Gary, Ben, Jon, List, I am, of course, in complete agreement with Gary, who provides good examples borrowed from Peirce.
No, Ben, that's not it at all! It's the opposite! I say, like Peirce, that there are signs that are not tokens, which also implies a type simply because we write "token." So you don't have to worry about signs that aren't tokens; scientific discovery proves it. However, as Peirce does, a distinction must be made between the Physical Sciences and the Psychic Sciences. Here is what Gemini has to say about it (I agree 100%). I use AI because it provides me with a high-quality answer in a matter of seconds, which I need to check. It saves me valuable time. Of course, this must be made very clear to the reader. *Start of quote*: The formulation of the laws of physics is an act of construction based on the discovery of regularity in nature. 1. *Discovery (Observation/Experiment):* The scientific community observes regularities (for example, apples always fall). 2. *Construction (Modeling/Formalization):* It then develops a theoretical model and a mathematical language (F = m g ) to describe, generalize, and predict these regularities. This process is subject to strict epistemological criteria (refutability, consistency, universality). 3. *Validation (Consensus):* The law thus constructed is validated by the scientific community through repeated experimentation and consensus within the dominant paradigm (see Thomas Kuhn). In short, laws exist in nature (discovery), but their formal, mathematical, and conceptual expression is a human and communal construction*. (End of quote)* So when apples fell, for example, in the Middle Ages, each falling apple was a sign without type, which was not a token, and I don't understand how anyone can deny that. On the other hand, in the psychic sciences, now known as the humanities and social sciences, we must proceed differently. Gemini again: *Start of quote*: The constructivist approach is often favored because the objects of study are not inert natural phenomena, but human, social, and cultural phenomena. 1. *The Object is Socially Constructed:* Unlike a physical law that would exist even without humans, concepts such as *social class*, *nation*, *gender,* or *unemployment* are categories that societies and researchers themselves have created to give meaning to reality. *Example:* The concept of the *"nuclear family"* is not a universal law, but a historical and sociological construct that varies across cultures and eras. 2. *Interaction Changes the Object*: The very act of studying a social phenomenon can change it. For example, if a study reveals that certain practices are considered undesirable, the people being studied may change their behavior, creating a reactivity effect (or Hawthorne effect*). *3. **The Role of Paradigms:* The theories and methods used (Marxism, functionalism, cognitive psychology, etc.) are *interpretive frameworks* (paradigms) that guide what is considered "discoverable." The interpretation of the same phenomenon (for example, delinquency) will be radically different depending on the interpretive framework chosen.. *Discovery in the Humanities and Social Sciences:* However, the discovery approach is not absent. It manifests itself in the search for regularities or underlying mechanisms: 1. *Statistical Regularities:* In sociology and economics, researchers seek to *discover* *correlations* or *statistical laws* that describe the aggregate behavior of groups (laws of supply and demand, demographic trends, suicide rates linked to isolation, etc.). 2. *Cognitive Mechanisms*: In psychology and social neuroscience, the goal is to discover universal mechanisms that govern human cognition, emotions, or judgment biases (e.g., memory functioning or learning mechanisms). 3. *Invariants:* Some anthropologists and linguists seek *invariant structures* in all human cultures and languages, which would be akin to discovering fundamental laws (such as the hypothesis of universal grammar). *Conclusion*: In the social sciences and humanities, it could be said that researchers *discover* *regularities* and *correlations* in human behavior, but that they must then *construct* the *concepts, theories, and models* to explain them. It is a continuous process of interpretive *modeling *of social realities that are themselves constantly evolving. *The Hawthorne effect refers to the responsiveness of subjects in an experiment when they become aware that they are the focus of a study. It is a methodological bias in which the act of observation itself influences the measured results. *(End of quote)* In the social sciences and humanities, for example, particular objects of knowledge are social facts which, according to Emile Durkheim, must be viewed and treated as things in order to make sociology a positive science. Therefore, before