Jon, Jack, Helmut, List, I must at once say that I tend to strongly agree with much of Jon's analysis, but with one possible -- although crucial -- exception which I'll comment on at the end of this post.
JAS: I believe that it is a mistake to mix Saussurean and Peircean terminology, dyadic semiology/linguistics with triadic semiotics, because they are very different and ultimately incompatible conceptualizations. Saussure's "signifier" effectively reduces signs to tokens (spatiotemporal entities), and his "signified" conflates the object and interpretant instead of carefully distinguishing them as Peirce vigorously advocates. GR: I fully agree. In my opinion, it's unfortunate that both Peircean 'semeiotics' and Saussurean 'semiology' are even both considered semiotics for the reasons Jon gives. The Peircean linguist and my colleague and friend, Michael Shapiro, argues *against* Saussure's theories and *for* Peirce's semeiotics even within linguistics! See, for example, his piece in *The Peirce Seminar Papers* (which he co-edited), his book, *The Sense of Change*, and his 2022 book, *The Logic of Language: A Semiotic Study of Speech, a *Peircean study on the theme. JAS: [Pierce] maintains that *nothing *that is real is beyond *possible *experience or otherwise incapable of being *cognized*, which is why he rejects Kant's "thing-in-itself" as we discussed at considerable length on the List about two years ago. It "can neither be indicated nor found"--it is not part of *anyone's* collateral experience/observation, and thus *always *absent from the commens--so "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. GR: In my opinion, there is nothing more to be said about Kant's 'thing-in-itself'(from the standpoint of semiotics) for the reasons Jon gave. I suppose it is easy for those relatively new to Peirce's semeiotic to conflate 'commens' with. 'the community of sign-users. But as Jon writes, *commens* or *commind *is not at all the community of sign-users, but rather it is "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place." And as Jon nicely explained, " consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter [. . .] in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function." Finally, as Jon commented, this thread is concerned with Peirce's "generalized idea of a sign--which encompasses the entire universe, not merely languages and other humanly devised sign systems." That extrapolation to a "generalized idea of a sign--which encompasses the entire universe. . ." is the debatable question at hand. As I earlier wrote, while this was indeed Peirce's notion (and which Jon is attempting to explicate and, in a sense, expand), I am not yet entirely convinced. Best, Gary R On Mon, Aug 4, 2025 at 6:25 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, Jack, List: > > Peirce metaphysically defines *exist* as "react with the other like > things in the environment" (quoted yesterday) and the *real* as "that > which holds its characters on such a tenure that it makes not the slightest > difference what any man or men may have *thought *them to be, or ever > will have *thought *them to be" (CP 6.495, c. 1906). Accordingly, > everything that exists is real, so every sign *token *is real; but there > are realities that do not exist, including signs in themselves, although > not every sign *type *is real. > > Most notably, the types that comprise languages and other humanly devised > sign systems are as they are only because people think about them that way, > such that their definitions are their immediate interpretants. For example, > it is merely due to long-established conventions that an adult male human > is designated by "man" in English, "*Mann*" in German, "*homme*" in > French, etc.; but it is a real fact that those words currently mean what > they do within those languages, and because they are (more or less) > directly translatable into each other, they are different types of the *same > *real sign. Moreover, all three instances of those words in the previous > sentence have a different tone from the rest, in accordance with the > convention of enclosing each in quotation marks when referring to it as a > type instead of using it as a token; and the two non-English word-instances > have another different tone, in accordance with the convention of > italicizing foreign language terms. > > I believe that it is a mistake to mix Saussurean and Peircean terminology, > dyadic semiology/linguistics with triadic semiotics, because they are very > different and ultimately incompatible conceptualizations. Saussure's > "signifier" effectively reduces signs to tokens (spatiotemporal entities), > and his "signified" conflates the object and interpretant instead of > carefully distinguishing them as Peirce vigorously advocates. The latter's > "commens" (or "commind") is not a broad community of sign-users, it is > "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused > in order that any communication should take place," which "consists of all > that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at > the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function. > ... No object can be denoted unless it be put into relation to the object > of the *commens*" (EP 2:478, SS 196-7, 1906 Mar 9), which object is the > *overlapping > *collateral experience/observation of the