Gary R., List:

I appreciate and agree with your additional comments in both posts today.
Summarizing my own understanding ...

   - We *prescind *each sign with *its *object and *its *interpretant from
   the real and continuous process of semiosis, such that these are artifacts
   of analysis.
   - According to Peirce, any *genuine *triadic relation *is not* reducible
   to the three dyadic relations that it involves, while any
*degenerate *triadic
   relation *is *so reducible.
   - The trichotomy for the sign's dyadic relation with its interpretant in
   Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is identical to the one for the sign's dyadic
   relation with its *final *interpretant in his later taxonomies.
   - The final interpretant is the *ideal *effect of the sign (would-be,
   genuine 3ns), while a dynamical interpretant is any *actual *effect of
   the sign (2ns of 3ns), and the immediate interpretant is its range of
   *possible *effects (may-be, 1ns of 3ns).
   - The final interpretant is "final" in the sense of a final cause (
   *telos*), not the temporally last member of a series; we aim to *conform
   *all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants,
   which is why logic as semeiotic is a *normative *science.
   - Any *individual* event of semiosis consists in an individual dynamical
   object determining an individual sign *token *to determine an individual
   *dynamical *interpretant, and these are the three correlates of a
   *degenerate *triadic relation.
   - Such events are *governed *(not deterministically dictated) by the
   *genuine *triadic relation whose three correlates are the sign itself
   (not any one instance thereof), its dynamical object, and its *final *
   interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 20, 2025 at 3:03 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Helmut, Jon, List,
>
> Peirce offers this definition of 'trichotomic' in an unpublished three
> page type-script written just after "A Guess at the Riddle" in early 1888
> (EP1: 280-284). Nathan Houser suggests that it was written "probably for
> oral presentation."
>
> TRICHOTOMIC is the art of making three-fold divisions. Such division
> depends on the conceptions of 1st, 2nd, 3rd [that is, 1ns, 2ns, 3ns,
> something which becomes obvious in the next three sentences GR]. First is
> the beginning, that which is fresh, original, spontaneous, free. Second is
> that which is determined, terminated, ended, correlative, object,
> necessitate, reading. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, bringing
> about. EP1: 280
>
>
> But this is looking at each category separately and abstractly in terms of
> its individual 'character' or 'mode of being'. Once the three categories
> are involved in semiosis their co-relations take on a* vital character *(as
> Peirce elsewhere explains).
>
> Each category is not only a mode of being but also a way of relating or
> being related. To speak of *correlates* is to say that each category
> implies or involves a corresponding kind of relational structure. So, in
> semeiotics, and as Jon wrote: "they are *in *a genuine triadic relation
> with the sign, which *involves *their respective dyadic relations but is
> not reducible to them."
>
> Perhaps it would be helpful to look at semiosis in light of the vector of
> determination where 2ns determines 1ns which in turn determines 3ns (in
> Peirce logical sense of 'is constrained by',* not* 'determined by
> efficient causation'). So, the object determines the sign which determines
> the interpretant, that is, the sign's meaning. I think it was Tom Short who
> very helpfully said that the object gives the sign its* aboutness*, and
> the sign gives the interpretant sign its *meaning*.
>
> Compare this with Time which follows the same vector: the past determines
> the present which in turn determines the future (again 'determines' should
> not be interpreted as efficient causation). Now it is possible to prescind
> a tripartite moment from the flow of time. But, firstly, prescision is but
> a kind of abstraction and, secondly, lived time is not experienced as three
> discrete instants (the instant being but a mathematical abstraction
> according to Peirce). Nonetheless, we do have a vital sense of the recent
> past and an anticipation of the future.
>
> As with Time, we can prescind some discrete object -> sign ->
> interpretent from the semiosic flow for some analytical purpose just as we
> can prescind some single moment from the ongoing flow of time. But that
> again would only be for the purpose of a discrete analysis. For just as the
> present melds into the future, so does the sign meld into its interpretant
> sign (and the semiosis *continues* in much the same way as the flow of
> time does).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
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