List: For the record, I *did not* change the subject line in my Saturday post <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00064.html>, to which the one below is a reply; I did so in my Sunday post <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00066.html> (and said so), because the topic of discussion was no longer "Sign Tokens and Sign Types."
JAS: However, "token" does not imply a type; only "instance" implies a type. Please carefully reread Peirce's definitions in CP 4.537 RM: So I reread CP 4.537 and find this: "In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an *Instance *of the Type." A sentence that clearly shows that instances are a strict subset of the set of tokens; it is the subset of tokens that are type instances. I appreciate the confirmation of what I have been saying all along--"sinsign" and "token" are equivalent, "legisign" and "type" are equivalent, and "replica" and "instance" are equivalent. Accordingly, just as every replica of a legisign is a sinsign, likewise every instance of a type is a token; and just as it is *theoretically *possible for there to be a sinsign that is *not *a replica of a legisign, likewise it is *theoretically *possible for there to be a token that is *not *an instance of a type. Nevertheless, I continue to maintain that there are no such *actual *sinsigns/tokens, especially since (so far) no one has been able to identify a concrete example of one. RM: But JAS claims that the three crowns in this diagram are empty, and to this end, he attributes to Peirce words that Peirce did not write On the contrary, I quoted Peirce's *exact* words--"Every time this [proverb] is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air." Accordingly, in each case--a linguistic sign, a diagram, a picture, a physical sign, a symptom, or a weathercock--the individual sinsign/token is a replica/instance of a general legisign/type. RM: Peirce does not say that such a representamen "would not be a sign at all" but "a part of the very fact represented", which is precisely a token that is not a replica or instance of a type, in other words a sinsign that is not governed by a legisign Again, I quoted Peirce's *exact *words--"The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. ... A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." Accordingly, there is no such thing as a singular *sign*--something that *represents *something else while having a *unique *embodiment, a sinsign/token that is *not* a replica/instance of a legisign/type. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Nov 17, 2025 at 11:50 AM robert marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary, List, > > I'm checking again because JAS in this latest post offers me the > opportunity to settle the issue once and for all (for me), and, on that > point, I will leave it at that. > > *JAS: **There are indeed signs that are not tokens, namely, tones and > types.* > > It's a response that I find challenging to qualify without overstepping > the bounds of courtesy. So, I won't qualify it. > > *JAS *follows: *However, "token" does not imply a type*;* only "instance" > implies a type. Please carefully reread Peirce's definitions in CP 4.537, > which I quoted in full* *Thursday evening*, *[…]* > > So I reread CP 4.537 and find this: > > *CSP:* *In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a > Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type > signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type* > *.* > > A sentence that clearly shows that *instances are a strict subset of the > set of tokens*; it is the subset of tokens that are type instances. > Peirce confirms this, a little further on, at the beginning of CP 2.265, > which follows: > > *In the course of the above descriptions of the classes, certain > subdivisions of some of them have been directly or indirectly referred to. > Namely, beside the normal varieties of Sinsigns, Indices, and Dicisigns, > there are others which are Replicas of Legisigns, Symbols, and Arguments, > respectively.* > > Here are the three corresponding Venn diagrams: > > > > [image: Three diagrams that place the replicas under the corresponding > Legisigns, illustrating what the text says through the existence of the > three non-empty crowns.] > Venn Diagram of relations of involvement Legisigns vs Sinsigns > > > > But JAS claims that the three crowns in this diagram are empty, and to > this end, he attributes to Peirce words that Peirce did not write: > > *JAS:* *I have never denied the possibility of such signs, which is > implicit in Peirce's terminology--we can (at least theoretically) > distinguish replicas/instances of legisigns/types from other > sinsigns/tokens (if there are any). However, he never identifies a diagram > as a sinsign/token that is not a replica/instance of a legisign/type; on > the contrary, he explicitly mentions a diagram as a sign > whose every embodiment "is one and the same representamen" (CP 5.138, EP > 2:203, 1903)--again, every individual diagram as a sinsign/token is a > replica/instance of a general legisign/type. Once more, I feel the need to > quote the relevant portion of that passage in full.* > > And here is the last sentence of this passage: > > *CSP:* [ …] *A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, > incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the > very fact represented*. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903) > > > > And here is what JAS writes about this last sentence: > > > > J*AS*: The last sentence effectively *confirms my position* that *there > are no singular sinsigns/tokens*, because anything that was "a unique > embodiment, incapable of repetition," *would not be a sign at all"*. > > > > I ask the reader for a bit of patience, as it is crucial to the conclusion > that they take a look at Peirce does not say that such a representamen *"would > not be a sign at all*" but "*a part of the very fact represented**"*, > which is precisely *a token that is not a replica or instance of a type, > in other words a sinsign that is not governed by a legisign *(see diagram > above). It can therefore be either* an Iconic Sinsign a "**sign by > likeness purely, of whatever it may be like", [e.g., an individual diagram] > *(CP 2.255), or a *Rhematic Indexical Sinsign* which "*directs attention > to an Object by which its presence is caused", [e.g., a spontaneous cry]* > (CP 2.256), or finally a *Dicent Sinsign *which* "affords information > concerning its Object"* and *"The only information it can afford is of > actual fact" [e.g., a weathercock].* (CP 2.257) > > > > In all three cases, these are *"objects of direct experience*," and > Dicent Sinsign *"must involve an Iconic Sinsign to embody the information > and a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign to indicate the Object to which the > information refers"*. In addition, "*the mode of combination, or Syntax, > of these two must also be significant*", an assertion which, thanks to > the word *"Syntax,"* will greatly assist me in claiming the status of > Universal Grammar for Triadic Signs for their lattice of ten classes. > > > > There are three further striking confirmations: > > > > CP 2.258: An *Iconic Legisign *[…] its mode of being is that of governing > *single > Replicas*, each of which will be an *Iconic Sinsign* *of a peculiar kind*. > > > > CP 2.259: A *Rhematic Indexical Legisign* […] Each *Replica of it* will > be a *Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind.* > > CP 2.260: A *Dicent Indexical Legisign* […] Each *Replica* of it will be > a *Dicent Sinsign* *of a peculiar kind.* > > > > To conclude, I almost agree with JAS's conclusion: > > *JAS:* *As always, I am ultimately content to let everyone reading along > evaluate the presented evidence and arguments for themselves, as well as > the cited and quoted texts by Peirce, and then draw their own conclusions.* > > > > Except that at no point did I attribute to Peirce anything he did not say. > > > > Regards, > > > > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* >
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