Gary R., List: GR: That extrapolation to a "generalized idea of a sign--which encompasses the entire universe" is the debatable question at hand. As I earlier wrote, while this was indeed Peirce's notion (and which Jon is attempting to explicate and, in a sense, expand), I am not yet entirely convinced.
Your continued skepticism is understandable. Summarizing my recent posts in this thread ... - My hypothesis, which purports to explain the surprising fact that the universe is intelligible, is that the One root of all being--the identical being of which all the different subjects within the universe partake--is the being of a sign. - The being of a sign is not isolated but triadic, always mediating between its object and interpretant, both of which are likewise of the nature of a sign. - The being of a sign in itself is not existence but governing its actual instances, which are tokens of types and possess tones. If I am right about all this, then the upshot is that *every* individual existing thing is a token of a type, an instance of a sign, an actual exemplar of a real general; and as I have said before, every dyadic reaction between such discrete things is a degenerate manifestation of continuous and triadic semiosis. This constitutes a reformulation of not only Peirce's objective idealism, in which "matter is effete mind," but also his extreme scholastic realism, which rejects the fundamental tenet of nominalism that *only* individual existing things are real. In Aristotelian terms, the formal cause of a token is the type that it iconically represents, along with any tones that it possesses, and its final cause is producing a dynamical interpretant. The formal cause of any such dynamical interpretant is the immediate interpretant of the type, and its final cause is the final interpretant of the sign. In both cases, the material and efficient causes are, respectively, the physical embodiment and whatever brings it about. Now, picking up from my post yesterday in the other thread ( https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00017.html), where I talked about concepts becoming more determinate by being ascribed to various individuals in propositions as illustrated by Existential Graphs (EGs)--recall that "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896). Accordingly, "The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of being" (CP 6.341, 1907). This goes along with Peirce's similar statements that I have quoted previously--"The very entelechy of being lies in being representable" (EP 2:324, NEM 4:262, 1901), and "the very entelechy of reality is of the nature of a sign" (NEM 4:297, 1901)--as well as an additional passage. CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304, NEM 4:239-40, 1901) We have returned to what you characterized two weeks ago as "the critical matter," which seems to be at the heart of your remaining misgivings. What Peirce calls here the "fact that is not abstracted but complete" is what he calls elsewhere the "one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). It would be *fully *described only by "the absolute Truth" as "the ultimate interpretant of every sign," the entire inexhaustible continuum of all true propositions that is represented by the blank sheet in EGs, which taken together would render all concepts *completely *determinate and all individuals *completely *definite. Of course, this ideal state of *infinite *information will never *actually* be achieved, it only *would *be achieved by an infinite community after infinite inquiry. Nevertheless, according to Peirce, "the *continuity *of the flow [of time] ... makes of all time an individual object. ... This continuity, or similarity of parts in respect to having parts, necessarily makes time an individual whole" (CP 8.114, 1900). Likewise, I maintain that the continuity of the flow of signs perfusing the entire universe makes of it an individual whole--*one* immense sign, a vast semiosic continuum, encompassing all time from the infinite past to the infinite future. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Aug 4, 2025 at 9:41 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Jack, Helmut, List, > > I must at once say that I tend to strongly agree with much of Jon's > analysis, but with one possible -- although crucial -- exception which I'll > comment on at the end of this post. > > JAS: I believe that it is a mistake to mix Saussurean and Peircean > terminology, dyadic semiology/linguistics with triadic semiotics, because > they are very different and ultimately incompatible conceptualizations. > Saussure's "signifier" effectively reduces signs to tokens (spatiotemporal > entities), and his "signified" conflates the object and interpretant > instead of carefully distinguishing them as Peirce vigorously advocates. > > GR: I fully agree. In my opinion, it's unfortunate that both Peircean > 'semeiotics' and Saussurean 'semiology' are even both considered semiotics > for the reasons Jon gives. The Peircean linguist and my colleague and > friend, Michael Shapiro, argues *against* Saussure's theories and *for* > Peirce's semeiotics even within linguistics! See, for example, his piece in > *The > Peirce Seminar Papers* (which he co-edited), his book, *The Sense of > Change*, and his 2022 book, *The Logic of Language: A Semiotic Study of > Speech, a *Peircean study on the theme. > > JAS: [Pierce] maintains that *nothing *that is real is beyond *possible > *experience > or otherwise incapable of being *cognized*, which is why he rejects > Kant's "thing-in-itself" as we discussed at considerable length on the List > about two years ago. It "can neither be indicated nor found"--it is not > part of *anyone's* collateral experience/observation, and thus *always *absent > from the commens--so "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or > false can be predicated of it. > > GR: In my opinion, there is nothing more to be said about Kant's > 'thing-in-itself'(from the standpoint of semiotics) for the reasons Jon > gave. > > I suppose it is easy for those relatively new to Peirce's semeiotic to > conflate 'commens' with. 'the community of sign-users. But as Jon writes, > *commens* or *commind *is not at all the community of sign-users, but > rather it is "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter > have to be fused in order that any communication should take place." And > as Jon nicely explained, " consists of all that is, and must be, well > understood between utterer and interpreter [. . .] in order that the sign > in question should fulfill its function." > > Finally, as Jon commented, this thread is concerned with Peirce's > "generalized idea of a sign--which encompasses the entire universe, not > merely languages and other humanly devised sign systems." > > That extrapolation to a "generalized idea of a sign--which encompasses the > entire universe. . ." is the debatable question at hand. As I earlier > wrote, while this was indeed Peirce's notion (and which Jon is attempting > to explicate and, in a sense, expand), I am not yet entirely convinced. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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