Helmut, Jon, List, Peirce offers this definition of 'trichotomic' in an unpublished three page type-script written just after "A Guess at the Riddle" in early 1888 (EP1: 280-284). Nathan Houser suggests that it was written "probably for oral presentation."
TRICHOTOMIC is the art of making three-fold divisions. Such division depends on the conceptions of 1st, 2nd, 3rd [that is, 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, something which becomes obvious in the next three sentences GR]. First is the beginning, that which is fresh, original, spontaneous, free. Second is that which is determined, terminated, ended, correlative, object, necessitate, reading. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, bringing about. EP1: 280 But this is looking at each category separately and abstractly in terms of its individual 'character' or 'mode of being'. Once the three categories are involved in semiosis their co-relations take on a* vital character *(as Peirce elsewhere explains). Each category is not only a mode of being but also a way of relating or being related. To speak of *correlates* is to say that each category implies or involves a corresponding kind of relational structure. So, in semeiotics, and as Jon wrote: "they are *in *a genuine triadic relation with the sign, which *involves *their respective dyadic relations but is not reducible to them." Perhaps it would be helpful to look at semiosis in light of the vector of determination where 2ns determines 1ns which in turn determines 3ns (in Peirce logical sense of 'is constrained by',* not* 'determined by efficient causation'). So, the object determines the sign which determines the interpretant, that is, the sign's meaning. I think it was Tom Short who very helpfully said that the object gives the sign its* aboutness*, and the sign gives the interpretant sign its *meaning*. Compare this with Time which follows the same vector: the past determines the present which in turn determines the future (again 'determines' should not be interpreted as efficient causation). Now it is possible to prescind a tripartite moment from the flow of time. But, firstly, prescision is but a kind of abstraction and, secondly, lived time is not experienced as three discrete instants (the instant being but a mathematical abstraction according to Peirce). Nonetheless, we do have a vital sense of the recent past and an anticipation of the future. As with Time, we can prescind some discrete object -> sign -> interpretent from the semiosic flow for some analytical purpose just as we can prescind some single moment from the ongoing flow of time. But that again would only be for the purpose of a discrete analysis. For just as the present melds into the future, so does the sign meld into its interpretant sign (and the semiosis *continues* in much the same way as the flow of time does). Best, Gary R On Mon, Oct 20, 2025 at 1:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, List: > > A correlate cannot *be *a relation, a correlate is *in *a relation. A > dyadic relation has two correlates, while a triadic relation has three > correlates and *involves *three dyadic relations between the different > pairs of those three correlates; a *genuine *triadic relation is not > *reducible > *to those three dyadic relations. For the genuine triadic relation of > representing or (more generally) mediating, there is no *separate *trichotomy > for the *object's *dyadic relation with the interpretant, since it is > always the same as the *sign's *dyadic relation with the interpretant. > The interpretant itself is thus a correlate, not a relation--it *is *the > meaning of the sign, not "a relation of a sign and a meaning"--and again, > the sign's relation with its interpretant is dyadic, not triadic. > > Phaneroscopic analysis of the *genuine *triadic relation of > representing/mediating reveals that every one sign has two objects and > three interpretants, for a total of six correlates. Its *genuine *correlates > are the sign itself, its dynamical object, and its final interpretant--what > Peirce simply calls the sign, its object, and its interpretant in 1903. In > addition, a dynamical interpretant is any *actual *effect of a sign *token > *in an individual *event *of semiosis, so there is a separate trichotomy > for that *external *dyadic relation; however, there is no separate > trichotomy for the *degenerate *triadic relation of the sign token with > its dynamical object and dynamical interpretant, since it is *reducible *to > the dyadic relations that it involves. The immediate object and immediate > interpretant are both *internal *to the sign, which is why there are no > separate trichotomies for their *degenerate *dyadic relations. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Mon, Oct 20, 2025 at 10:15 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> thank you for clarifying "trichotomy". So "S-O-I" is not one (it is >> compositional). My other point was: I think, regarding e.g. the >> interpretant for a correlate is not prescinding it from its >> relation-nature, because a correlate can be a relation. I think (right? >> false?) that the interpretant is a relation of a sign and a meaning, and >> the relation is, that it is the sign´s meaning. The relation between the >> interpretant and the sign is a triadic relation (sign, sign, meaning), that >> equals the dyad (sign, meaning), which again is the interpretant. But I >> dont know. if this is mathematically correct: (A,A,B) = (A,B)? When I have >> a relation with another man, which is the fact, that I owe him ten dollars, >> then the relation between me and this fact is again the fact, that I owe >> him ten dollars. >> >> Best, Helmut >> 19. Oktober 2025 um 02:50 >> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> >> *wrote:* >> Helmut, List: >> >> I will answer your second question first, then come back to your first >> question. >> >> >> HR: What is a trichotomy? Is it both about specification/classification, >> and composition? >> >> >> In Peirce's semeiotic, a trichotomy is for classification, not >> composition. As used for classifying signs, it is a division according to >> whether a specific correlate or relation falls under the category of >> 1ns/2ns/3ns (1903) or belongs in the corresponding 1st/2nd/3rd universe >> whose constituents are possibles/existents/necessitants (1908). >> >> >> HR: why is there so much emphasis put on the distinction between a >> correlate (object, interpretant) and the relation between the sign and each >> of both? >> >> >> Because when classifying signs, there are *different *trichotomies for >> the correlates and their relations. A sign is a qualisign/sinsign/legisign >> (later tone/token/type) according to the mode of apprehension of the sign >> itself (S). It is an abstractive/concretive/collective according to the >> mode of being of the dynamical object *itself* (Od), but an >> icon/index/symbol according to its dyadic *relation *with its dynamical >> object (Od-S). It is a gratific/actuous/temperative according to the >> purpose of the final interpretant *itself* (If), but a >> rheme/dicisign/argument (later seme/pheme/delome) according to its dyadic >> *relation* with its final interpretant (S-If). When arranging the >> trichotomies in the proper logical order, Peirce places the Od-S trichotomy >> *after >> *the S trichotomy (1903), but the Od trichotomy *before* the S >> trichotomy (1908). He also places the S-If trichotomy after the Od-S >> trichotomy (1903), and the If trichotomy after the S trichotomy (1908). >> >> >> HR: I think, the object and the interpretant are already relations with >> the sign: The object (at least the immediate, but I think, both parts) >> doesn't exist, if it isn't denoted by, and determines the sign. The >> interpretant is already determined by the sign, and without an anticipated >> interpretant, the sign would not exist. >> >> >> The object and interpretant are correlates, not relations; they are *in *a >> genuine triadic relation with the sign, which *involves *their >> respective dyadic relations but is not reducible to them. As I have said >> many times before, I understand semiosis to be a *continuous *process; >> so when we pick out any *individual *sign, we are *prescinding *it from >> that flow, and we must also then identify *its *object and *its >> *interpretant. >> In that sense, you are correct that something does not *serve *as a >> dynamical object apart from the signs that it determines. Moreover, a sign >> might not have any *actual *(dynamical) interpretants, but it always has >> *possible >> *(immediate) and *ideal *(final) interpretants. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sat, Oct 18, 2025 at 2:47 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jon, Robert, List, >>> >>> I have two questions, the first is, why is there so much emphasis put on >>> the distinction between a correlate (object, interpretant) and the relation >>> between the sign and each of both? I think, the object and the interpretant >>> are already relations with the sign: The object (at least the immediate, >>> but I think, both parts) doesn´t exist, if it isn´t denoted by, and >>> determines the sign. The interpretant is already determined by the sign, >>> and without an anticipated interpretant, the sign would not exist. This >>> could be explained this more explicitly, by mentioning the two parts of the >>> object, and the three of the interpretant, but my point works anyway >>> already so, I think. >>> My second question is: What is a trichotomy? Is it both about >>> specification/classification, and composition? From the word root (to cut >>> something into three pieces) I would say, it only is about composition, >>> e.g. for sign, object, interpretant. But not for classification, like >>> rheme, dicent, argument. Because there it is not about parts of something, >>> but about "either-or" classes. "Either-or" means, these items already are >>> apart, you cannot cut something into three pieces here. Ok, you can do this >>> with your mind, but then you don´t cut the real -or imagined- thing apart, >>> not even prescindingly, but virtually e.g. a sheet of paper, on which >>> classes are written. Then you have a trichotomy of paper, but not of the >>> interpretant (aka(?) its relation with the sign). >>> >>> Best, Helmut >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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