being taken up by sociologists (or ethnologists), before any abduction concerning them has been formulated, these facts are sinsigns without type. JAS finally admitted the possibility of signs that are not replicas of legisigns, but this was to say that they could not exist, opposing his authority to that of Peirce on the question of the diagram. But I note that he did not comment on the DNA case. It would be a considerable task to critique his remarks, which I once again feel are an attempt at information saturation. So, I won't be doing that, even if he cries scandal. I prefer to take the time to finalize a paper on Mathematical Exactitude, which, by rigorously and clearly framing the kind of debates we are having here, will serve as a reference for me as I take up the scientific commitment that Peirce expresses in a letter to Francis C. Russell dated September 23, 1894: My special business is to bring *mathematical exacti**tude, - I mean modern mathematical exactitude into philosophy, - and to apply the ideas of mathematics in philosophy* [...] I don't mean to shackle anybody with any condition other than that they shall work at the rendering of philosophy mathematically exact and scientifically founded on positive experience of some kind. (NEM IV: 12, 1894). Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor; PhD Mathematics, PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le ven. 14 nov. 2025 à 06:12, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> a écrit : > Jon, Ben, > > You are both quite right that 'token' corresponds to 'sinsign' and not to > 'replica'. I have to be more careful in the future to hold that > correspondence firmly in mind as I had earlier fully agreed with it. > > So what happened? Perhaps I would have caught it -- rethought it -- if I > hadn't rushed to send my post before heading off to the theater this > evening. But no excuses! Just another reason for me to spend a day or two > reviewing other posts and fully thinking things through thoroughly in order > to avoid making such a blunder. > > At the moment I'm working on a post regarding Peirce's changing > terminology, and so this gaffe on my behalf is especially disturbing. > Although my post is principally concerned with the general change in > terminology more than any particular change (although there will be, > necessarily, examples), the question of the challenge that Peirce's > changing terminology presents to students of Peirce's logic as semeiotic, > especially in semeiotic grammar, seems to me to be an important one to > address. > > Meanwhile, your catching this error of mine is a major wake up call for > me, so thank you both. > > Best, > > Gary R > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 11:18 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Robert, Ben, Gary R., List: >> >> I received Robert's post (see below with original formatting), but the >> subject line was slightly different, such that Gmail put it in its own new >> thread--unlike Ben's and Gary's posts, which it kept in this ongoing thread. >> >> I agree with Ben's "system-building instinct" that if there are no >> singular tokens, then there can be no singular sinsigns; and if there are >> singular sinsigns, then there must be singular tokens. Again, "token" is >> Peirce's replacement term for "sinsign," not "replica"; his replacement >> term for "replica" is "instance." In short, a type *is *a legisign, a >> token *is *a sinsign, a tone *is* a qualisign, and an instance *is *a >> replica. Accordingly, I disagree with Gary's definitions of type and >> token--they are *not *how Peirce defined those terms. I have been >> repeatedly citing CP 4.537 (1906) for *his *definitions but now feel >> like I have no choice but to quote them in full, which I hope will settle >> the matter. >> >> CSP: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed >> book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty >> *the's >> *on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense >> of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English >> language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page >> or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or >> Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. >> Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a *Type*. A Single >> event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one >> happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any >> one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as >> occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a >> single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to >> call a *Token*. An indefinite significant character such as a tone of >> voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a >> Sign a *Tone*. In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied >> in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the >> Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an *Instance* >> of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a >> page. >> >> >> I agree with Robert that Peirce's 1903 taxonomy allows for the >> *possibility *of sinsigns that are not replicas of legisigns, i.e., sign >> tokens that are not instances of sign types. However, I remain unconvinced >> that there are any such *actual *sinsigns/tokens, and I disagree with >> Robert that an individual diagram qualifies as one. The examples within >> brackets for the different sign classes in CP 2.254-61 are not in Peirce's >> original manuscript for the *Syllabus*--they were added by the CP >> editors, which is why they were omitted from EP 2:294-5. Nevertheless, >> comparing 2.255 with 2.258 *confirms *my position rather than refuting >> it--"an individual diagram" (iconic sinsign/token) is *not* singular, it >> is a replica/instance of "a diagram, apart from its factual individuality" >> (iconic legisign/type). After all, any diagram is "capable of repetition," >> and every reproduction of it "is one and the same representamen" (CP 5.138, >> EP 2:203, 1903). >> >> Gary suggests that "a weathervane pointing in a particular direction" is >> a sinsign/token that is *not *a replica/instance of a legisign/type, but >> Peirce explicitly disagrees, as I pointed out in my post >> <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00047.html> on >> Monday. "If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as >> they refer to different parts of the air" (ibid.). "I speak of the >> weathercock,--the type, not the single instance" (EP 2:406, 1907). I even >> spelled out what I see as the various correlates of this non-linguistic >> sign in my post >> <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00049.html> on >> Tuesday. Peirce also explicitly states that "smoke as a sign of fire" is a >> "natural universal," defined as "a natural sign predicable of a plurality >> of things" (CP 2.371, 1902), i.e., a legisign/type. Likewise, "a >> spontaneous cry of pain" is a replica/instance of a legisign/type, not a >> singular sinsign/token. The distinguishing aspect of a legisign/type is *not >> *that it is "conventional," but that it is "a general, which does not >> exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" (CP 8.313, 1905 >> Jan 22). >> >> Finally, I agree with Ben that in accordance with scholastic realism, >> whether a particular *existent* sinsign/token is a replica/instance of a >> *real* legisign/type is not dependent on whether or when any human >> *does *recognize it as such, only on whether an infinite community after >> infinite investigation *would* recognize it as such. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 4:15 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Ben, Robert, Jon, List, >>> >>> As I currently see it a token is not equivalent to a sinsign in >>> Peirce's semeiotic although they are closely related concepts, but >>> coming from different classification schemes. 'Sinsign' comes from >>> Peirce's first classification trichotomy (based on the sign's mode of >>> being): >>> >>> Qualisign: A quality that is a sign >>> Sinsign: An actual existent thing or event that is a sign >>> Legisign: A general law or type that is a sign >>> >>> >>> On the other hand, 'token' comes from the later type-token distinction: >>> >>> Type: A general form or law in some 'conventional' sense. >>> Token: A particular instance or replica of* that* type. >>> >>> >>> So, in short, a token is a sinsign, but not all sinsigns are tokens. And >>> every 'type' signifies through an instance or replica of it, and the >>> replica is a sinsign. >>> >>> So, an example of a token (replica of a legisign) would be Peirce's >>> famous example of the word 'the' which is a replica of the legisign "the"' >>> (the conventional meaning of "the"). >>> >>> An example of an sinsign that is *not* a token would be the well-known >>> example of a weathervane pointing in a particular direction. Some >>> additional Peirce examples include a spontaneous cry of pain and smoke >>> as a sign of fire which are individual existent sinsigns but* not* >>> replicas of a conventional type. >>> >>> In short, tokens are sinsigns that replicate legisigns (as conventional >>> types) while sinsigns include tokens but also non-conventional >>> individual signs. So, again, in my view while all tokens are sinsign, >>> not all sinsigns are tokens: *no* sinsign can function independently >>> of some general law, while tokens essentially depend on their relation >>> to a conventional type. >>> >>> Ben: "My system-building instinct would be then seek out qualisigns >>> that are not tones, and legisigns that are not types, if there are any such. >>> " >>> >>> If what I wrote above is correct then there are qualisigns which are not >>> tones (such as the qualitative character of any 'spontaneous cry'. And >>> the natural law that produces flashes of lightning would be a >>> qualisign which is not a tone. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 2:49 PM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Robert, Jon, all, >>>> >>>> I didn't know what you meant by "singular token" before. You mean a >>>> typeless token. I hadn't been following the thread. Also, Robert, I can't >>>> get the peirce-l server to re-send your post to me, which i had not >>>> received in the first place. So I include it below in case anybody else >>>> hasn't received it. Removing unnecessary HTML markup seemed to help last >>>> time - not a single bounce of my previous post. >>>> >>>> Peirce called himself a Scholastic Realist of an extreme stripe. I >>>> don't know why he would bar an undiscovered type, an unknown type, if it >>>> were a type about which any investigator _would_ agree upon sufficient >>>> investigation. Unknown does not equate to unknowable. I also worry about >>>> the idea of sinsigns that are not tokens. My system-building instinct >>>> would be then seek out qualisigns that are not tones, and legisigns that >>>> are not types, if there are any such. >>>> >>>> Best, Ben >>>> >>>> On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 11:47 AM robert marty <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon, List, >>>>> >>>>> JAS: "there are no singular tokens, i.e., there no singular sinsigns." >>>>> >>>>> JAS:"there are no singular tokens", >>>>> >>>>> YES! It's a tautology, since it's a token, it's a replica of a type. >>>>> >>>>> Do we agree on that after all ? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> JAS: "i.e., there no singular sinsigns" >>>>> >>>>> NO ! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Peirce: CP 2.254: First: A Qualisign …is any quality … a quality can >>>>> only denote *an* >>>>> >>>>> * Object* .. >>>>> >>>>> CP 2.255: Second: An Iconic Sinsign [*e.g., *an >>>>> individual diagram]… it determine the idea of *an object* … >>>>> >>>>> CP 2.256: Third: A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign …it directs >>>>> attention to *an Object* … >>>>> >>>>> CP 2.257: Fourth: A Dicent Sinsign … affords information concerning *its >>>>> Objec*t … *The only information it can afford is of actual fact *… >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> CP 2.265: In the course of the above descriptions of the classes, >>>>> certain subdivisions of some of them have been directly or indirectly >>>>> referred to. Namely, beside the *normal varieties of Sinsigns*, >>>>> Indices, and Dicisigns, there are others which are *Replicas of >>>>> Legisigns*, Symbols, and Arguments, *respectively.* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> RM: That is to say, among the *normal varieties* *of Sinsigns* there >>>>> are *replicas* *of Legisigns*; among *the normal varieties* *of >>>>> Indices* there are *replicas* *of Symbols*; among *the normal >>>>> varieties of Dicisigns* there are *replicas of* *Arguments* … >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Conclusion:* *the normal varieties of Sinsigns that are not replicas >>>>> of Legisigns are singular signs that are not tokens.* >>>>> >>>>> *Example by Peirce*: by CP 2.255 an *individual diagram*, is an >>>>> Iconic Sinsign and by CP 2.258, a diagram, *apart from its factual >>>>> individuality* is any general law *or type* named Iconic Legisign … >>>>> In other words, an individual diagram retains its singularity until an >>>>> expert identifies it as a token of a type, which can take a very long time >>>>> (this was the case for DNA). How many diagrams drawn by bricoleurs in >>>>> their >>>>> articles will retain this status forever ? Indeed: >>>>> >>>>> *It was necessary for me to determine what I should call one science. >>>>> For this purpose I have united under one science studies such as the same >>>>> man, in the present state of science, might very well pursue. I have been >>>>> guided in determining this by noting how scientists associate themselves >>>>> into societies, and what contributions are commonly admitted into one >>>>> journal: being on my guard against the survival of traditions from bygone >>>>> states of science. *(NEM IV: 15, 1902, List of Proposed Memoirs on >>>>> Logic, No. 1. *On the Classification of the Theoretic Sciences of >>>>> Research*) >>>>> >>>>> *QED* >>>>> >>>>> Do we agree on that after all ? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Robert Marty >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy >>>>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty >>>>> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* >>>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
