Hello everyone
On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 7:10 AM, Paul Turner <[email protected]>wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
> First off, my intention is never to insult or in any way disrespect you, or
> anyone here. I apologise if I made you feel insulted.
>
"In class, the Professor of Philosophy, noting Phædrus' apparent good
behavior and diligence, has decided he may not be such a bad student after
all. This is a second mistake. He has decided to play a little game with
Phædrus by asking him what he thinks of cookery. Socrates has
demonstrated to Gorgias that both rhetoric and cooking are branches of
pandering...pimping...because they appeal to the emotions rather than true
knowledge.
"In response to the Professor's question, Phædrus gives Socrates' answer
that
cookery is a branch of pandering.
"There's a titter from one of the women in the class which displeases
Phædrus because he knows the Professor is trying for a dialectical hold on
him similar to the kind Socrates gets on his opponents, and his answer is
not
intended to be funny but simply to throw off the dialectical hold the
Professor is trying to get. Phædrus is quite ready to recite in detail the
exact
arguments Socrates uses to establish this view.
"But that isn't what the Professor wants. He wants to have a dialectical
discussion in class in which he, Phædrus, is the rhetorician and is thrown
by
the force of dialectic. The Professor frowns and tries again. ``No. I mean,
do you really think that a well-cooked meal served in the best of
restaurants
is really something that we should turn down?''
"Phædrus asks, ``You mean my personal opinion?'' For months now, since
the innocent student disappeared, there have been no personal opinions
ventured in this class.
``Yaaas,'' the Professor says.
"Phædrus is silent and tries to work out an answer. Everyone is waiting. His
thoughts move up to lightning speed, winnowing through the dialectic,
playing one argumentative chess opening after another, seeing that each one
loses, and moving to the next one, faster and faster...but all the class
witnesses is silence. Finally, in embarrassment, the Professor drops the
question and begins the lecture.
"But Phædrus doesn't hear the lecture. His mind races on and on, through
the permutations of the dialectic, on and on, hitting things, finding new
branches and sub-branches, exploding with anger at each new discovery of
the viciousness and meanness and lowness of this `àrt'' called dialectic.
The
Professor, looking at his expression, becomes quite alarmed, and continues
the lecture in a kind of panic. Phædrus' mind races on and on and then on
further, seeing now at last a kind of evil thing, an evil deeply entrenched
in
himself, which pretends to try to understand love and beauty and truth and
wisdom but whose real purpose is never to understand them, whose real
purpose is always to usurp them and enthrone itself. Dialectic...the
usurper.
That is what he sees. The parvenu, muscling in on all that is Good and
seeking to contain it and control it. Evil. The Professor calls the lecture
to an
early end and leaves the room hurriedly." [ZMM]
Dan comments:
I offer this rather long quote in an effort to explain how I felt when you
suggested I am saying that Robert Pirsig is "buttering up" the readers. I
think it is as insulting being told I am pandering to my readers by making
an effort to better my writings by offering them a firm grounding in the
background of my stories. You are basically saying by writing down to a
reader an artful author is pandering to them. I disagree.
>
> >
> > > To answer your questions, in context (1), the MOQ, which is an
> > intellectual
> > > pattern, begins with human experience. In context (2), the universe,
> as
> > > understood within that intellectual pattern, begins with inorganic
> > patterns
> > > emerging from Dynnamic Quality
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > Are you equating the MOQ with reality in context 1? That is how I read
> it.
> >
>
> The short answer is no, but perhaps not for the reason you may think. I
> suggest we have to intellectually subordinate EVERYTHING to value,
> including reality, so that we immediately avoid the Parmenidean/Platonic
> split between Reality and Appearance, Truth and Opinion. What I mean is
> that we shouldn't start with a notion of a Reality and try to find
> something that fulfills its role. This, I suggest, is the enormous problem
> created by the Ancient Greeks, not so much the candidates they came up
> with. If we do this inversion, reality becomes a term for that which is of
> the highest quality. So the question "Is the MOQ reality?" becomes "Is the
> MOQ of the highest quality?" This is a more useful question, I think.
