Jon, List, I cannot yet support your hypothesis that the universe’s variety is unified through the notion that the fundamental root of all Being is the being of a sign. Yet I fully agree (with you and Peirce) that a sign cannot be conceived in isolation, that it must always be connected with its object and interpretant. This is simply to say that the nature of a sign is essentially triadic, mediating between its object and its interpretant -- no news there!
The excellent Peirce’s example you offered (close to my heart as I, on occasion, take the ferry boat from Lower Manhattan over to Governor's Island) does indeed show that *a sign always embodies relations beyond itself.* So, prescinding any sign requires also prescinding not only its object and interpretant, but also their relations, both triadic and dyadic. That logically makes sense. Extrapolating that to argue that it follows that the 'fundamental root of all Being is the being of a sign', is not yet convincing: prescision is a logical move, not *necessarily* a metaphysical one. I do, however, most certainly agree that this analysis explains why Peirce’s classification of signs uses multiple trichotomies as they are all needed for a full analysis of what a sign *is*. Beyond that, I've nothing further to offer for now. Perhaps others do. Best, Gary R On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 6:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > Since it has gotten quiet again, I will venture to reiterate and discuss > further the concluding statement of my previous post in this thread. > > > JAS: My hypothesis is that the observed variety of the universe is unified > and explained by recognizing that the One root of all being--the identical > being of which all the different subjects within the universe partake--is > the being of a sign. > > > > A question naturally arises from this--what exactly *is* the being of a > sign? For one thing, as other List members have often correctly pointed > out, any sign that we prescind from the real and continuous process of > semiosis as an *ens rationis* cannot be accurately conceived as *isolated*. > At a minimum, it must always be connected with its object and (at least > potential) interpretant, as well as other signs. The nature of a sign is > "essentially triadic ... because three things are concerned in the > functioning of a Sign; the Sign itself, its Object, and its Interpretant" > (CP 4.531, 1906). "3ns is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, > in bringing a second and third into relation to each other. ... In its > genuine form, 3ns is the triadic relation existing between a sign, its > object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as > constituting the mode of being of a sign. A sign mediates between the > *interpretant* sign and its object" (CP 8.328&332, SS 24&31, 1904 Oct > 12). Hence, the mode of being of a sign *per se*--not to be confused with > its classification as a qualisign/sinsign/legisign or tone/token/type--is > 3ns as *mediation*. A portion of a long excerpt from an unpublished > manuscript that I recently provided in the Spencer-Brown thread also seems > relevant here. > > > CSP: As the self representing point was supposed to stand on the map just > imagined, it did not merely represent itself; for it represented its > relations to the other points of Governor's Island. Indeed, it represented > itself *only* in so far as it represented those relations. A relation, > however, is not comprised in one of the terms of the relation, but only in > the two together; and what is true of the point on the map is equally so of > the word *Finis*; and so it is in all like cases. A Relation, in the > usual sense of this word, may be defined as a fact concerning a collection > of objects, but a fact regarded *as* regarded as belonging to one of them > primarily, and to another secondarily in an opposed way, and some relations > are triadic, that is, to a third correlate in still another way, (like the > relation of giving), etc. (R 634:21, 1909 Sep 16) > > > > Again, there is a trivial sense in which anything whatsoever represents > *itself*; but according to Peirce, any point on a map also represents its > relations to *other* points, the word *Finis* at the very end of a book > also represents its relation to *the rest* of that text, and the same is > true "in all like cases." He explicitly distinguishes a relation from any > one of its terms, defining it instead as "a fact concerning a collection of > objects," one of which is primary, another secondary, and--in the case of a > triadic relation, such as giving--yet another tertiary. For example, the > word "sign" designates the primary object of the genuine triadic relation > of mediating, not that relation itself. Nevertheless, every sign > *represents* not only itself and its object, but also its relations to > its object and interpretant--the second and third correlates of the triadic > relation of which that sign is the first correlate--and sometimes its > relations to other signs, as well. Perhaps this is why the three > trichotomies for classifying signs in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy are according > to the sign *itself*, its *relation *to its (dynamical) object, and its > *relation > *to its (final) interpretant. > > > > In summary, prescinding any sign (S) requires *also* prescinding its > dynamical object (Od), its final interpretant (If), and the genuine triadic > relation connecting these three correlates (Od-S-If)--as well as the two > distinct dyadic relations that the latter involves (Od-S and S-If), any > dynamical interpretant (Id) that a replica/instance of the sign actually > determines, and this additional dyadic relation (S-Id). Adding the > immediate object (Oi) and immediate interpretant (Ii), which are internal > to the sign and thus have no external dyadic relations with it, we now have > the ten trichotomies for classifying signs in Peirce's 1906-8 taxonomies. > Presumably, they are all necessary for *that* purpose because they are > all necessary for "an accurate and broad analysis of the *nature* of a > Sign" (SS 80, 1908 Dec 23; emphasis mine). Hence, we should be able to > employ them fruitfully for the latter instead of dwelling on the > former--especially if we reconceive tone/token/type as labels for different > aspects of the same sign, not different signs. > > > > I could say more about the being of a sign but will stop here for today, > in case anyone would like to respond to what I have said so far. Thanks in > advance for any feedback. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
