Jon, List, I had already addressed these issues in my message dated 08/11/25. But since JAS only reads my posts to find material to feed his usual stories, I find myself forced to repeat my comments every time, just as he repeats his.
This time, I unfortunately made a lapsus calami <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/lapsus_calami>, and I apologize, as I was certainly not paying close enough attention when proofreading. I wrote: "A sentence that clearly shows that instances are a strict subset <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subset#Proper_subset> of the set of *tokens* *;* it is the subset of *tokens* that are type instances." Instead of: "A sentence that clearly shows that instances are a strict subset of the set of *sinsigns*; it is the subset of *sinsigns* that are type instances". This slip of the pen makes my sentence containing it self-contradictory, since I wrote "a strict subset." Often, in such cases, readers correct without even realizing it, as is true in my latest text of 17/11/25, where the excerpt from the cross-reading of CP 2.265, as well as the three Venn diagrams illustrating it, leaves no doubt on this subject. But JAS saw an opportunity to score a point, going so far as to express satisfaction at seeing me write the opposite of what I have always maintained. To this end, I would like to reiterate the following excerpt from my message dated 08/11/25 <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00040.html>, which I have just mentioned: [beginning of quote] *a**. "Namely, beside the normal varieties of Sinsigns, Indices, and Dicisigns, there are others which are Replicas of Legisigns, Symbols, and Arguments, respectively." *(CP 2.265) a.1 First of all the sinsigns: they contain the "normal varieties". What Peirce means by this is "all the signs that conform to the definition of sinsigns", that is to say singular signs. But *some of them*, he notes, are *replicas of legisigns*. *The normal varieties are thus the sinsigns that are not replicas. *[end of quote] Despite this, JAS concludes that I wrote that "sinsign" and "token" are equivalent. In contrast, everything else shows that not only I but also Peirce say the opposite and, moreover, that my diagrams visualize the difference in the form of *crowns*. Then JAS tries to capitalize on his good fortune, which doesn't surprise me much. But it turns out that, despite myself, my slip of the pen worked like a trap, since it highlighted, once again, the erroneous nature of his conceptions of the relations between classes of signs, and I can only regret that. It is now clear that, for JAS, apart from signs governed by laws, there is nothing else that refers to a kind of Absolute Idealism where everything proceeds from the Idea, as, for example, in Hegelianism or in the religions of the Book. Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor; PhD Mathematics, PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le mar. 18 nov. 2025 à 19:05, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> a écrit : > List: > > For the record, I *did not* change the subject line in my Saturday post > <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00064.html>, to which > the one below is a reply; I did so in my Sunday post > <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00066.html> (and said > so), because the topic of discussion was no longer "Sign Tokens and Sign > Types." > > JAS: However, "token" does not imply a type; only "instance" implies a > type. Please carefully reread Peirce's definitions in CP 4.537 > > > RM: So I reread CP 4.537 and find this: "In order that a Type may be used, > it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and > thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of > a Type an *Instance *of the Type." A sentence that clearly shows that > instances are a strict subset of the set of tokens; it is the subset of > tokens that are type instances. > > > I appreciate the confirmation of what I have been saying all > along--"sinsign" and "token" are equivalent, "legisign" and "type" are > equivalent, and "replica" and "instance" are equivalent. Accordingly, just > as every replica of a legisign is a sinsign, likewise every instance of a > type is a token; and just as it is *theoretically *possible for there to > be a sinsign that is *not *a replica of a legisign, likewise it is > *theoretically > *possible for there to be a token that is *not *an instance of a type. > Nevertheless, I continue to maintain that there are no such *actual > *sinsigns/tokens, > especially since (so far) no one has been able to identify a concrete > example of one. > > RM: But JAS claims that the three crowns in this diagram are empty, and to > this end, he attributes to Peirce words that Peirce did not write > > > On the contrary, I quoted Peirce's *exact* words--"Every time this > [proverb] is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, > and every time it is thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is > the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or > symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as > they refer to different parts of the air." Accordingly, in each case--a > linguistic sign, a diagram, a picture, a physical sign, a symptom, or a > weathercock--the individual sinsign/token is a replica/instance of a > general legisign/type. > > RM: Peirce does not say that such a representamen "would not be a sign at > all" but "a part of the very fact represented", which is precisely a token > that is not a replica or instance of a type, in other words a sinsign that > is not governed by a legisign > > > Again, I quoted Peirce's *exact *words--"The mode of being of a > representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. ... A representamen > which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not > be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." Accordingly, > there is no such thing as a singular *sign*--something that *represents > *something > else while having a *unique *embodiment, a sinsign/token that is *not* a > replica/instance of a legisign/type. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Nov 17, 2025 at 11:50 AM robert marty <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, Gary, List, >> >> I'm checking again because JAS in this latest post offers me the >> opportunity to settle the issue once and for all (for me), and, on that >> point, I will leave it at that. >> >> *JAS: **There are indeed signs that are not tokens, namely, tones and >> types.* >> >> It's a response that I find challenging to qualify without overstepping >> the bounds of courtesy. So, I won't qualify it. >> >> *JAS *follows: *However, "token" does not imply a type*;* only >> "instance" implies a type. Please carefully reread Peirce's definitions in >> CP 4.537, which I quoted in full* *Thursday evening*, *[…]* >> >> So I reread CP 4.537 and find this: >> >> *CSP:* *In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a >> Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type >> signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type* >> *.* >> >> A sentence that clearly shows that *instances are a strict subset of the >> set of tokens*; it is the subset of tokens that are type instances. >> Peirce confirms this, a little further on, at the beginning of CP 2.265, >> which follows: >> >> *In the course of the above descriptions of the classes, certain >> subdivisions of some of them have been directly or indirectly referred to. >> Namely, beside the normal varieties of Sinsigns, Indices, and Dicisigns, >> there are others which are Replicas of Legisigns, Symbols, and Arguments, >> respectively.* >> >> Here are the three corresponding Venn diagrams: >> >> >> >> [image: Three diagrams that place the replicas under the corresponding >> Legisigns, illustrating what the text says through the existence of the >> three non-empty crowns.] >> Venn Diagram of relations of involvement Legisigns vs Sinsigns >> >> >> >> But JAS claims that the three crowns in this diagram are empty, and to >> this end, he attributes to Peirce words that Peirce did not write: >> >> *JAS:* *I have never denied the possibility of such signs, which is >> implicit in Peirce's terminology--we can (at least theoretically) >> distinguish replicas/instances of legisigns/types from other >> sinsigns/tokens (if there are any). However, he never identifies a diagram >> as a sinsign/token that is not a replica/instance of a legisign/type; on >> the contrary, he explicitly mentions a diagram as a sign >> whose every embodiment "is one and the same representamen" (CP 5.138, EP >> 2:203, 1903)--again, every individual diagram as a sinsign/token is a >> replica/instance of a general legisign/type. Once more, I feel the need to >> quote the relevant portion of that passage in full.* >> >> And here is the last sentence of this passage: >> >> *CSP:* [ …] *A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, >> incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the >> very fact represented*. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903) >> >> >> >> And here is what JAS writes about this last sentence: >> >> >> >> J*AS*: The last sentence effectively *confirms my position* that *there >> are no singular sinsigns/tokens*, because anything that was "a unique >> embodiment, incapable of repetition," *would not be a sign at all"*. >> >> >> >> I ask the reader for a bit of patience, as it is crucial to the >> conclusion that they take a look at Peirce does not say that such a >> representamen *"would not be a sign at all*" but "*a part of the very >> fact represented**"*, which is precisely *a token that is not a replica >> or instance of a type, in other words a sinsign that is not governed by a >> legisign *(see diagram above). It can therefore be either* an Iconic >> Sinsign a "**sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like", >> [e.g., an individual diagram] *(CP 2.255), or a *Rhematic Indexical >> Sinsign* which "*directs attention to an Object by which its presence is >> caused", [e.g., a spontaneous cry]* (CP 2.256), or finally a *Dicent >> Sinsign *which* "affords information concerning its Object"* and *"The >> only information it can afford is of actual fact" [e.g., a weathercock].* >> (CP 2.257) >> >> >> >> In all three cases, these are *"objects of direct experience*," and >> Dicent Sinsign *"must involve an Iconic Sinsign to embody the >> information and a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign to indicate the Object to >> which the information refers"*. In addition, "*the mode of combination, >> or Syntax, of these two must also be significant*", an assertion which, >> thanks to the word *"Syntax,"* will greatly assist me in claiming the >> status of Universal Grammar for Triadic Signs for their lattice of ten >> classes. >> >> >> >> There are three further striking confirmations: >> >> >> >> CP 2.258: An *Iconic Legisign *[…] its mode of being is that of >> governing *single Replicas*, each of which will be an *Iconic Sinsign* *of >> a peculiar kind*. >> >> >> >> CP 2.259: A *Rhematic Indexical Legisign* […] Each *Replica of it* will >> be a *Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind.* >> >> CP 2.260: A *Dicent Indexical Legisign* […] Each *Replica* of it will be >> a *Dicent Sinsign* *of a peculiar kind.* >> >> >> >> To conclude, I almost agree with JAS's conclusion: >> >> *JAS:* *As always, I am ultimately content to let everyone reading along >> evaluate the presented evidence and arguments for themselves, as well as >> the cited and quoted texts by Peirce, and then draw their own conclusions.* >> >> >> >> Except that at no point did I attribute to Peirce anything he did not >> say. >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> >> Robert Marty >> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy >> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty >> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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