>
Dan:
Interesting. By asking if the MOQ is of the highest quality then it would
appear (to me) that we are in effect asking whether there can be nothing
better than the MOQ. I am pretty sure that something better will one day
emerge.
What I see you saying is that the MOQ begins with human experience. Well,
actually that is exactly what you say. Now, it may be that I am
misinterpreting your words but the MOQ is not so grandiose as to claim it
begins with experience. Yes, the MOQ is a collection of intellectual
quality patterns seeking to explain reality in a more expansive way than
does our current prevailing mythos.
Rather, I would say intellectual quality patterns emerge from Dynamic
Quality. For me, it works better to think of experience and Dynamic Quality
as becoming synonymous. It appears this statement bothers you (among others
here) a bit though I have yet to discern why.
>
> I know that a more conventional MOQ answer would be that Dynamic Quality is
> reality and the MOQ is a static pattern so is not equivalent to reality and
> I think that's a good enough answer in most cases but can't help feeling it
> puts a little toe onto the Yellow Brick Road back to Athens....
>
Dan:
I hesitate to say Dynamic Quality "is" anything. We may say what 'it' is
not and we may use analogies and synonyms to intellectually illuminate what
we are on about when we say 'Dynamic Quality' but to say 'it' is reality,
or this, or that, is to fall further into a trap of naming the unnameable.
>
>
> > And if in context 2 the universe (as understood within the MOQ?) begins
> > with inorganic patterns, then why does Robert Pirsig make the claim that
> > ideas come before matter within the MOQ? Wouldn't it be far simpler to
> say
> > matter comes before ideas and leave it at that?
> >
>
> Simpler perhaps, but both positions are true in different contexts.
> Certainly I suggest it is simpler to assume that inorganic patterns came
> first within an evolving universe of static patterns when reading LILA from
> Ch 11 onwards. The whole basis of morality collapses without that
> assumption.
>
Dan:
How so? In fact, I think that a world of inorganic patterns waiting for our
intellectual discovery dissolves any notion that the world is a moral
order. These inorganic patterns have nothing to do with morality. They are
rock and stone, mineral and bone. It appears to me that the only way a
moral hierarchy works in the MOQ is to recognize that these inorganic
patterns begin as ideas, not old patterns scattered about like fossils.
>
> Dan:
> > I actually hoped for better from you, Paul. Where does the nonsense creep
> > into what I wrote?
> >
> > No, I do not think there is any "buttering up" going on. As I said, I
> think
> > in introducing a more expanded way of viewing reality--the MOQ--that it
> is
> > necessary to start with a common sense approach. If you see that as
> > buttering up the reader, then I doubt we will ever find any common ground
> > here. It almost seems as if you are looking for reasons to insult me.
> >
>
> Sorry if it came across as an insult. I'll start again. You seem to be
> saying that Pirsig only talks about evolution predating human experience
> because it's common sense, only to then dismiss common sense as really
> untrue. It's like you think he says, "yes, it's common sense but actually
> it's wrong, ideas came first, end of story." That's not expanding common
> sense understanding, it's denying it. In my reading he is saying it's
> common sense because it *has value* so we should believe it.
>
Dan:
When I get up in the night and stumble to the bathroom and in the dark stub
my toe on a chair I inadvertently left sitting in the middle of the room, I
am quite sure that the patterns of that chair are separate and apart from
my aching toe.
However, that idea arises from the experience which as it unfolds is a
mystery. At the moment I stub my toe it is like the person sitting upon a
hot stove. The pain and the curses come after the experience. The pattern
that I name 'chair' did not cause the pain I feel in my toe. Rather, the
pain emerges from the experience of toe upon chair, and only as an
afterthought.
