Ulysses, Gary R., Robert, List: I did not receive the post from Ulysses, but I noticed it in the online archive and have included it below (at the bottom) in case others likewise did not receive it.
UP: If, in line with tychism and synechism, there is a continuity between singular/chance-driven events and laws or that “matter is effete mind”, then the line between tokens and types is not absolute. As I see it, the relationship between any individual sinsign/token and the general legisign/type of which it is a replica/instance is the same as that between any discrete thing and the continuum of which it is an instantiation (synechism). *Which* of the infinite potentialities within that continuum are actualized is where chance/spontaneity plays a role (tychism). After all, nothing can become *actual* without first being a *real* possibility, i.e., a potentiality. This is consistent with my longstanding metaphysical hypothesis that the constitution of being is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns), and that the sequence of events in each case of the latter is spontaneity (1ns) followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking (3ns). UP: Thus, the *codification* of a law in human language, while also being a legsign, is different than the underlying chemical law. I agree, since linguistic types are arbitrary human inventions, while natural types are *real*--independent of whether or what anyone thinks about them. This is why I maintain that there can be (and often are) different linguistic types of the same real sign, such as "man" in English and "homme" in French; they have the same dynamical object, which is likewise a real general. RM: I say, like Peirce, that there are signs that are not tokens, which also implies a type simply because we write "token." There are indeed signs that are not tokens, namely, tones and types. However, "token" *does not* imply a type, only "instance" implies a type. Please carefully reread Peirce's definitions in CP 4.537, which I quoted in full Thursday evening, prompting Gary to agree with me after all. As far as I know, it is the *only *place where he uses the now-colloquial expression, "Token of a Type," and he does so specifically to define the term "instance" as his replacement for "replica." RM: So when apples fell, for example, in the Middle Ages, each falling apple was a sign without type, which was not a token, and I don't understand how anyone can deny that. Anyone who affirms scholastic realism, as Peirce emphatically did, *must *deny that. A falling apple was *always *an instance of a *real *(natural) type, even when no humans were around to observe it--this did not and still does not depend on whether or what anyone thinks about it. On the other hand, the verbal *description *of it is obviously a linguistic type, of which no instances existed until humans invented and uttered certain specific words. Nevertheless, the sign *itself* that is embodied in the instances of any such linguistic type, in any *possible *language or other sign system, is *real*--it never did and never will depend on whether or what anyone thinks about it. RM: Therefore, before being taken up by sociologists (or ethnologists), before any abduction concerning them has been formulated, these facts are sinsigns without type. According to Peirce, "What we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself" (NEM 4:239, EP 2:304, 1901). "There is but one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). "By a proposition, as something which can be repeated over and over again, translated into another language, embodied in a logical graph or algebraical formula, and still be one and the same proposition, we do not mean any existing individual object but a type, a general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" (CP 8.313, 1905 Jan 22). Taking these three passages together, any purportedly individual fact is *prescinded *from the totality of reality; and because it has the *structure *of a proposition, it can be *represented *by a proposition, which is a real type--a *general *sign whose dynamical object is likewise general. That proposition is *true *even if no one ever *actually *formulates it as a token, an instance of the type, expressed in some humanly devised language or other sign system such as Existential Graphs--an *individual *sign whose dynamical object is either the general object of the type or an individual instantiation of that general object. RM: JAS finally admitted the possibility of signs that are not replicas of legisigns, but this was to say that they could not exist, opposing his authority to that of Peirce on the question of the diagram. I have never denied the *possibility *of such signs, which is implicit in Peirce's terminology--we can (at least theoretically) distinguish replicas/instances of legisigns/types from other sinsigns/tokens (if there are any). However, he *never *identifies a diagram as a sinsign/token that is *not *a replica/instance of a legisign/type; on the contrary, he *explicitly *mentions a diagram as a sign whose *every *embodiment "is one and the same representamen" (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903)--again, every *individual *diagram as a sinsign/token is a replica/instance of a *general *legisign/type. Once more, I feel the need to quote the relevant portion of that passage in full. CSP: The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented. The last sentence effectively confirms my position that there are no *singular* sinsigns/tokens, because anything that was "a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition," would not be a *sign *at all. RM: But I note that he did not comment on the DNA case. Not specifically, because my response to it is no different from what I already said about chemistry and the entire scientific enterprise. RM: It would be a considerable task to critique his remarks, which I once again feel are an attempt at information saturation. So, I won't be doing that, even if he cries scandal. As always, I am ultimately content to let everyone reading along evaluate the presented evidence and arguments for themselves, as well as the cited and quoted texts by Peirce, and then draw their own conclusions. