dmb,
One way I've heard it differentiated would be:
Enlightenment: the wisdom of Emptiness
Nirvana: the end of suffering
And another question might be, does selfless mean without ego and without sense
organs?
Marsha
> On Oct 11, 2013, at 2:44 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> Ron said:
> Trying to classify percepts as primary or secondary is idle, Bertram Russel
> said "the belief in the existence of things outside my own biography must be
> regarded as a prejudice." but our justifications for such a belief is
> pragmatic as C.S. Peirce said "let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what
> we do not doubt in our hearts".
>
>
> David M replied to Ron:
> I believe it is not idle, it tells us the basis of our knowledge is in
> experience, it is the basis of empirical evidence and ...it is exactly what
> we use to do all the sciences and interestingly and importantly it is much
> easier to agree about primary experiences like what is hot and cold, how
> fast something is moving for experiencers in the same frame of reference,
> then it is to agree about more complex objects like money or artworks, when
> we need to think again about ideas and concepts it is always good to strip
> these away and get back to what we experience without our ideas and concepts
> to consider alternatives and look for something better, but the challenge is
> always to get our ideas to make sense of our pre-conceptual experiences.
> Obviously ideas and concepts can change what we experience, they change who
> we are and how we respond, but I think we can bracket these as Husserl
> suggests, doing this is surely the best way to get under the dominance of
> SOM, but it surely leaves us looking to try and understand experience prior
> to language and culture as far as we can, saying nothing it is
> undifferentiated is not very useful when at the same time we claim it as the
> source of SQ and as full of potential, well is this potential simply tapped
> by concepts? seems unlikely that such a theory is complete or adequate. This
> is my problem.
>
>
> dmb says:
> There are two major misconceptions at work behind the scenes. These
> misconception are the cause of your so-called problem.
>
> It's not quite explicit but it's still pretty clear that you're using the
> idea of "primary experience" in a way that is very different from the meaning
> intended by Pirsig and James. We see this in the way you expect "primary
> experience" to play a role in the scientific process. But the kind of
> "primary experience" Pirsig and James are talking about is better understood
> in terms of satori or nirvana. Obviously, this is a very different sense of
> the word "experience" than is used in the sciences or in traditional sensory
> empiricism. Basically, you're converting their Zen mysticism into common
> sense realism.
>
> The second misconception is in thinking that things like "rock", "red",
> "white", "moon", "cold" and "hot" are pre-conceptual or naked percepts, raw
> sense data or whatever. It's not just Pirsig who says that seeing shapes and
> forms is to intellectualize. All of our perceptions are "theory-laden", they
> say. The "myth of the given" has been exposed as such. There's a number of
> famous slogans announcing various degrees of acknowledgement. Even the
> simplest ideas - like object permanence, the idea that the biscuit will stay
> in the tin - are still learned ideas. We are suspended in a language that
> always already sorts experience into these basic categories.
>
>
> Dave M. said:
> ...I used the white moon in a black background I am trying to indicate the
> differences is percepts that allow us to latch on to something in experience
> to base all our responses on, ..that is the very heart of my point about
> pre-conceptual experience of difference or pattern. Here for me the white of
> the moon is the experience itself, same as the experience of actually
> tasting a banana, ..even DMB knows this, he has tasted a banana surely,
> but he can't admit that there are patterns and difference in primary
> experience.
>
>
>
> dmb says:
> Basically, you want primary experience to be a determinate reality. You don't
> want pre-conceptual experience to be an indeterminate flux because you
> mistakenly believe that this means it is devoid of content and therefore
> cannot be the source or substance of our concepts. You mistakenly believe
> that it means we can't taste bananas or see the moon?
>
> I think you need to take a careful look at what these guys are actually
> saying about "pure experience". It's non-dual experience, not a subjective
> experience of objective realities. This is undivided experience of the whole
> situation all at once, not the unprocessed sense data of traditional
> empiricism. I mean, you're using Pirsig's terms to refer to things that
> Pirsig has rejected and has no place in the MOQ's structure. That creates
> tons of confusion and frustration.
>
>
> You can't really even have a problem with their "primary experience" until
> you get a handle on what they're saying, unless you grapple what the term's
> actual meaning. So far, you've only been objecting to your own misconceptions
> of this as some kind of white noise that's devoid of content. But as I keep
> telling you, "undifferentiated" simply means that the content has not yet
> been conceptualized.
>
> "Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to intellectual
> abstractions. Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense
> that there is a knower and a known,..."
>
> "Quality is shapeless, formless, indescribable. To see shapes and forms is to
> intellectualize. Quality is independent of any such shapes and forms."
>
>
> DQ = pure experience = sciousness
>
> "What is “sciousness”? Bricklin explains in his introduction to the book that
> “James labeled consciousness-without-self ‘sciousness,’ and
> consciousness-with-self ‘con-sciousness.’” For those up to speed on their
> Eastern philosophy, “consciousness-without-self” (sciousness) is, of course,
> precisely how the Buddha defined nirvana, the traditional goal of spiritual
> seeking. Bricklin defines it as a “nondual” state of enlightened immediacy
> and wholeness in which the usual distinction between self and other, knower
> and known, is dissolved. Ordinary “con-sciousness,” on the contrary, would be
> considered dualistic, erroneously split down the middle between a perceiving
> subject and the world of objects being perceived."
>
>
>
>
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