It isn't wrong to think the chair caused the pain in my toe and thinking
otherwise does nothing to mediate the pain that I feel. Neither is thinking
because something is common sense that it is wrong. The map analogy might
help here. A polar map isn't wrong but it is not a common sense way of
viewing a map.
Beginning a metaphysics by grounding it in a common sense everyday world is
a brilliant move, in my opinion. If you are at all familiar with story
telling most good authors start from the everyday world. By using this as a
foundation it is easier to lead the diligent readers into the suspension of
disbelief sometimes necessary to understand the story.
Same thing in Lila. In order to follow the MOQ it behooves the reader to
suspend their belief in the culturally accepted mythos that is the
subject/object metaphysics. If the author were to say, look, there are no
objects in reality. There are only patterns of value. We'd laugh and say,
sure, buddy, sure. That stupid pattern I stubbed my toe on sure hurts
though.
>
>
> > > Aside from rendering LILA a
> > > rather pointless book, that interpretation doesn't make sense if you
> look
> > > at the structure of the book. By the time he gets to context (2) and
> > into
> > > its evolutionary element in Ch 11 he has already put his cards on the
> > table
> > > in Ch 8 regarding the epistemological basis of the MOQ. Not to mention
> > > ZMM. He does the opposite of what you are saying. That's what my
> paper
> > is
> > > supposed to bring out.
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > Chapter 8 begins:
> > "The idea that the world is composed of nothing but moral value sounds
> > impossible at first. Only objects are supposed to be real. "Quality" is
> > supposed to be just a vague fringe word that tells what we think about
> > objects. The whole idea that Quality can create objects seems very wrong.
> > But we see subjects and objects as reality for the same reason we see the
> > world right-side up although the lenses of our eyes actually present it
> to
> > our brains upside down. We get so used to certain patterns of
> > interpretation we forget the patterns are there."
> >
> > Dan comments:
> > He starts out by saying his idea that the world is composed of moral
> values
> > sounds impossible. Of course it does. He goes on to say how Quality
> > creating objects flies in the face of common sense. However, he uses this
> > as a springboard to delve more deeply into the MOQ vs how we normally see
> > subjects and objects (the mythos).
> >
> > Far from being the opposite of what I say, it appears it is the opposite
> of
> > what you claim.
> >
>
> We're really misreading each other somewhere here! That's his "cards on
> the table" right there. You said he starts from SOM-based common sense in
> Ch 11 to seek agreement from readers prior to making the MOQ statement that
> experience comes first. I'm saying that the MOQ statement is in Ch 8, i.e.
> before Ch 11.
>
> "There's a principle in physics that if a thing can't be distinguished from
> anything else it doesn't exist. To this the Metaphysics of Quality adds a
> second principle: if a thing has no value it isn't distinguished from
> anything else. Then, putting the two together, a thing that has no value
> does not exist. The thing has not created the value. The value has created
> the thing. When it is seen that value is the front edge of experience,
> there is no problem for empiricists here. It simply restates the
> empiricists' belief that experience is the starting point of all reality.
> The only problem is for a subject-object metaphysics that calls itself
> empiricism."
>
> What am I missing?
>
Dan:
I guess I am unsure what you're asking. I do not remember saying Robert
Pirsig starts from chapter 11 seeking agreement with the MOQ... rather I
think he starts much earlier and goes on much later than chapter 11.
>
> > OK, here's the equivocation again. In context (2) experience and human
> > > experience are not one and the same.
> >
> >
> > Dan:
> > So you are ignoring most of what Robert Pirsig says in Lila's Child?
> >
>
> No, but as I said, he often speaks from context (1) in LC to remind people
> of it, in my opinion. He also elaborates context (2), even talking about
> inorganic experience. To understand the MOQ, you need both contexts.
