Mike List I’m not sure if I’m ‘allowed’ to react to your post since I’ve done one post today - but thank you for your excellent example, which accurately outlines the difference between the External Object and the Dynamic Object and the build up of Knowledge resting within Thirdness - a Thirdness held within the collective life, by all ‘perceivers and interactors’.
Edwina > On Sep 16, 2025, at 11:54 AM, Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: > > List, > > In my opinion, Edwina keeps pointing to us on the list about the true nature > of Peirce's formulation of the triadic process in semiosis. Here is another > example. Humans can not see in the UV spectrum, but bees and butterflies do. > When we (humans) look at the External Object of certain flowers, the Dynamic > Object that we perceive lacks the UV clues seen by pollinators, which act > sometimes like runway lights guiding to the nectar sources (for many colorful > flowers). We know these UV markers are there because we have been able to > enhance our native perceptions with UV filters on cameras and such, so our > knowledge of the External Object is somewhat enhanced even though we can not > directly perceive these markers. In fact, there are other markers including > scents and pheromones that are also beyond our direct perception. What we > understand the flower to be (the Dynamic Object) can continually grow and > become more refined over time as we add additional sensors and indirect > knowledge, but we can never truly know the fulsome External Object. The > powerful insight of Peirce was that the nature of reality in all of its > aspects is a function of all perceivers and interactors, human or not, > individual or not, and it is the combination of all of these interpreters > that gets us closer to the full reality of external objects. > > It is a lesson of humility and says much about what we may each claim to be > the 'truth'. > > Best, Mike > > On 9/15/2025 9:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: >> List, Jerry,Jack, >> >> Again, I need to define terms.- the External Object and the Dynamic Object: >> >> The Dynamic Object is, in my understanding, the 2nd correlate of the >> Peircean triad [ DO-R-I] . The triadic process begins within the sign-unit >> or sign-vehicle which holds the Representamen or knowledge base of >> ‘mediation. The Representamen picks up data from the External Object which >> data then becomes known as the Dynamic Object. >> >> See Peirce’s well known outline of the weather 8.314, where he writes; >> >> “This is a sign, whose Object, as expressed is the weather at the that time, >> but whose dynamical Object is the impression which I have presumably derived >> from peeping between the window curtains. “ [Note; In this example, the sign >> unit or sign-vehicle is either Peirce or Mrs. Peirce and my emphasis points >> out the External Object ]. >> >> And “By the way, the dynamical object does not mean something out of the >> mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but including >> more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual experience” EPII, p >> 478 >> >> Note – the External Object is ‘the weather at the time’, while the DO is the >> 2nd correlate of the semiosic triad, the ‘impression of that External >> ‘weather at the time’. >> >> There” are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our >> opinions about them; those reals affect our senses according to regular >> laws, ….5.384. This is a definition of the External Object. >> >> Now- as to Ethics – I’m not sure how it fits in with my comparative outline >> of Thirdness as ’genuine’ [pure] or degenerate[ affiliated with Secondness >> and/or Firstness]. I would say only that Ethics is as pointed out in 5.34 is >> a ‘normative science’ that differentiates between good and bad- and, in >> particular, uses ” efforts of will’ – which obviously has to mean that it >> involves Secondness or indexicality. Or- one could conclude that analysis >> based on ethics is Thirdness-as-Secondness, because it considers the >> pragmatic effects of the semiosic interaction. >> >> >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >>> On Sep 15, 2025, at 2:56 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> >>> <mailto:[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Jack, Edwina, list, other people, >>> >>> Where do you stand with respect to the bold assertion by Peirce in CP 5.36? >>> >>> He seems to indicate that your problem is an old problem. >>> What is it you admire of Ethics? What is its secret (ART 57, or do I mean >>> ART 37)? >>> I mean, is esthetics only for imbeciles or the useless- merely a matter we >>> desire to forget? >>> >>> But we cannot get any clue to the secret of Ethics >>> -- a most entrancing field of thought but soon broadcast with pitfalls - >>> until we have first made up our formula for what it is that we are prepared >>> to admire. >>> I do not care what doctrine of ethics be embraced, it will always be so. >>> (CP 5.36). >>> >>> Best, >>> Jerry Rhee >>> >>> “It was this turn in which I thought the poets had preceded him, >>> for it had always been a puzzle to me how the principle of telling lies >>> like the truth, >>> upon which all of Greek poetry rests, could precede the telling of the >>> truth, >>> for it seemed obvious to me, as it had to Socrates, >>> that one cannot lie knowingly unless one knows the truth.” >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2025 at 1:26 PM Jack Cody <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> Edwina, List, >>>> >>>> ME: "I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an "ethical >>>> understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to