubt we will ever find any common ground > here. It almost seems as if you are looking for reasons to insult me. > Sorry if it came across as an insult. I'll start again. You seem to be saying that Pirsig only talks about evolution predating human experience because it's common sense, only to then dismiss common sense as really untrue. It's like you think he says, "yes, it's common sense but actually it's wrong, ideas came first, end of story." That's not expanding common sense understanding, it's denying it. In my reading he is saying it's common sense because it *has value* so we should believe it. > > Aside from rendering LILA a > > rather pointless book, that interpretation doesn't make sense if you look > > at the structure of the book. By the time he gets to context (2) and > into > > its evolutionary element in Ch 11 he has already put his cards on the > table > > in Ch 8 regarding the epistemological basis of the MOQ. Not to mention > > ZMM. He does the opposite of what you are saying. That's what my paper > is > > supposed to bring out. > > > > Dan: > Chapter 8 begins: > "The idea that the world is composed of nothing but moral value sounds > impossible at first. Only objects are supposed to be real. "Quality" is > supposed to be just a vague fringe word that tells what we think about > objects. The whole idea that Quality can create objects seems very wrong. > But we see subjects and objects as reality for the same reason we see the > world right-side up although the lenses of our eyes actually present it to > our brains upside down. We get so used to certain patterns of > interpretation we forget the patterns are there." > > Dan comments: > He starts out by saying his idea that the world is composed of moral values > sounds impossible. Of course it does. He goes on to say how Quality > creating objects flies in the face of common sense. However, he uses this > as a springboard to delve more deeply into the MOQ vs how we normally see > subjects and objects (the mythos). > > Far from being the opposite of what I say, it appears it is the opposite of > what you claim. > We're really misreading each other somewhere here! That's his "cards on the table" right there. You said he starts from SOM-based common sense in Ch 11 to seek agreement from readers prior to making the MOQ statement that experience comes first. I'm saying that the MOQ statement is in Ch 8, i.e. before Ch 11. "There's a principle in physics that if a thing can't be distinguished from anything else it doesn't exist. To this the Metaphysics of Quality adds a second principle: if a thing has no value it isn't distinguished from anything else. Then, putting the two together, a thing that has no value does not exist. The thing has not created the value. The value has created the thing. When it is seen that value is the front edge of experience, there is no problem for empiricists here. It simply restates the empiricists' belief that experience is the starting point of all reality. The only problem is for a subject-object metaphysics that calls itself empiricism." What am I missing? > OK, here's the equivocation again. In context (2) experience and human > > experience are not one and the same. > > > Dan: > So you are ignoring most of what Robert Pirsig says in Lila's Child? > No, but as I said, he often speaks from context (1) in LC to remind people of it, in my opinion. He also elaborates context (2), even talking about inorganic experience. To understand the MOQ, you need both contexts. > > So it is correct to say that in > > context (2) objects and organisms (as a name for inorganic patterns and > > biological patterns) exist (i.e. emerge from Dynamic Quality) > independently > > and prior to human experience (specifically social and intellectual > > patterns). > > > Dan: > I think it might be better to say this is a high quality idea... an > assumption, but correct? I guess that depends on your definition of > 'correct' doesn't it? Hence your context 2 assumption... > > > > It is not correct to say they exist independently and prior to > > experience. > > > > Dan: > According to context 1? > I would say it is incorrect to assume that objects exist independently of and prior to experience in either context. With reference to the definition of correct, yes, that is shorthand for "a high quality assumption." > > > > Within the framework of the MOQ the world > > > is composed of static quality patterns emerging from Dynamic Quality, > > seen > > > as synonymous with experience. Therefore to say these patterns exist > > prior > > > to human imagination is going against the grain of the MOQ. > > > > > > > It is going against the grain of context (1) but is true within context > > (2). Now you want know which is really true, right? > > > > Dan: > All right, Paul. Play your games. > Thanks for that.... Dan: > > "In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a preexisting > object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or > object. Experience and Dynamic Quality become synonymous. Change is > probably the first concept emerging from this Dynamic experience. Time is a > primitive intellectual index of this change. Substance was postulated by > Aristotle as that which does not change. Scientific “matter” is derived > from the concept of substance. Subjects and objects are intellectual terms > referring to matter and nonmatter. So in the MOQ experience comes first, > everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to > scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, > is not really so pure. I hope this explains what is said above, “In the MOQ > time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a > deduction from experience.” [Robert Pirsig, Lila's Child] > > Dan comments: > So the MOQ does not subscribe to pure empiricism? This is just a > qualification? What you seem to be saying is that experience is > intellectual in nature, a relationship. This seems counter to what Robert > Pirsig is saying but perhaps it is on account of my having latched onto his > statement and I am wrong to do so. > What I'm saying is that any definition of experience is already intellectual in nature. We already have one undefined term so to add another is of little value. By encompassing the emergence of static patterns within a definition of experience I think it enhances our intellectual understanding, if nothing else it allows us to actually talk about it and infer from it. The pure empiricism is maintained by retaining within that definition the precedence of Dynamic Quality over all patterns. The "qualification" I referred to is his prefixing of "Dynamic" to "experience." I had a long