>
Dan:
Yes he does speak of inorganic experience and he also explains the
different contexts the term 'experience' is saddled with. It isn't wrong to
say we experience the world. We do. But the MOQ goes further in stating
that our ideas of the world emerge from experience, not the other way
around. If you wish to separate that into different contexts there is no
crime involved. I suppose I find it more intellectually viable to think of
the MOQ as a continuous metaphysics encompassing the mythos rather than two
different contextual notions.
>
>
> > > So it is correct to say that in
> > > context (2) objects and organisms (as a name for inorganic patterns and
> > > biological patterns) exist (i.e. emerge from Dynamic Quality)
> > independently
> > > and prior to human experience (specifically social and intellectual
> > > patterns).
> >
> >
> > Dan:
> > I think it might be better to say this is a high quality idea... an
> > assumption, but correct? I guess that depends on your definition of
> > 'correct' doesn't it? Hence your context 2 assumption...
> >
> >
> > > It is not correct to say they exist independently and prior to
> > > experience.
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > According to context 1?
> >
>
> I would say it is incorrect to assume that objects exist independently of
> and prior to experience in either context. With reference to the
> definition of correct, yes, that is shorthand for "a high quality
> assumption."
>
Dan:
Good.
>
>
> > >
> > > Within the framework of the MOQ the world
> > > > is composed of static quality patterns emerging from Dynamic Quality,
> > > seen
> > > > as synonymous with experience. Therefore to say these patterns exist
> > > prior
> > > > to human imagination is going against the grain of the MOQ.
> > > >
> > >
> > > It is going against the grain of context (1) but is true within context
> > > (2). Now you want know which is really true, right?
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > All right, Paul. Play your games.
> >
>
> Thanks for that....
>
Dan:
My turn to apologize.
>
> Dan:
> >
> > "In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a
> preexisting
> > object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or
> > object. Experience and Dynamic Quality become synonymous. Change is
> > probably the first concept emerging from this Dynamic experience. Time
> is a
> > primitive intellectual index of this change. Substance was postulated by
> > Aristotle as that which does not change. Scientific “matter” is derived
> > from the concept of substance. Subjects and objects are intellectual
> terms
> > referring to matter and nonmatter. So in the MOQ experience comes first,
> > everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to
> > scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects,
> > is not really so pure. I hope this explains what is said above, “In the
> MOQ
> > time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a
> > deduction from experience.” [Robert Pirsig, Lila's Child]
> >
> > Dan comments:
> > So the MOQ does not subscribe to pure empiricism? This is just a
> > qualification? What you seem to be saying is that experience is
> > intellectual in nature, a relationship. This seems counter to what Robert
> > Pirsig is saying but perhaps it is on account of my having latched onto
> his
> > statement and I am wrong to do so.
> >
>
> What I'm saying is that any definition of experience is already
> intellectual in nature.
Dan:
Sure. As soon as definitions arise it is intellectual in nature.
> We already have one undefined term so to add
> another is of little value.
Dan:
I think Robert Pirsig offers a slew of synonyms and analogies for Dynamic
Quality, doesn't he? The Absolute, the Tao, not this, not that, etc. These
are all intellectual terms pointing to that which is beyond intellect. I
tend to find value in that but I can see where others may not.
> By encompassing the emergence of static
> patterns within a definition of experience I think it enhances our
> intellectual understanding, if nothing else it allows us to actually talk
> about it and infer from it. The pure empiricism is maintained by retaining
> within that definition the precedence of Dynamic Quality over all patterns.
> The "qualification" I referred to is his prefixing of "Dynamic" to
> "experience." I had a long period of correspondence with Pirsig about the
> use of "experience" in the MOQ, from these discussions I believe his main
> concern is that experience should not be taken to mean the result of a
> subject coming into contact with an object. Nothing in either context as I
> describe them suggests that.
>
Dan:
Yes I agree with this concern. To state we experience static quality or we
experience Dynamic Quality is to misunderstand the context in which the MOQ
is using the term.