ourselves and >>>> among each other, is the only practical constant that remains regardless >>>> of one's view of the universe or particular physical/metaphysical >>>> understanding. That's where I locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby >>>> ideal is not idealism but necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of >>>> the term." >>>> >>>> ----------------------------------- >>>> >>>> I'd like to press the above in the context of "dynamic object(s)". If one >>>> assumes "convergence" within Peirce's system, it seems evident to me that >>>> one has to pay the price, small or large, of the dynamic(al) object >>>> insofar as I understand that (almost as static, if not quite, or >>>> literally, static). >>>> >>>> Which leads to me to reject for the moment the idea of positivist >>>> knowledge with respect to things which may or may not be known, ever, and >>>> rather pragmatically relocate the debate within the most fundamental >>>> dialectic we have: "ethics". >>>> >>>> Though many books have been written on ethics, I do not believe a thousand >>>> years makes much of a difference (or an infinite period at that) with >>>> respect to the idea that "Murder is false/entirely wrong" (that harm >>>> inflicted, generally, is almost always, if not always, false/wrong). With >>>> that in mind, one must surely conclude that the Dynamic Object of that >>>> "moral judgement" is already "known" and is scarcely possible that we >>>> could know "why" any more in an infinite period than we already do? >>>> >>>> That is, we can argue catechism until the cows come home but we all surely >>>> know, innately (I sense arguments?), that these things are just "wrong". I >>>> see no value in infinite inquiry here —that is, no one is coming along >>>> with a "...and to murder was wrong because..." revelation which overrides >>>> basic innate moral instinct (or judgement) as we already have it. >>>> >>>> And thus, no matter what, I really do think ethics, as the most truthful >>>> way in which to treat one's self and lifeforms around one, is always >>>> "constant" —all ideas regarding the make-up of the universe or the atom >>>> (much the same?) do nothing to the idea (not really an idea, for surely >>>> this must emerge from pure firstness which, though technically "possible" >>>> in Peirce, may, in prohibition terms be said to be a "resource" which when >>>> required, one can draw on, and thus always actual and possible without >>>> contradiction) —do nothing to the idea that, practically, we already have >>>> a constant, which in global terms, we treat as if it scarcely existed >>>> (ETHICS). >>>> >>>> I've long since assumed that literalist versions of Plato's Cave aside, >>>> the only actual question in such situations, (an actually genuine >>>> "solution"), is ethics. It can be nothing else. And so, from >>>> firstness-soundness-thirdness, DO/Inf Inq, all to/through ethics. >>>> >>>> There is a better response in what I've said there —even the germs of a >>>> paper, but I wanted to make a brief contribution and I think a truthful >>>> one (I would like to hear people's opinions on the idea that truthful >>>> ethics is always universal, that is, not nominalist, and already, in so >>>> many respects, decided/determined, if not actualized —which is where one >>>> might cite "inquiry"? Though I maintain that 99% of all ethical principles >>>> one needs are basically innate and stem from the idea, never selfish, that >>>> none ought be able to do "one" harm ("learned" as a child...). We merely >>>> extend that to other people —though as a global society, despite everyone >>>> knowing these things, and knowing them insofar as they ever will, we seem >>>> rather crap at enforcing it consistently (we are antediluvian in this >>>> respect). >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Jack >>>> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on >>>> behalf of Jack Cody <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>> Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 6:21 PM >>>> To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Edwina Taborsky >>>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function >>>> >>>> Edwina, List, >>>> >>>> I think that post is very well done. Precise epistemological location and >>>> also a clearly articulated view of what thirdness is with respect to >>>> nominalism and realism, respectively. >>>> >>>> I'll have a think over that but I consider it a potentially very >>>> interesting start from which to hear other people's views. I think the >>>> descriptions/definitions are important as otherwise we're talking around >>>> each other. >>>> >>>> I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an "ethical >>>> understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to ourselves and >>>> among each other, is the only practical constant that remains regardless >>>> of one's view of the universe or particular physical/metaphysical >>>> understanding. That's where I locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby >>>> ideal is not idealism but necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of >>>> the term. >>>> >>>> Best >>>> Jack >>>> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on >>>> behalf of Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>> Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 3:33 PM >>>> To: Gary Richmond <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>> Cc: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; >>>> edwina taborsky <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function >>>> >>>> Thirdness and its Function >>>> >>>> 1] I think a discussion of whether or not