List: Since it has gotten quiet again, I will venture to reiterate and discuss further the concluding statement of my previous post in this thread.
JAS: My hypothesis is that the observed variety of the universe is unified and explained by recognizing that the One root of all being--the identical being of which all the different subjects within the universe partake--is the being of a sign. A question naturally arises from this--what exactly *is* the being of a sign? For one thing, as other List members have often correctly pointed out, any sign that we prescind from the real and continuous process of semiosis as an *ens rationis* cannot be accurately conceived as *isolated*. At a minimum, it must always be connected with its object and (at least potential) interpretant, as well as other signs. The nature of a sign is "essentially triadic ... because three things are concerned in the functioning of a Sign; the Sign itself, its Object, and its Interpretant" (CP 4.531, 1906). "3ns is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other. ... In its genuine form, 3ns is the triadic relation existing between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as constituting the mode of being of a sign. A sign mediates between the *interpretant* sign and its object" (CP 8.328&332, SS 24&31, 1904 Oct 12). Hence, the mode of being of a sign *per se*--not to be confused with its classification as a qualisign/sinsign/legisign or tone/token/type--is 3ns as *mediation*. A portion of a long excerpt from an unpublished manuscript that I recently provided in the Spencer-Brown thread also seems relevant here. CSP: As the self representing point was supposed to stand on the map just imagined, it did not merely represent itself; for it represented its relations to the other points of Governor's Island. Indeed, it represented itself *only* in so far as it represented those relations. A relation, however, is not comprised in one of the terms of the relation, but only in the two together; and what is true of the point on the map is equally so of the word *Finis*; and so it is in all like cases. A Relation, in the usual sense of this word, may be defined as a fact concerning a collection of objects, but a fact regarded *as* regarded as belonging to one of them primarily, and to another secondarily in an opposed way, and some relations are triadic, that is, to a third correlate in still another way, (like the relation of giving), etc. (R 634:21, 1909 Sep 16) Again, there is a trivial sense in which anything whatsoever represents *itself*; but according to Peirce, any point on a map also represents its relations to *other* points, the word *Finis* at the very end of a book also represents its relation to *the rest* of that text, and the same is true "in all like cases." He explicitly distinguishes a relation from any one of its terms, defining it instead as "a fact concerning a collection of objects," one of which is primary, another secondary, and--in the case of a triadic relation, such as giving--yet another tertiary. For example, the word "sign" designates the primary object of the genuine triadic relation of mediating, not that relation itself. Nevertheless, every sign *represents* not only itself and its object, but also its relations to its object and interpretant--the second and third correlates of the triadic relation of which that sign is the first correlate--and sometimes its relations to other signs, as well. Perhaps this is why the three trichotomies for classifying signs in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy are according to the sign *itself*, its *relation *to its (dynamical) object, and its *relation *to its (final) interpretant. In summary, prescinding any sign (S) requires *also* prescinding its dynamical object (Od), its final interpretant (If), and the genuine triadic relation connecting these three correlates (Od-S-If)--as well as the two distinct dyadic relations that the latter involves (Od-S and S-If), any dynamical interpretant (Id) that a replica/instance of the sign actually determines, and this additional dyadic relation (S-Id). Adding the immediate object (Oi) and immediate interpretant (Ii), which are internal to the sign and thus have no external dyadic relations with it, we now have the ten trichotomies for classifying signs in Peirce's 1906-8 taxonomies. Presumably, they are all necessary for *that* purpose because they are all necessary for "an accurate and broad analysis of the *nature* of a Sign" (SS 80, 1908 Dec 23; emphasis mine). Hence, we should be able to employ them fruitfully for the latter instead of dwelling on the former--especially if we reconceive tone/token/type as labels for different aspects of the same sign, not different signs. I could say more about the being of a sign but will stop here for today, in case anyone would like to respond to what I have said so far. Thanks in advance for any feedback. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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