>
>
> > > > It is perhaps good to
> > > > remember that within the MOQ, ideas come before matter.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Yes, this is context (1).
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > No, this is within the MOQ. I said nothing about context 1.
> >
>
> I know, that is just my translation of what you said.
>
Dan:
Ah.
>
> >
> > > > Paul: In
> > > > > context (1) experience is limited to the emergence of intellectual
> > > > patterns
> > > > > which contain “every last bit” of the world. This definition of
> > > > experience
> > > > > retains the precedence of Dynamic Quality over emergent static
> > patterns
> > > > > (which is discussed in your dialogue with Pirsig on Annotation #57
> in
> > > LC)
> > > > > while avoiding the distractive debate about whether experience is
> > > > *either*
> > > > > static *or* Dynamic.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Dan:
> > > > If the MOQ states that Dynamic Quality is synonymous with experience
> > then
> > > > it is neither static or 'Dynamic' since these are both intellectual
> > terms
> > > > referring to that which is beyond definition.
> > > >
> > >
> > > When something is beyond definition, why bother with creating synonyms?
> > > That's why I said identifying experience solely with Dynamic Quality
> has
> > > little intellectual value on its own.
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > Why bother with speaking about Dynamic Quality at all? We throw
> > intellectual terms at 'it' but that is all we may do. In creating
> synonyms
> > and analogies we might better delineate what we are on about even if it
> > cannot be described.
> >
>
> OK, but the *emergence of static patterns from Dynamic Quality* should be
> described if we are to get into the metaphysics of value at all. I think
> "experience" is a good word for that emergence. The Buddhists call it
> "dependent origination" but this puts a further burden on the Western
> reader.
>
Dan:
Why doesn't emergence of static patterns from experience work better within
the context of the MOQ? I understand there are many here who insist on
using qualifiers like 'direct' and 'pure' to describe experience but I
think it unnecessarily complicates an already complex metaphysics when we
begin breaking up 'experience' into all these different terms.
>
>
> > > > If on the other hand "experience is limited to the emergence of
> > > > intellectual patterns
> > > > which contain “every last bit” of the world" then context 1 seems to
> > > refer
> > > > to an individual (subject) defining the world (object).
> > > >
> > >
> > > I don't follow this argument. In context (1) both the individual and
> the
> > > object are intellectual patterns emerging from Dynamic Quality which is
> > > neither.
> > >
> > >
> > Dan:
> > "experience (subject) is limited to the emergence of intellectual
> patterns
> > which contain “every last bit” of the world (object)"
> >
>
> "Experience is limited to the emergence of intellectual patterns which
> contain "every last bit" of the world (including subjects and objects)"
>
Dan:
Who is experiencing what?
>
>
> > > In context (1), it is stated that the mythos has, in fact, always been
> > > created and sustained by value.
> >
> >
> > Dan:
> > Then why the prevalence of subject/object metaphysics?
> >
>
> Because of its value.
>
Dan:
But a subject/object metaphysics denies value.
>
>
> > > Context (2) is working out what the mythos
> > > would consist of if it was based on the assumption that everything in
> it
> > > was actually patterns of value.
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > Yet you seem to be backtracking with your context 2 rather than expanding
> > rationality.
> >
>
> How so?
>
Dan:
Well, context 1 seems to say the world is composed of value. That is
basically what ZMM is on about. The latter part of Lila seeks to put order
to that value by postulating the four levels and their moral codes.
>
> > > > Paul: However, I do agree with your observation
> > > > > insofar as the distinction between subject and object exists within
> > the
> > > > > static mythos, even as reconstructed by the MOQ. This distinction
> is
> > > > very
> > > > > valuable, if it wasn’t it would never have been made and wouldn’t
> now
> > > be
> > > > > assumed to exist by so many people.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Dan:
> > > > I don't know that I would go so far. I think the MOQ expands upon and
> > > > encapsulates subject/object metaphysics but if we begin to form an
> > > > understanding with it, then it becomes clear that objects as such
> > cannot
> > > > exist independently and prior to experience.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Again, I assume you mean human experience. As above, it is correct to
> > say
> > > that in context (2) objects and organisms (as a name for inorganic
> > patterns
> > > and biological patterns) exist independently and prior to human
> > experience.
