Dave M. said:
Your quite right that this stuff has a lot of history, I've read a lot of this
stuff in 30 years of study, but where I used the white moon in a black
background I am trying to indicate the differences is percepts that allow us to
latch on to something in experience to base all our responses on, placing this
before all consideration of universals and particulars or things or externals
to experience, that is the very heart of my point about pre-conceptual
experience of difference or pattern. Here for me the white of the moon is the
experience itself, same as the experience of actually tasting a banana, also
a pattern that you could recognise on repeat, so not a concept. We need to see
the active and not passive observing aspect of experience here, concepts come
about from the sameness in experience, dynamic newness too, for example eating
a new food with a new flavour, nothing conceptual in such an experience, nor
in the second taste that
gives you a pattern, sure come up with a name for his new taste later to
conceptualise it, but as with the black and white expert girl who experiences
colour for the first time there is something patterned and differentiating in
experience that is more than just conceptualisation, even DMB knows this, he
has tasted a banana surely, but he can't admit that there are patterns and
difference in primary experience.
But thanks for the useful input and contextualisation.
[Ron replies]
Certain characteristics of sense perception as a basis for knowledge raises
certain philosophical problems,
distortions caused by context,perspective, expectations and convention, not to
mention that percepts
are discontinuous, seeing consists of seperate glances , the brain pieces these
distinct stimuli to construct
an image of a stable and continuos world. There is also time lag in all sense
perception, thus what we sense at any particular instant is a delayed report
from a dilatory messenger. Perception is shaped for us by sensory organs
of a particular kind with a limited range, therefore we can not claim certainty
or universality for empirical knowledge
based on sense perception.
Trying to classify percepts as primary or secondary is idle, Bertram Russel
said "the belief in the existence of
things outside my own biography must be regarded as a prejudice." but our
justifications for such a belief
is pragmatic as C.S. Peirce said "let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy
what we do not doubt in our hearts".
Perception is an active inquirey not passive reception. An artistic
construction.
..good luck
..
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