Jon, I have to say that I thonk you're wrong — "apriori" is very much ontological in Kant as it goes hand in hand with his noumenal distinction. Indeed, Kant’s response to Hume centers on a critical distinction: that metaphysical cognition, by its very concept, cannot be derived from experience. As Kant writes:
“First, concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition, it already lies in the concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical. The principles of such cognition (which include not only its fundamental propositions or basic principles, but also its fundamental concepts) must therefore never be taken from experience; for the cognition is supposed to be not physical but metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond experience. Therefore it will be based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology. It is therefore cognition a priori, or from pure understanding and pure reason.” (Prolegomena, 15). Kant’s point is this: if a claim is metaphysical, it cannot rely on empirical input, for then it would no longer be metaphysics, but natural science or psychology. Therefore, all metaphysical knowledge must be a priori, and this is not merely a logical or epistemic label. It reflects a deeper ontological condition: that which is a priori stands beyond and before experience as such, and serves as the ground for the possibility of experience itself. Moreover, I don't doubt that an ant exerpiences the world. I also do not doubt that with or without infinity I will never experience the world as an ant does. I don't see how that blocks inquiry. It's common sense. You cannot possibly hold the position that on the one hand the ant's experience is real enough (it exists and I doubt anyone doubts this) but that on the other a human can have experiences that an ant has? It's so radically different as to be absurd and so there are basically infinitely many experiences of the world (assume a large number of species on this planet, in this time period alone, that it verges on infinite) which humans will never have. That is not blocking inquiry. It is to state that however a tree experiences the world it is not possible that a human should ever have that experience. This is basic to me. Infinite inquiry, by axiom, is such that you would merely repeat the same logical mistake an infinite period of times if you were to disagree with the basic claims here and so it really doesn't do any good to cite it (in this context). That there is a truth, transcendental as far as I can tell, I do not doubt. That that truth is "positivistic" (in any respect qua knowledge) I doubt entirely. I think understanding has almost nothing to do with knowledge. But that's a larger reply. To ask you one final question: if you believe in God, and I mean this within the context of ontology and this thread as you've alluded to it before, surely you would find this at least interesting. Jesus cannot be a sign, surely. for he says that "it is a wicked generation that seeketh after a sign" and he knows the messiah is sought for. If the universe were a sign, Jesus seems to contradict this. I too believe in God, as it goes, but I do not believe the universe is a sign at all. Best wishes, Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, August 5, 2025 11:09 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Ontology (was Spencer-Brown's concept of 'reentry') Jack, Helmut, List: JRKC: I think it useful to think with Saussure when reading Peirce My concern remains that this is likely to result in serious misunderstandings of Peirce, because his conception of signs is completely different from and incompatible with Saussure's--triadic instead of dyadic, sign/object/interpretant instead of signifier/signified. My own book recommendation on this is The Fate of Meaning: Charles Peirce, Structuralism, and Literature, by John K. Sheriff. JRKC: If a real (or the real) is that which is what it is regardless of what is thought/experienced ... then it corresponds very simply to Kant's notion of the apriori No, these are not at all synonymous. Kant's "a priori" is an epistemological term, designating "knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience" (emphasis mine); this is Kant's own definition in Critique of Pure Reason, although SEP adds, "Enabling experiences may be required" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/). On the other hand, Peirce's "real" is an ontological term, designating that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it; and he also defines "external" as designating that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about anything, so whatever is external is real, but there are realities that are not external. JRKC: I think the onus is on Peirce (or rather the Peircean community) to demonstrate how radical the difference is in that one respect (real/beyond experience...) when Peirce flirts with it fairly explicitly. The debate is not over whether there are any realities beyond all actual experience--no doubt there are, due to the limitations of finite human existence--but over whether there are any realities beyond all possible experience. Claiming that there are such realities "goes beyond what can be directly observed, and we have no right to conclude what goes beyond what we observe, except so far as it explains or accounts for what we observe" (CP 6.613, 1893). It also blocks the way of inquiry, which is why maintaining that whatever is real is capable of being known--i.e., capable of being represented--is a well-founded methodological principle and regulative hope. What I am exploring in this thread is whether it is also a viable ontological hypothesis, encompassing all three Universes of Experience, in conjunction with the tenet that every potential dynamical object of a sign--i.e., whatever is intelligible--is likewise of the nature of a sign. HR: The real part of a sign is something that stands out from its environment. This remark again exhibits the all-too-common confusion of reality with existence. A sign token exists and is real, as a spatiotemporal entity that stands out from and reacts with the other things in its environment. A sign type does not exist but is real in some cases, although not within languages and other humanly devised sign systems that rely on arbitrary conventions or stipulated definitions. A sign in itself does not exist but is real, governing its actual instances, which are different tokens of different types within different sign systems. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 9:59 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jack, Jon, Edwina, Gary, List, Apriori in the Kantian sense does not mean independent of all experience: A synthetic apriori proposition, for example the categorical imperative, as it is a proposition, requires sombody insofar experienced, so that she/he is able to understand a proposition. But it is independent of the kind of experience. It is understandable and agreeable in the same way for everybody, regardless of the culture she/he is from. With a dancehall dress code for instance it is different. When i said a sign (in its totality) is not real, but it contains something real, i meant that purely analytical. The real part of a sign is something that stands out from its environment. A bird´s chirp in a forest is the real part of a decided bird- sign for an ornithologist. For an alien first visiting earth it would also be a sign part, but nothing about birds, but only "Wow! There´s something!". Same with symbols, we still do not know the meanings of Teotihuacan pictograms, but we know, that they are symbols meaning something, because they are different from what´s around them. Best regards, Helmut 5. August 2025 um 09:22 "Jack Cody" <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, List, Jon, you are as articulate as you always are (appreciated) but I cannot agree with you on two points. One, I think it useful to think with Saussure when reading Peirce so long as you do not take Saussure for Peirce (I read a book I want to cite — just by description here — some time ago which was a very long study on the history of each figure and where each diverged on very specific points of order: I found that to be excellent, though all I can remember is that it featured each in the title? Also, on the apriori and the real. I mean, this should be easy. If a real (or the real) is that which is what it is regardless of what is thought/experienced (and Peirce makes this distinction over and over) then it corresponds very simply to Kant's notion of the apriori (or Kant's apriori — his general use of that term which indicates "beyond experience" which is also that which covers "things" which are however they are regardless of one's experience or thoought). I think the onus is on Peirce (or rather the Peircean community) to demonstrate how radical the difference is in that one respect (real/beyond experience...) when Peirce flirts with it fairly explicitly. Best, Jack
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