Hi Jon - Off-list
To be simpler about it. Our experience of things is not what thigns are and nor can it be such. Otherwise there would be an absurd anthropocentric omnipotence claim being made. Things exist. We experience them (as humans). That, human experience of things, is not equivalent to "things" and need not even be similar (Hume's point entirely so far qua habit rather than necessity). However, ala Descartes ad absurdum (methodology) that things exist beyond human experience (altogether) regardless of what humans do experience is necessary and this is Kant's basic thesis (and he's right). It basically explains the starting position of Godel's incompleteness theorems as well certain other mathematical (or pure mathematical) claims. I don't want it to be too dense or unorthodox. So best to give a simple version and see where you disagree and why (qua Peirce of course). Best wishes, Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, August 5, 2025 11:09 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Ontology (was Spencer-Brown's concept of 'reentry') Jack, Helmut, List: JRKC: I think it useful to think with Saussure when reading Peirce My concern remains that this is likely to result in serious misunderstandings of Peirce, because his conception of signs is completely different from and incompatible with Saussure's--triadic instead of dyadic, sign/object/interpretant instead of signifier/signified. My own book recommendation on this is The Fate of Meaning: Charles Peirce, Structuralism, and Literature, by John K. Sheriff. JRKC: If a real (or the real) is that which is what it is regardless of what is thought/experienced ... then it corresponds very simply to Kant's notion of the apriori No, these are not at all synonymous. Kant's "a priori" is an epistemological term, designating "knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience" (emphasis mine); this is Kant's own definition in Critique of Pure Reason, although SEP adds, "Enabling experiences may be required" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/). On the other hand, Peirce's "real" is an ontological term, designating that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it; and he also defines "external" as designating that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about anything, so whatever is external is real, but there are realities that are not external. JRKC: I think the onus is on Peirce (or rather the Peircean community) to demonstrate how radical the difference is in that one respect (real/beyond experience...) when Peirce flirts with it fairly explicitly. The debate is not over whether there are any realities beyond all actual experience--no doubt there are, due to the limitations of finite human existence--but over whether there are any realities beyond all possible experience. Claiming that there are such realities "goes beyond what can be directly observed, and we have no right to conclude what goes beyond what we observe, except so far as it explains or accounts for what we observe" (CP 6.613, 1893). It also blocks the way of inquiry, which is why maintaining that whatever is real is capable of being known--i.e., capable of being represented--is a well-founded methodological principle and regulative hope. What I am exploring in this thread is whether it is also a viable ontological hypothesis, encompassing all three Universes of Experience, in conjunction with the tenet that every potential dynamical object of a sign--i.e., whatever is intelligible--is likewise of the nature of a sign. HR: The real part of a sign is something that stands out from its environment. This remark again exhibits the all-too-common confusion of reality with existence. A sign token exists and is real, as a spatiotemporal entity that stands out from and reacts with the other things in its environment. A sign type does not exist but is real in some cases, although not within languages and other humanly devised sign systems that rely on arbitrary conventions or stipulated definitions. A sign in itself does not exist but is real, governing its actual instances, which are different tokens of different types within different sign systems. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 9:59 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jack, Jon, Edwina, Gary, List, Apriori in the Kantian sense does not mean independent of all experience: A synthetic apriori proposition, for example the categorical imperative, as it is a proposition, requires sombody insofar experienced, so that she/he is able to understand a proposition. But it is independent of the kind of experience. It is understandable and agreeable in the same way for everybody, regardless of the culture she/he is from. With a dancehall dress code for instance it is different. When i said a sign (in its totality) is not real, but it contains something real, i meant that purely analytical. The real part of a sign is something that stands out from its environment. A bird´s chirp in a forest is the real part of a decided bird- sign for an ornithologist. For an alien first visiting earth it would also be a sign part, but nothing about birds, but only "Wow! There´s something!". Same with symbols, we still do not know the meanings of Teotihuacan pictograms, but we know, that they are symbols meaning something, because they are different from what´s around them. Best regards, Helmut 5. August 2025 um 09:22 "Jack Cody" <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, List, Jon, you are as articulate as you always are (appreciated) but I cannot agree with you on two points. One, I think it useful to think with Saussure when reading Peirce so long as you do not take Saussure for Peirce (I read a book I want to cite — just by description here — some time ago which was a very long study on the history of each figure and where each diverged on very specific points of order: I found that to be excellent, though all I can remember is that it featured each in the title? Also, on the apriori and the real. I mean, this should be easy. If a real (or the real) is that which is what it is regardless of what is thought/experienced (and Peirce makes this distinction over and over) then it corresponds very simply to Kant's notion of the apriori (or Kant's apriori — his general use of that term which indicates "beyond experience" which is also that which covers "things" which are however they are regardless of one's experience or thoought). I think the onus is on Peirce (or rather the Peircean community) to demonstrate how radical the difference is in that one respect (real/beyond experience...) when Peirce flirts with it fairly explicitly. Best, Jack
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