I think the important point that Edwina raises is that Peirce’s flavor or realism is much more evolutionary than platonic realism. If, in line with tychism and synechism, there is a continuity between singular/chance-driven events and laws or that “matter is effete mind”, then the line between tokens and types is not absolute.
While I am not convinced that a chemist discovering a fact is an example of a token without a type, it is worth considering in more detail. I understand this to be a case where the chemist discovers an instance of a general physical law. In this case, it is a sinsign instance of a legisign. However, the novel formulation of the fact (in symbolic language) as no longer a mere fact but as evidence of a law by the scientific community is an interesting case in itself, especially because the discovery may only partially illuminate the underlying physical tendency. Thus, the *codification* of a law in human language, while also being a legsign, is different than the underlying chemical law. Through a scientific community, the content of the symbol might grow to approximate the underlying tendency more completely. This complicates the relationship between “token” and “type” because the fact is an instance of two different but related types— one that is “real” and one that “exists” (and evolves) to approximate the real. While it was always an instance of the former in real sense, it could not have always been an instance of the latter, as that type didn’t exist yet. This is further complicated by Pierce’s hypothesis of an evolutionary universe. If the laws of the universe evolve, does this suggest that at some level of analysis physical “laws” themselves can be in a causal relationship with one another? Do laws compete and adapt like species? For example can universal constants like gravity or the speed of light be different and, if not, is their stability/time symmetry a purely mathematically deduced outcome of an absolute principle, or is it the outcome of some evolutionary process that weeded out less stable possibilities? I think Peirce would entertain the latter or find a continuity between both positions. Given this, I think the question of whether a physical law is a “sinsign” or a “legisign” is less black and white, or at least not fully predetermined by apriori principles. While a physical law’s dominant character is that of a law or thirdness, the law at one moment in its evolutionary history might still be in a causal relationship with other laws and thus exhibit some characteristics of secondness. This does not answer JAS question directly, but it points to the possibility that types themselves might evolve, the there might be moments between when the type is fully formed and when instances don’t have a proper type. For example in speciation, the proto members of a species are between two species. Or in a machine learning algorithm, the first elements are sorted randomly and their membership to a group emerges through the classification process. Especially in bad or unscientific classifications, some things (or noise) might be forced to be a member of a type despite not being a member of a “real” type and in these cases, before the spurious type is fully developed as used as a classification system, you could have instances that are non members of that “type”. Of course this begs the question of what are real vs spurious types, and even if some things don’t belong to certain types they may still belong to others. On Thu, 13 Nov 2025 at 8:49 pm, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Robert, Jon, all, > > I didn't know what you meant by "singular token" before. You mean a > typeless token. I hadn't been following the thread. Also, Robert, I can't > get the peirce-l server to re-send your post to me, which i had not > received in the first place. So I include it below in case anybody else > hasn't received it. Removing unnecessary HTML markup seemed to help last > time - not a single bounce of my previous post. > > Peirce called himself a Scholastic Realist of an extreme stripe. I don't > know why he would bar an undiscovered type, an unknown type, if it were a > type about which any investigator _would_ agree upon sufficient > investigation. Unknown does not equate to unknowable. I also worry about > the idea of sinsigns that are not tokens. My system-building instinct > would be then seek out qualisigns that are not tones, and legisigns that > are not types, if there are any such. > > Best, Ben > > * *From*: robert marty <robert.marty98 AT gmail.com> > * *To*: peirce-l AT list.iu.edu, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschmidt AT > gmail.com> > * *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign Tokens and Sign Types (was Peirce's > Categorial Involution, and Contemporary Peirce Scholarship) > * *Date*: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 18:46:26 +0100 > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Jon, List, > > JAS: "there are no singular tokens, i.e., there no singular sinsigns." > > JAS:"there are no singular tokens", > > YES! It's a tautology, since it's a token, it's a replica of a type. > > Do we agree on that after all ? > > JAS: "i.e., there no singular sinsigns" > > NO ! > > Peirce: CP 2.254: First: A Qualisign …is any quality … a quality can only > denote *an* > > * Object* .. > > CP 2.255: Second: An Iconic Sinsign [*/e.g., /*an individual > diagram]… it determine the idea of *an object* … > > CP 2.256: Third: A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign …it directs > attention to *an Object* … > > CP 2.257: Fourth: A Dicent Sinsign … affords information > concerning *its Objec*t … *The only information it can afford is of actual > fact *… > > CP 2.265: In the course of the above descriptions of the > classes, certain subdivisions of some of them have been directly or > indirectly referred to. Namely, beside the *normal varieties of Sinsigns*, > Indices, and Dicisigns, there are others which are *Replicas of Legisigns*, > Symbols, and Arguments, *respectively.* > > RM: That is to say, among the *normal varieties* *of Sinsigns* there are > *replicas* *of Legisigns*; among *the normal varieties* *of Indices* there > are *replicas* *of Symbols*; among *the normal varieties of Dicisigns* > there are *replicas of* *Arguments* … > > Conclusion:*the normal varieties of Sinsigns that are not replicas of > Legisigns are singular signs that are not tokens.* > > *Example by Peirce*: by CP 2.255 an *individual diagram*, is an Iconic > Sinsign and by CP 2.258, a diagram, *apart from its factual individuality* > is any general law *or type* named Iconic Legisign … In other words, an > individual diagram retains its singularity until an expert identifies it as > a token of a type, which can take a very long time (this was the case for > DNA). How many diagrams drawn by bricoleurs in their articles will retain > this status forever ? Indeed: > > /It was necessary for me to determine what I should call *one science*. > For this purpose I have united under one science studies such as the same > man, in the present state of science, might very well pursue. I have been > guided in determining this by noting how scientists associate themselves > into societies, and what contributions are commonly admitted into one > journal: being on my guard against the survival of traditions from bygone > states of science. /(NEM IV: 15, 1902, List of Proposed Memoirs on Logic, > N^o . 1. /On the Classification of the Theoretic Sciences of Research/) > > *QED* > > Do we agree on that after all ? > > Regards, > > Robert Marty > > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
