Hi EKR,
On 18.05.18 19:57, Eric Rescorla wrote: > Eliot, > > The certificate part seems basically right (I think you should require specific KeyUsage bits). It's in there: > It is expected that the Key Usage extension would contain "Digital > Signature" and that the extended key usage would include either "code > signing" or "email protection". This leaves a little a little flexibility. I think this is sufficient, and compatible with existing CAs. > > Maybe I missed it, but I didn't see anything about the level of trust you should have in cases where you can't reliably tie the endpoint's transmissions to its certificate. It's there but could be clearer: OLD: > A > MUD manager MUST cease processing of that file it cannot validate the > chain of trust to a known trust anchor until an administrator has > given approval. NEW: > A > MUD manager MUST cease processing of that file it cannot validate the > chain of trust to a known trust anchor or the MUDsigner until an > administrator has > given approval. That is- throw an exception and let the admin sort it out. Eliot
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