Gary R., List:

I suppose that I should take a step back and clarify what my semiosic
ontological hypothesis purportedly explains. The surprising fact, the
universe is intelligible, is observed; but if the One root of all
being--the identical being of which all the different subjects within the
universe partake--were the being of a sign, then the intelligibility of the
universe would be a matter of course; hence, there is reason to suspect
that the root of all being is the being of sign. This formulation
summarizes the abductive/retroductive stage of my inquiry, and now I am in
the deductive stage of explicating my hypothesis, initially by exploring an
obvious question that arises--what exactly *is* the being of a sign?


Peirce offers more clues to his own answer in three quotations that I
included in my reply to Ivar last week (
https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00072.html), which I will
not reiterate here. He elaborates on the first of them later in the same
text, as well as in a contemporaneous manuscript. "It is of the nature of a
sign to be an individual replica and to be in that replica a living
general" (EP 2:324, 1901). "Now it is very true that a word is not a thing,
and there is a sense in which a sign is not a reality; although in another
sense the very entelechy of reality is of the nature of a sign" (NEM 4:297,
1901). In summary, what Peirce says about propositions and symbols in the
following remarks is true of *all* signs.


CSP: I have not fully defined a proposition, because I have not
discriminated the proposition from the individual sign which is the
embodiment of the proposition. By a proposition, as something which can be
repeated over and over again, translated into another language, embodied in
a logical graph or algebraical formula, and still be one and the same
proposition, we do not mean any existing individual object but a type, a
general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals
conform. (CP 8.313, 1905 Jan 22)


CSP: We have to distinguish Symbols, which are not themselves existent
things from *Instances *of them, which are Icons of them. Just as if the
word 'the' occurs 20 times on my copy of a certain page of a certain book,
those are 20 'lnstances' of a single Symbol. (NEM 3:887, 1908 Dec 5)


These distinctions inform Peirce’s late trichotomy for classifying a sign
according to its own mode of being, apprehension, or presentation. As I
hinted at the end of my previous post (
https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00100.html), I advocate
reconceiving it as designating different aspects of the *same *sign,
not *different
*signs, consistent with these definitions.


CSP: Such a definitely significant Form [as the one English word 'the'], I
propose to term a *Type*. A Single event which happens once and whose
identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which
is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing
being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as
this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a
book, I will venture to call a *Token*. An indefinite significant character
such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose
to call such a Sign a *Tone*. In order that a Type may be used, it has to
be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of
the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an
*Instance* of the Type. (CP 4.537, 1906)


Type, token, tone, and instance respectively replace legisign, sinsign,
qualisign, and replica in Peirce’s earlier writings. While conceding that
in one sense, a sign is not *real*, he nevertheless describes its nature as
the very *entelechy* (perfection) of reality, presumably because "there can
be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, 1901).
Moreover, his main point in all these passages is that a sign does not
*exist *in itself--"react with the other like things in the environment"
(CP 6.495, c. 1906)--nor as a general type within a language or other
system of signs, because it is "capable of repetition." Instead, a sign
only *exists* in its instances, which are individual tokens, each of which
is "a unique embodiment" that can possess different tones while always
representing the type (iconically) in addition to the latter’s dynamical
object.


Again, more to come, but that seems like enough for now.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 1, 2025 at 8:47 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> I cannot yet support your hypothesis that the universe’s variety is
> unified through the notion that the fundamental root of all Being is the
> being of a sign. Yet I fully agree (with you and Peirce) that a sign cannot
> be conceived in isolation, that it must always be connected with its object
> and interpretant. This is simply to say that the nature of a sign is
> essentially triadic, mediating between its object and its interpretant --
> no news there!
>
> The excellent Peirce’s example you offered (close to my heart as I, on
> occasion, take the ferry boat from Lower Manhattan over to Governor's
> Island) does indeed show that *a sign always embodies relations beyond
> itself.* So, prescinding any sign requires also prescinding not only its
> object and interpretant, but also their  relations, both triadic and
> dyadic. That logically makes sense. Extrapolating that to argue that it
> follows that the 'fundamental root of all Being is the being of a sign', is
> not yet convincing: prescision is a logical move, not *necessarily* a
> metaphysical one.
>
> I do, however, most certainly agree that this analysis explains why Peirce’s 
> classification of signs uses multiple trichotomies as they are all needed for 
> a full analysis of what a sign *is*.
>
> Beyond that, I've nothing further to offer for now. Perhaps others do.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
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