someone is a ‘nominalist’ vs a >>>> ‘scholastic realist’ can be empty – particularly when neither term is >>>> defined. >>>> >>>> 2] I think the nature of and role of Thirdness is vital – and ask whether >>>> or not it can appear in either nominalism or scholastic realism or in >>>> both? First – a brief definition. >>>> >>>> Nominalism, in my view refers to a belief that generals or universals >>>> [Thirdness] are concepts created by man and only individual entities >>>> ‘exist’. Scholastic realism refers to the view that generals or >>>> universals, understood as the rule of law governing individual >>>> instantiations of these laws -are real in themselves and not creations of >>>> man. >>>> >>>> 3] I don’t think either view can be removed from its societal connections >>>> and implications. The scholastic realism view fits into a societal view >>>> where the laws of life, so to speak, are predetermined [ by god?] and >>>> fixed; they can’t be changed by man’s whim. The nominalist view arose >>>> twice, in the 13th c and in the 18th c – when the rise of individual >>>> freedom of thought emerged, and the individual was seen as capable of not >>>> merely acceptance but of generating new laws, new rules. These are >>>> monumentally different world views and have of course, social and >>>> political implications. >>>> >>>> 4] Thirdness according to Peirce is, as developed by Nature, “ a mode of >>>> being which consists in the Secondness that it determines” 1903. 1.536. >>>> And “Thirdness cannot be understood without Secondness.” 1904. 8.331. >>>> Thirdness mediates between input and output, between “the causal act and >>>> the effect’ 1894.1.328 and Thirdness emerges ‘in nature’ 1887 1.366. – >>>> creating an ‘intelligible law. >>>> >>>> Obviously these definitions of Thirdness are aspects of scholastic realism >>>> not nominalism – but it is important to note both ultimate agency – Nature >>>> vs god and correlations. >>>> >>>> 4] I note – and I think this is vital - Peirce emphasizes the role of >>>> Secondness in actualizing Thirdness, ie, Thirdness does not function >>>> alone but as correlated with Secondness and Firstness enabling it to >>>> existentially function as that rule of law, to function as a predictive >>>> force of morphological formation. Where, Thirdness in the ‘first degree of >>>> degeneracy’ 1903. 5.70, in ‘irrational plurality, where the rule of law >>>> enables multiple individuals all aspects of that rule of law”… >>>> >>>> The key connective triadic sign is the Symbolic Indexical, [Thirdness as >>>> Secondness] which has been recently discussed and is one of the key Signs >>>> in Peircean semiosis. >>>> >>>> 5] I note that this insistence on the indexical actuality of Thridness >>>> moves Peirce into an analysis where these rules can change! Because of >>>> that connection with Secondness! These changing rules are not as concepts >>>> articulated by man but, in themselves. This is not nominalism but moves >>>> into the self-organized realm of CAS [ complex adaptive systems] which are >>>> a later development in the scientific world – and is most certainly a >>>> concept rejected by those who subscribed to the invincibility of these >>>> rules - ie- that Secondness or actuality had no effect on them. . >>>> >>>> Most certainly Peirce rejected predetermined Thirdness, with his support >>>> of the ‘symbols grow’ ; the fact that Thirdness rules evolve, adapt and >>>> change – due both to chance [ Firstness] Tychasm] and Agapasm or a feeling >>>> of connectness to the data. >>>> >>>> But he also rejected the vagaries of nominalism which sees a world without >>>> the realities of non-human Thirdness, ie, without the reality of rules and >>>> laws which are objectively real and not ‘figments of the mind’. >>>> Nominalism can move into pure idealism, where the rules can be considered >>>> human ideas - and these can lead to totalitarianism. >>>> >>>> 6] If we continue with the societal context – we can then ask – why does >>>> one or the other theory become dominant? The theory of nominalism, which >>>> empowers man to make-and-change-the rules of life; vs the theory of >>>> realism which inserts a non-human agency as the source of the laws >>>> {Nature,god]. And – furthermore – an additional concept that these laws >>>> are immutable and cannot change or be changed vs that the laws can >>>> self-organize and change. I think these are two basic mindsets which will >>>> always be with us – and we cannot ignore the societal modes in which they >>>> operate. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]> . >>>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>?subject=SIG%20peirce-l">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >>>> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >>>> email account, then go to >>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]> . >>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l"; >>> <mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l>>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >>> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >>> email account, then go to >>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >> >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l"; >> <mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l>>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > -- > __________________________________________ > > Michael K. Bergman > 319.621.5225 > http://mkbergman.com <http://mkbergman.com/> > http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __________________________________________ > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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