period of correspondence with Pirsig about the use of "experience" in the MOQ, from these discussions I believe his main concern is that experience should not be taken to mean the result of a subject coming into contact with an object. Nothing in either context as I describe them suggests that. > > > It is perhaps good to > > > remember that within the MOQ, ideas come before matter. > > > > > > > Yes, this is context (1). > > > > Dan: > No, this is within the MOQ. I said nothing about context 1. > I know, that is just my translation of what you said. > > > > Paul: In > > > > context (1) experience is limited to the emergence of intellectual > > > patterns > > > > which contain “every last bit” of the world. This definition of > > > experience > > > > retains the precedence of Dynamic Quality over emergent static > patterns > > > > (which is discussed in your dialogue with Pirsig on Annotation #57 in > > LC) > > > > while avoiding the distractive debate about whether experience is > > > *either* > > > > static *or* Dynamic. > > > > > > > > > Dan: > > > If the MOQ states that Dynamic Quality is synonymous with experience > then > > > it is neither static or 'Dynamic' since these are both intellectual > terms > > > referring to that which is beyond definition. > > > > > > > When something is beyond definition, why bother with creating synonyms? > > That's why I said identifying experience solely with Dynamic Quality has > > little intellectual value on its own. > > > > Dan: > Why bother with speaking about Dynamic Quality at all? We throw > intellectual terms at 'it' but that is all we may do. In creating synonyms > and analogies we might better delineate what we are on about even if it > cannot be described. > OK, but the *emergence of static patterns from Dynamic Quality* should be described if we are to get into the metaphysics of value at all. I think "experience" is a good word for that emergence. The Buddhists call it "dependent origination" but this puts a further burden on the Western reader. > > > If on the other hand "experience is limited to the emergence of > > > intellectual patterns > > > which contain “every last bit” of the world" then context 1 seems to > > refer > > > to an individual (subject) defining the world (object). > > > > > > > I don't follow this argument. In context (1) both the individual and the > > object are intellectual patterns emerging from Dynamic Quality which is > > neither. > > > > > Dan: > "experience (subject) is limited to the emergence of intellectual patterns > which contain “every last bit” of the world (object)" > "Experience is limited to the emergence of intellectual patterns which contain "every last bit" of the world (including subjects and objects)" > > In context (1), it is stated that the mythos has, in fact, always been > > created and sustained by value. > > > Dan: > Then why the prevalence of subject/object metaphysics? > Because of its value. > > Context (2) is working out what the mythos > > would consist of if it was based on the assumption that everything in it > > was actually patterns of value. > > > > Dan: > Yet you seem to be backtracking with your context 2 rather than expanding > rationality. > How so? > > > Paul: However, I do agree with your observation > > > > insofar as the distinction between subject and object exists within > the > > > > static mythos, even as reconstructed by the MOQ. This distinction is > > > very > > > > valuable, if it wasn’t it would never have been made and wouldn’t now > > be > > > > assumed to exist by so many people. > > > > > > > > > > Dan: > > > I don't know that I would go so far. I think the MOQ expands upon and > > > encapsulates subject/object metaphysics but if we begin to form an > > > understanding with it, then it becomes clear that objects as such > cannot > > > exist independently and prior to experience. > > > > > > > Again, I assume you mean human experience. As above, it is correct to > say > > that in context (2) objects and organisms (as a name for inorganic > patterns > > and biological patterns) exist independently and prior to human > experience. > > It is not correct to say they exist independently and prior to > experience. > > > > Dan: > Which experience do you mean? > Inorganic and biological. > As above, in context (2) experience and human experience are not one and > > the same. > > > > Dan: > In the MOQ, they are the same. > If, as you say, experience is synonymous with Dynamic Quality and human experience is synonymous with experience, then human experience is synonymous with Dynamic Quality, no? Is your pure empiricism still intact here? Seems to me humans have gone from being part of static quality to something else here? > > > Paul: If the former, I’ve addressed that above. If the > > > > latter, then, first of all I agree, this “remembering” that we must > do > > is > > > > the value of context (1). But further to that, the point of context > > (1) > > > > is that our reality of distinguishable things consists of nothing but > > > “good > > > > ideas”. > > > > > > > > > Dan: > > > This seems too restrictive; so from context 1 we are purely dealing > with > > > idealism? > > > > > > > No, context (1) does not assume that intellectual patterns are produced > by > > some form of fundamental mind, they are patterns of value. > > > > Dan: > Emerging from Dynamic Quality? > Yes. > > > Paul: By stating that there is no way to verify them I assume you mean > > > > there is no way to check if ideas correspond to something real > > > > > > > > > Dan: > > > Not exactly. If within the framework of the MOQ static quality patterns > > > emerge from Dynamic Quality (seen as synonymous with experience) then > the > > > assumption these patterns exist prior to experience cannot be verified > > one > > > way or the other. There is nothing at all we can say of them prior to > > > experience. > > > > > > > Again, I assume you mean prior to human experience. The high quality of > > the assumption that inorganic and biological patterns exist (i.e. emerge > > from Dynamic Quality) before humans and continue to exist independently > of > > us is verified on a daily basis. > > > > Dan: > Verified how? By experience? > Yes, by the "harmony" experienced by their integration with other emerging intellectual patterns. > > If there is something for you to assimilate, it is just that the everyday > > perspective of context (2) is just as true as context (1) which is all I > > think you see the MOQ as consisting of. > > > > Dan: > Huh. Well I suppose I will have to work on that. Thank you for your time > and patience. > Likewise. 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