Jack, List: I am replying in the separate thread that I started yesterday because what we are actually discussing here again fits better under this subject line vs. the other one.
It is a common and understandable mistake to conflate what Peirce calls "esthetics" with the more familiar notion of "aesthetics." The former is the first of the three *normative *sciences, supplying principles to both ethics and logic. It is the study of the *intrinsically admirable*, not artistic evaluation that often boils down to subjective taste. "In short, ethics must rest upon a doctrine which without at all considering what our conduct is to be, divides ideally possible states of things into two classes, those that would be admirable and those that would be unadmirable, and undertakes to define precisely what it is that constitutes the admirableness of an ideal. Its problem is to determine by analysis what it is that one ought deliberately to admire *per se* in itself regardless of what it may lead to and regardless of its bearings upon human conduct. I call that inquiry *Esthetics*" (CP 5.36, EP 2:142, 1903). "Esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior reason. ... Ethics, or the science of right and wrong, must appeal to esthetics for aid in determining the *summum bonum*" (CP 1.191, EP 2:260, 1903). Accordingly, referring to "the immediate *feeling *that something is right or wrong" and "that truthful ethical *feeling*" puts you in the realm of esthetics rather than ethics or logic. Put simply, esthetics, ethics, and logic respectively have to do with feeling, action, and thought as manifestations of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. "For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200, 1903). In that sense, "the 1ns of ethics" (and logic) *just is* esthetics. Ethics seeks to answer the question, "What is the right thing to do?" However, we must first establish what *makes *something the right thing to do so that we can *also *answer the question, "*Why *is that the right thing to do?" From a Peircean standpoint, the examples that you mention below were "ethical wins" *because *they were consistent with the *summum bonum*, which esthetics identifies as the growth of concrete reasonableness. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Sep 16, 2025 at 2:11 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry, Edwina, List, > Jerry, > Jon brought this up subsequently in a slightly different thread—and I > intend to reply there also—but one must, I think, note that the most > significant ethical wins in human history have been blind to aesthetics (in > the literal sense) altogether: emancipation (race-based slavery) and, well, > emancipation (gender-based slavery [of a kind]). > To disregard form entirely vis-à-vis ethnicity/race and gender/sexuality > (I mean women’s emancipation and also the various civil rights movements to > end segregation—not just in the US) and to see/recognize simply the *human > being*… this is not an aesthetic? > The “content of one’s [human] character”—rather important. It is the same, > in rhetoric, as “all are created/born equal.” What I am pointing to is that > I do not see an aesthetical value to these movements insofar as one would > equate the traits, physical, with the ideal, non-physical. Indeed, the > entire point of those movements is to ignore such traits insofar as they > would otherwise render one equal or inferior. > What is there to admire? It is the right thing to do. It is obviously > “true.” But it is not a painting whose form I can study and admire for > years, cultivating it as if it were a commodity with its own special > language—though, at a different “level,” such movements certainly do have > their own special language. > And more broadly: what is there to discuss, if not ethics? I mean this > seriously. If you remove ethics from economic theory, you essentially have > no economics—despite economists over the centuries not always agreeing on > how to implement policies with respect to macro-goals (ideals which stand > as macro to technical/literal macroeconomics). > Is it secretive? I’m not sure. The “ethics” I mean is the one which > everyone acts with all the time—though not everyone has ever read a book > about it. A bit like the capacity to speak language without having to be a > linguist (and some would say that is preferable—not sure if the metaphor > fully carries here). > Whilst JAS in a different post—which needs a different reply—noted that > there are certain things we already know and do not need infinite inquiry > for, I maintain that the only truths we could know already and not require > infinite inquiry for are ethical truths. As I write this, we are within > some modality of thirdness (with indexicality of various kinds, and thus > secondness too), but what interests me is the *firstness* of ethics. > That is, such—ethical behavior, or the immediate feeling that something is > right or wrong—is clearly *a priori* with respect to its codification in > texts like these. And given certain empirical measures of testing, > including things like polls over time (the only test for ethics other than > some novel methods), I am interested in identifying that verified “truth” > which I am pointing/indexing toward here, and which is universal, as being > very much *a priori* with respect to my pointing. > Ethical truth merely enters the “register/langue” as some variety of > secondness/thirdness (no doubt). But surely it must precede these—because > when I feel a sensation of offense at an unethical act, the spoken or > written account of it is not the same as what I have felt. That sensation > is a mode of *firstness*, irreducible to the symbolic, and can only be > acting upon a genuinely truthful “resource” common to all people. This very > much interests me. > Thus, I ask if aesthetic is right when we consider that truthful ethical > feeling/sensation (tone/etc) is not really formal at all? And when the > truthful/ethical/moral thing to do, has, quite literally, been to > "disregard form" (as differentiation qua equality..). Thus, a sense of > injustice against one's own self or others, or both, is rather often > aroused in the world we live in, and given we need ethical progress, I do > not doubt that much of that feeling is "truthful" (micro to macro). > Therefore, it is the firstness of ethics, which intrigues me with respect > to Peirce. This is half-baked, I admit, but I think you can see there is > something there? (Maybe not). > Best, > Jack >
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