> > > It is not correct to say they exist independently and prior to
> > experience.
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > Which experience do you mean?
> >
>
> Inorganic and biological.
>
Dan:
How can we (intellectually) know that "in context (2) objects and organisms
(as a name for inorganic patterns and biological patterns) exist
independently and prior to human experience." Isn't this a high quality
assumption?
>
> > As above, in context (2) experience and human experience are not one and
> > > the same.
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > In the MOQ, they are the same.
> >
>
> If, as you say, experience is synonymous with Dynamic Quality and human
> experience is synonymous with experience, then human experience is
> synonymous with Dynamic Quality, no?
Dan:
No. First, I didn't say it. Robert Pirsig said it. "Man is the measure of
all things." [ZMM] "Man is always the"measure of all things, even in
matters of space and dimension." [Lila]
RMP Annotation 37
I don’t think they are fuzzy.
DG:
But they are human specific.
RMP:
Anders is slipping into the materialist assumption that there is a huge
world out there that has nothing to do with people. The MOQ says that is a
high quality assumption, within limits. One of its limits is that without
humans to make it that assumption cannot be made. It is a human specific
assumption. Strictly speaking, Anders has never heard of or ever will hear
of anything that isn’t human specific. [Lila's Child]
Dan comments:
It appears to me that the MOQ begins with experience and to postulate
non-human experience is a materialistic assumption which works within
limits. To add qualifiers like 'human' and 'non-human' to the term
'experience' seems to complicate matters more than to simplify.
> Is your pure empiricism still intact
> here?
Dan:
Again it isn't my pure empiricism.
> Seems to me humans have gone from being part of static quality to
> something else here?
>
Dan:
I think confusion arises when we assume too much.
>
> > > > Paul: If the former, I’ve addressed that above. If the
> > > > > latter, then, first of all I agree, this “remembering” that we must
> > do
> > > is
> > > > > the value of context (1). But further to that, the point of
> context
> > > (1)
> > > > > is that our reality of distinguishable things consists of nothing
> but
> > > > “good
> > > > > ideas”.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Dan:
> > > > This seems too restrictive; so from context 1 we are purely dealing
> > with
> > > > idealism?
> > > >
> > >
> > > No, context (1) does not assume that intellectual patterns are produced
> > by
> > > some form of fundamental mind, they are patterns of value.
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > Emerging from Dynamic Quality?
> >
>
> Yes.
>
Dan:
Good.
>
> > > > Paul: By stating that there is no way to verify them I assume you
> mean
> > > > > there is no way to check if ideas correspond to something real
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Dan:
> > > > Not exactly. If within the framework of the MOQ static quality
> patterns
> > > > emerge from Dynamic Quality (seen as synonymous with experience) then
> > the
> > > > assumption these patterns exist prior to experience cannot be
> verified
> > > one
> > > > way or the other. There is nothing at all we can say of them prior to
> > > > experience.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Again, I assume you mean prior to human experience. The high quality
> of
> > > the assumption that inorganic and biological patterns exist (i.e.
> emerge
> > > from Dynamic Quality) before humans and continue to exist independently
> > of
> > > us is verified on a daily basis.
> > >
> >
> > Dan:
> > Verified how? By experience?
> >
>
> Yes, by the "harmony" experienced by their integration with other emerging
> intellectual patterns.
>
Dan:
How is this ("that inorganic and biological patterns exist (i.e. emerge
from Dynamic Quality) before humans and continue to exist independently of
us," not a high quality assumption beyond verification?
Thank you,
Dan
http://www.danglover.com
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