Right. We can conceive of a rhematic iconic sinsign without conceiving of it being a replica/token of a legisign. And yet, a rhematic iconic sinsign could still be a token of a legisign. For example a sensory experience of redness could be an icon conceived without relation to a legisign or law. But we can also understand red as a manifestation of laws governing the electromagnetic spectrum (or regularities governing human perception).
So even if it is quite clear only certain signs have replicas, it is not clear that certain sinsigns don’t have conceivable “types” or legisigns. Pure random chaos might be a candidate … but even that is an instance of the type “chaos” which has general characteristics that distinguish it from other things and thus is a token of a type. Even some things we might have once assumed were noise, such as cosmic background radiation, turn out to be important indices of larger processes (ie of the big bang). I don’t know this means every possible sign token can be mapped to at least one sign type but it does suggest we can work with the hypothesis that a sinsign is a replica of some conceivable legisign. On Fri, 7 Nov 2025 at 3:37 pm, Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Robert, List > > Robert, having read your work presented by you in the last post, I note > that you deductively demonstrate that there are only six classes of signs > to which the notion of token corresponds at all. > > Am I right, then, in assuming that the answer to JAS's general question > is, as I suspect, "no"? That is, not all is an instance of token/type > correspondence but rather there is a delimitation? > > Cheers, > > Jack > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of robert marty <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, November 7, 2025 7:50 AM > *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign Tokens and Sign Types (was Peirce's > Categorial Involution, and Contemporary Peirce Scholarship) > > List, > > A few years ago, I posted a short note online that accurately addresses > this issue. > https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens > > Regards, > Robert Marty > > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* > > > > Le ven. 7 nov. 2025 à 02:10, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > a écrit : > > Gary R., List: > > I changed the subject line to reflect the narrower focus of this > discussion. > > I agree with you and those other scholars that even a "first-time" sign > token is an instance of a sign type because its (definitely significant) > *form *is capable of repetition in subsequent sign tokens, and the same > is true of natural signs. In fact, anything that we can describe using > words, which as sign tokens are *always * instances of sign types, must > likewise be either a general itself or an instantiation of a general. Only > an* entirely unique* sign token would *not *be an instance of a sign > type--something brute, unrepeatable, and indescribable; pure 2ns, with no > 3ns whatsoever, which of course is impossible for anything involved in > semiosis. > > In a communicational context, there can be a disconnect between the > intention of the utterer, which pertains to the object of the sign, and the > understanding of the interpreter, which pertains to its interpretant. Put > simply, the utterer can be *unsuccessful *in conveying his/her intention > in the sign's *immediate *interpretant, resulting in an unexpected *dynamical > *interpretant; everyone has experienced this. In your example, the sender > wanted to utter an instance of the sign whose type in English is "hide," > but the receiver interpreted it as an instance of the sign whose type in > English is "run." Did the receiver misinterpret, or did the sender misspeak > (using his/her hands)? > > Who can say, since there was no pre-established *definition* of that > particular gesture, corresponding to its immediate interpretant? Although > like every sign token, it was an instance of a sign type, that type had not > yet been associated by *both *parties with any sign *in itself*, such > that it was capable of being translated into "hide," "run," or some other > English word. The sender presumably *thought* something equivalent to > "hide," which he/she translated into a certain hand signal; but when the > interpreter saw it, he/she instead *thought *something equivalent to > "run." > > I do not know how to answer your concluding question, "how wide should we > consider 'type' and 'law' to be in Peirce's semiotic?" What does "wide" > mean in this context? By contrast, what would "narrow" mean? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2025 at 8:14 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jon, List, > > Is it possible that any of these -- a unique (first time) hand signal, or > a lightning flash, or a hiccup -- is an example of a token that is not an > instance of a type? > > Some Peirce scholars, including Joe Ransdell (but also Short, Liszka, and > Parker), wondered about 'first-time' or 'natural' signs that at "first > blush" (as Joe would say) look type-less. But, as I recall, these scholars, > each and all, concluded that such (e.g., 'natural signs') function under > *some* generality: a natural law, a habit, or an 'interpretive > generalization', even if that interpretation were formed on the spot (and > even, say, if that first time unique hand signal were misinterpreted to > mean 'run' when the signaler meant 'hide'.) > > So my own answer to the question would be that there really isn't a > sign-token that isn’t, in some way, an instance of a type. > > But then another question arises: how wide should we consider 'type' and > 'law' to be in Peirce's semiotic? > > Best, > > Gary R > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
