David Morey said to Dave Buchanan:

I'll take incoherent back for a second,  you say DQ is full of content,  I say 
it is full of pattern, let's say it is full of X, now why is content so much 
better a word than pattern, what rules it out? Is there a better word for X? I 
have tried the split between DQ and SQ as pre-conceptual patterns and 
conceptual patterns,  you don't like that,  what about dynamic patterns versus 
static patterns? 
 
[Ron says]
Dave Morey, I believe Dave B. to be maintaining the arguement which centers 
around
the meaning of terms within a particular context, that context being MoQ. It 
seems
that you want to question if that meaning also can extend to the arguement of 
percept/
concept and still maintain a high degree of explanitory power while keeping its 
contextual
meaning within MoQ.
The problem of percept/concept is an old one, it resembles the one/many problem 
and we
can glean some insight into the topic by looking at what ancients have said 
about it as well
as contemporary minds who have recognized the problem and then compare that to 
how
Pirsig addressed the problem.
Lets start with the premise you have supplied below.
 
"Is the moon (a concept) round (a concept)? Let us look and see, well it is 
white (a percept)"
 
"white" or "white-ness" is commonly understood as a concept, a universal as 
well as black
and the reason why is that percepts are constantly changing, coming to be and 
fading away
as the ancients stated the meaning (Heraclitus is known for this observation of 
experience)
 
Dave continues:
 but does it fill all my experience? No. The white is surrounded by black (a 
percept). So the moon has a shape (a pattern caused by the percepts not the 
concepts) and this shape is round (a concept). For you the shape-pattern of the 
moon is a concept,  for me round is a concept but the perceived shape in our 
experience is not a concept it is just a specific shape that we then come to 
notice and describe as round and the moon...
 
[Ron]
I see that in this arguement you are making certain assumptions in regards to 
what you are
presuming to be percepts and that they posses a certain unfiltered purity and 
that this
purity renders form independant of the human minds ability to understand it.
 
Plato thought that too and that is why the theory of forms was his attempt to 
explain
why things fall into kinds it was his answer to Heraclitus, it was his attempt 
to account
for recurrent elements of our experience as well as such general ideas as 
"white" "black"
"justice" "beauty" and "good".
 
Aristotle disagreed, to him universals (forms) were artistic assembly of many 
particular
unintelligible percepts into wholes, that the process or the act of making 
distinction,in
your example experiencing a shape, is a complex process of placing limit on the 
limitless.
Aristotle asserts that the terms limit and Good become synonomous in meaning
in this context. Which kinda boils down to the idea that experience exists 
because
its intelligible, to understand is to experience. Human experience would not be
human experience if it was unintelligible.
 
I think the best answer is the Pragmatic one, universals; or types or classes, 
(forms)
{shapes}distinctions in experience, are not so much part of the dynamic flux 
but more
part of the human framework of concepts, they suggest what possibly "is" and 
what may
"be" but all distinction is part of the past, made by memory and always half 
emerged
in what was or we would never be able to experience the "now" in any kind of 
meaningful
way. 
 
Dave M. concludes:
we can point to it before we call it the moon or describe it,  other people can 
see where in this common experience we are pointing and see this pattern in 
their experience too,  if it is not a pattern how can they turn to see 
something and suddenly realise it is there, if concepts are required to turn 
percepts into patterns how do we experience new things that come along and 
surprise us? Do concepts require work to make them or do you think they just 
pop into existence prior to culture and language? I just cannot make sense of 
what you think concepts mean?

[Ron]
New things come along and surprise us precisely because we are turning percepts 
into
patterns, remember we are talking about meaning not what really is and is not 
and I can
understand Dave B.'s frustration because you seem to insist on the primacy of 
an external
independent prime creator of pattern that human concepts correspond to and 
mirror when
the Pragmatic assertion is the primacy of human imposition on experience.
 
I think alittle backround reading on the central problems of philosophy and how 
philosophers
throughout history attempted to explain them and how Pirsigs explains them 
would help
tremendously in this situation and I think you would understand what Dave B. is 
saying
with alittle more clarity too.
 
Dave Buchanan is simply framing the MoQ in context to these philosophical 
problems
and how Pirsigs work answers, accounts for and explains them within that 
historical framework.
That is why he hammers on the correct and accurate meaning of MoQ terms because 
they
hold the most meaning in refference to this history.
 
It's what we all should be concerned with on a philosophy forum.
 
 
..
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