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Nov 14, 2025 at 5:54 AM robert marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, Ben, Jon, List, > > I am, of course, in complete agreement with Gary, who provides good > examples borrowed from Peirce. > > No, Ben, that's not it at all! It's the opposite! I say, like Peirce, that > there are signs that are not tokens, which also implies a type simply > because we write "token." So you don't have to worry about signs that > aren't tokens; scientific discovery proves it. However, as Peirce does, a > distinction must be made between the Physical Sciences and the Psychic > Sciences. > > Here is what Gemini has to say about it (I agree 100%). I use AI because > it provides me with a high-quality answer in a matter of seconds, which I > need to check. It saves me valuable time. Of course, this must be made very > clear to the reader. > > *Start of quote*: The formulation of the laws of physics is an act of > construction based on the discovery of regularity in nature. > > 1. *Discovery (Observation/Experiment):* The scientific > community observes regularities (for example, apples always fall). > > 2. *Construction (Modeling/Formalization):* It then develops > a theoretical model and a mathematical language (F = m g ) to describe, > generalize, and predict these regularities. This process is subject to > strict epistemological criteria (refutability, consistency, universality). > > 3. *Validation (Consensus):* The law thus constructed is > validated by the scientific community through repeated experimentation and > consensus within the dominant paradigm (see Thomas Kuhn). > > In short, laws exist in nature (discovery), but their formal, > mathematical, and conceptual expression is a human and communal construction*. > (End of quote)* > > So when apples fell, for example, in the Middle Ages, each falling apple > was a sign without type, which was not a token, and I don't understand how > anyone can deny that. > > On the other hand, in the psychic sciences, now known as the humanities > and social sciences, we must proceed differently. Gemini again: > > *Start of quote*: The constructivist approach is often favored because > the objects of study are not inert natural phenomena, but human, social, > and cultural phenomena. > > 1. *The Object is Socially Constructed:* Unlike a physical > law that would exist even without humans, concepts such as *social class*, > *nation*, *gender,* or *unemployment* are categories that societies and > researchers themselves have created to give meaning to reality. > > *Example:* The concept of the *"nuclear family"* is not a universal law, > but a historical and sociological construct that varies across cultures and > eras. > > 2. *Interaction Changes the Object*: The very act of > studying a social phenomenon can change it. For example, if a study reveals > that certain practices are considered undesirable, the people being studied > may change their behavior, creating a reactivity effect (or Hawthorne > effect*). > > *3. **The Role of Paradigms:* The theories and methods used > (Marxism, functionalism, cognitive psychology, etc.) are *interpretive > frameworks* (paradigms) that guide what is considered "discoverable." The > interpretation of the same phenomenon (for example, delinquency) will be > radically different depending on the interpretive framework chosen.. > > *Discovery in the Humanities and Social Sciences:* However, the discovery > approach is not absent. It manifests itself in the search for regularities > or underlying mechanisms: > > 1. *Statistical Regularities:* In sociology and economics, > researchers seek to *discover* *correlations* or *statistical laws* that > describe the aggregate behavior of groups (laws of supply and demand, > demographic trends, suicide rates linked to isolation, etc.). > > 2. *Cognitive Mechanisms*: In psychology and social > neuroscience, the goal is to discover universal mechanisms that govern > human cognition, emotions, or judgment biases (e.g., memory functioning or > learning mechanisms). > > 3. *Invariants:* Some anthropologists and linguists seek > *invariant > structures* in all human cultures and languages, which would be akin to > discovering fundamental laws (such as the hypothesis of universal grammar). > > *Conclusion*: In the social sciences and humanities, it could be said > that researchers *discover* *regularities* and *correlations* in human > behavior, but that they must then *construct* the *concepts, theories, > and models* to explain them. It is a continuous process of interpretive > *modeling > *of social realities that are themselves constantly evolving. > > *The Hawthorne effect refers to the responsiveness of subjects in an > experiment when they become aware that they are the focus of a study. It is > a methodological bias in which the act of observation itself influences the > measured results. *(End of quote)* > > In the social sciences and humanities, for example, particular objects of > knowledge are social facts which, according to Emile Durkheim, must be > viewed and treated as things in order to make sociology a positive science. > Therefore, before being taken up by sociologists (or ethnologists), before > any abduction concerning them has been formulated, these facts are sinsigns > without type. > > JAS finally admitted the possibility of signs that are not replicas of > legisigns, but this was to say that they could not exist, opposing his > authority to that of Peirce on the question of the diagram. But I note that > he did not comment on the DNA case. It would be a considerable task to > critique his remarks, which I once again feel are an attempt at information > saturation. So, I won't be doing that, even if he cries scandal. I prefer > to take the time to finalize a paper on Mathematical Exactitude, which, by > rigorously and clearly framing the kind of debates we are having here, will > serve as a reference for me as I take up the scientific commitment that > Peirce expresses in a letter to Francis C. Russell dated September 23, > 1894: > > My special business is to bring *mathematical exacti**tude, - I mean > modern mathematical exactitude into philosophy, - and to apply the ideas of > mathematics in philosophy* [...] I don't mean to shackle anybody with any > condition other than that they shall work at the rendering of philosophy > mathematically exact and scientifically founded on positive experience of > some kind. (NEM IV: 12, 1894). > > Regards, > > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor; PhD Mathematics, PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* > > Le ven. 14 nov. 2025 à 06:12, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> a > écrit : > >> Jon, Ben, >> >> You are both quite right that 'token' corresponds to 'sinsign' and not to >> 'replica'. I have to be more careful in the future to hold that >> correspondence firmly in mind as I had earlier fully agreed with it. >> >> So what happened? Perhaps I would have caught it -- rethought it -- if I >> hadn't rushed to send my post before heading off to the theater this >> evening. But no excuses! Just another reason for me to spend a day or two >> reviewing other posts and fully thinking things through thoroughly in order >> to avoid making such a blunder. >> >> At the moment I'm working on a post regarding Peirce's changing >> terminology, and so this gaffe on my behalf is especially disturbing. >> Although my post is principally concerned with the general change in >> terminology more than any particular change (although there will be, >> necessarily, examples), the question of the challenge that Peirce's >> changing terminology presents to students of Peirce's logic as semeiotic, >> especially in semeiotic grammar, seems to me to be an important one to >> address. >> >> Meanwhile, your catching this error of mine is a major wake up call for >> me, so thank you both. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > - *From*: Ulysses <upascal AT gmail.com> - *To*: peirce-l AT list.iu.edu, Benjamin Udell <baudell AT gmail.com> - *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign Tokens and Sign Types (was Peirce's Categorial Involution, and Contemporary Peirce Scholarship) - *Date*: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 23:38:38 +0100 ------------------------------ I think the important point that Edwina raises is that Peirce’s flavor or realism is much more evolutionary than platonic realism. If, in line with tychism and synechism, there is a continuity between singular/chance-driven events and laws or that “matter is effete mind”, then the line between tokens and types is not absolute. While I am not convinced that a chemist discovering a fact is an example of a token without a type, it is worth considering in more detail. I understand this to be a case where the chemist discovers an instance of a general physical law. In this case, it is a sinsign instance of a legisign. However, the novel formulation of the fact (in symbolic language) as no longer a mere fact but as evidence of a law by the scientific community is an interesting case in itself, especially because the discovery may only partially illuminate the underlying physical tendency. Thus, the *codification* of a law in human language, while also being a legsign, is different than the underlying chemical law. Through a scientific community, the content of the symbol might grow to approximate the underlying tendency more completely. This complicates the relationship between “token” and “type” because the fact is an instance of two different but related types— one that is “real” and one that “exists” (and evolves) to approximate the real. While it was always an instance of the former in real sense, it could not have always been an instance of the latter, as that type didn’t exist yet. This is further complicated by Pierce’s hypothesis of an evolutionary universe. If the laws of the universe evolve, does this suggest that at some level of analysis physical “laws” themselves can be in a causal relationship with one another? Do laws compete and adapt like species? For example can universal constants like gravity or the speed of light be different and, if not, is their stability/time symmetry a purely mathematically deduced outcome of an absolute principle, or is it the outcome of some evolutionary process that weeded out less stable possibilities? I think Peirce would entertain the latter or find a continuity between both positions. Given this, I think the question of whether a physical law is a “sinsign” or a “legisign” is less black and white, or at least not fully predetermined by apriori principles. While a physical law’s dominant character is that of a law or thirdness, the law at one moment in its evolutionary history might still be in a causal relationship with other laws and thus exhibit some characteristics of secondness. This does not answer JAS question directly, but it points to the possibility that types themselves might evolve, the there might be moments between when the type is fully formed and when instances don’t have a proper type. For example in speciation, the proto members of a species are between two species. Or in a machine learning algorithm, the first elements are sorted randomly and their membership to a group emerges through the classification process. Especially in bad or unscientific classifications, some things (or noise) might be forced to be a member of a type despite not being a member of a “real” type and in these cases, before the spurious type is fully developed as used as a classification system, you could have instances that are non members of that “type”. Of course this begs the question of what are real vs spurious types, and even if some things don’t belong to certain types they may still belong to others.
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