utterer and interpreter. > > From Peirce's standpoint, it is also incorrect to equate "the real" with > "the *a priori*" and/or that which is "beyond experience." He maintains > that *nothing *that is real is beyond *possible *experience or otherwise > incapable of being *cognized*, which is why he rejects Kant's > "thing-in-itself" as we discussed at considerable length on the List about > two years ago. It "can neither be indicated nor found"--it is not part of > *anyone's* collateral experience/observation, and thus *always *absent > from the commens--so "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or > false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be > thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). Instead, Peirce > maintains that "we have *direct experience of things in themselves*" (CP > 6.95, 1903), and that the dynamical object of any sign "is itself something > in the nature of a representation, or sign,--something noumenal, > intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself" (CP 5.553, > EP 2:380, 1906). In my own formulation, to be *at all* is to be > *representable*. > > Accordingly, confining the interpretant to "an effect upon a person" is "a > sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception > understood" (EP 2:478, SS 81, 1908 Dec 23). As Peirce put it in a > contemporaneous letter to a different correspondent, "My idea of a sign has > been so generalized that I have at length despaired of making anybody > comprehend it, so that for the sake of being understood, I now limit it, so > as to define a sign as anything which is on the one hand so determined (or > specialized) by an object and on the other hand so determines the mind of > an interpreter of it that the latter is thereby determined mediately, or > indirectly, by that real object that determines the sign" (NEM 3:866, 1908 > Dec 5). This thread is about his broader conception--his generalized idea > of a sign--which encompasses the entire universe, not merely languages and > other humanly devised sign systems. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Aug 4, 2025 at 1:50 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Helmut, Jon, List. >> >> "A sign is not real. But a sign contains something real: There is always >> something, that is discernable from its environment, without which the sign >> would not function." — Helmut R. >> >> I tend to agree with Helmut here. I do not think it contains something — >> although you could argue on a signifer/signifed basis that the signifer >> points to the signified and that in abstract linguistic usage that which >> most signs (banal language use) "contain" is that connection: the relation, >> Pavlovain in its arbitrariness, between signifier and signified. Saussure >> would call this the "social product" which is deposited in the brain in >> what Peirce might call the "commens" or community (of speakers). >> >> Real, insofar as that term is used here, surely must be that which is >> (true) regardless of whatever anyone may experience/think (this is properly >> apriori). In that respect, I have to, and this is more metaphysical (though >> necessary) conclude with Helmut that it's unlikely "signs" are "real" in >> that apriori (beyond experience) sense. Not entirely sure of where Peirce >> stood upon the issue beyond two or three quotations that as I've noted >> before, though I am a ways from producing my own work here, I do not find >> consistent. That is, the "apriori" in Kant (whom we know Peirce "more than >> admires" but whose "noumenal" Peirce cannot accept) — that apriori is that >> which is "beyond experience" but necessarily exists. It is remarkably close >> to what Peirce would call that "real" insofar as I have ever understood >> Peirce here (though Peirce doesn't want to pay what is often cited as the >> "noumenal price"). >> >> Just some thoughts. >> >> Best >> >> Jack >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on >> behalf of Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Monday, August 4, 2025 5:40 PM >> *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] < >> [email protected]> >> *Subject:* Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Ontology (was Spencer-Brown's concept >> of 'reentry') >> >> Jon, List, >> >> A sign is not real. But a sign contains something real: There is always >> something, that is discernable from its environment, without which the sign >> would not function. With "discernable" I mean that a thought-experimental >> alien, who is maximally different from us, would see that there is >> something special, without knowing its meaning. Like us seeing the "Wow"- >> signal in extraterrestrial waves- which might be just due to random chance >> though, as i donot say, that everything discernable is a sign, but only the >> other way around. >> >> An object does not have to be discernable, it might be a probe of the >> ocean or a coordinate in empty space. >> >> The universe is discernable from its environment, although in this case >> the environment is an inner environment: Something particular. It is easy >> to discern an universal law from a cultural rule, or a human right based on >> the castegorical imperative from a dancehall dress code. >> >> So the universe is a sign. >> >> Best regards, helmut >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
