Robert, Ulysses, JAS, List I did not receive either Robert’s or Ulysses’ posts. They came attached to this post from JAS.
I note that JAS did not include my name in his response, and so, I am assuming that he does not want to take up the issue I have been posting about - namely, the reality of novelty in the universe. I have provided enough quotations and examples - But, the FACTS are, that Peirce includes the category of Firstness in his universe, and this means that both the emergence of novelty and its transformation into habit within Thirdness, is clearly outlined in his various examination of diversity and growth. Plus, his rejection of what he called ’necessitarianism’ and a priori determinism, means that it is quite incorrect to declare, as JAS has done, that > After all, nothing can become actual without first being a realpossibility, > i.e., a potentiality. This is consistent with my longstanding metaphysical > hypothesis that the constitution of being is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) > of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns), and > that the sequence of events in each case of the latter is spontaneity (1ns) > followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking (3ns). The above outline, in my view, rejects Peirce’s outline of the emergence of novel instances. It is incorrect, I suggest, to define actuality as dependent on a Firstness operating as ‘indefinite possibilities', which defines this category as some kind of Well-of-Platonic Forms [or God’s Will] - and we are back to a form of necessitarianism and determinism. . This puts the universe into some kind of predetermined identity - where these ‘Forms’ or possibilities have some kind of reality. And where there is no possibility of actual total novelty. This ignores Peirce’s clear definition of Firstness as ‘chance, freedom, ..and novelty. Complete novelty with no past defining them as ‘possibility’ and no clear path ‘forward’ so to speak. Peirce outlines how these novel deviations can become habits - and points out that habits do emerge, do grow. As I said - his tychasm and agapsm clearly show these actions. And we cannot ignore the increasing complexity of the universe. To posit that speciation and complexity is dependent on a pre-existent ‘well of possibilities’ requires that one explain how and why such an ‘infinite’ well came into being..and why novelty is rejected. After all- if one posits such an infinite realm of possibilities, then, this rejects self-organized novelty within the universe, and puts us back onto the 18th-19th pre-darwinian mindset of ‘It’s God’s Determination. It’s the same mindset - and too ambiguous to analyse. As for human or cognitive novelty and the emergence of for example, novel technological habits, there can be, I think, no question that these exist - and again, are not located in some pre-existent ‘realm of infinite possibilities. Whether it be the wheel or the compass or the vaccine - the ’shuffling’ of existent material entities and their rearrangement into a new entity [ the wheel, the spectacle, the engine,, the vaccine]..are novel entities with utterly new habits-of-formation. Therefore, again, I agree with Peirce that novelty and emergence of totally new entities andha bits is a reality - Edwina > On Nov 15, 2025, at 10:48 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Ulysses, Gary R., Robert, List: > > I did not receive the post from Ulysses, but I noticed it in the online > archive and have included it below (at the bottom) in case others likewise > did not receive it. > > UP: If, in line with tychism and synechism, there is a continuity between > singular/chance-driven events and laws or that “matter is effete mind”, then > the line between tokens and types is not absolute. > > As I see it, the relationship between any individual sinsign/token and the > general legisign/type of which it is a replica/instance is the same as that > between any discrete thing and the continuum of which it is an instantiation > (synechism). Which of the infinite potentialities within that continuum are > actualized is where chance/spontaneity plays a role (tychism). After all, > nothing can become actual without first being a realpossibility, i.e., a > potentiality. This is consistent with my longstanding metaphysical hypothesis > that the constitution of being is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of > indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns), and that > the sequence of events in each case of the latter is spontaneity (1ns) > followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking (3ns). > > UP: Thus, the *codification* of a law in human language, while also being a > legsign, is different than the underlying chemical law. > > I agree, since linguistic types are arbitrary human inventions, while natural > types are real--independent of whether or what anyone thinks about them. This > is why I maintain that there can be (and often are) different linguistic > types of the same real sign, such as "man" in English and "homme" in French; > they have the same dynamical object, which is likewise a real general. > > RM: I say, like Peirce, that there are signs that are not tokens, which also > implies a type simply because we write "token." > > There are indeed signs that are not tokens, namely, tones and types. However, > "token" does not imply a type, only "instance" implies a type. Please > carefully reread Peirce's definitions in CP 4.537, which I quoted in full > Thursday evening, prompting Gary to agree with me after all. As far as I > know, it is the only place where he uses the now-colloquial expression, > "Token of a Type," and he does so specifically to define the term "instance" > as his replacement for "replica." > > RM: So when apples fell, for example, in the Middle Ages, each falling apple > was a sign without type, which was not a token, and I don't understand how > anyone can deny that. > > Anyone who affirms scholastic realism, as Peirce emphatically did, must deny > that. A falling apple was always an instance of a real (natural) type, even > when no humans were around to observe it--this did not and still does not > depend on whether or what anyone thinks about it. On the other hand, the > verbal description of it is obviously a linguistic type, of which no > instances existed until humans invented and uttered certain specific words. > Nevertheless, the sign itself that is embodied in the instances of any such > linguistic type, in any possible language or other sign system, is real--it > never did and never will depend on whether or what anyone thinks about it. > > RM: Therefore, before being taken up by sociologists (or ethnologists), > before any abduction concerning them has been formulated, these facts are > sinsigns without type. > > According to Peirce, "What we call a 'fact' is something having the structure > of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself" > (NEM 4:239, EP 2:304, 1901). "There is but one individual, or completely > determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A fact is so highly > a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented > in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). "By a proposition, as > something which can be repeated over and over again, translated into another > language, embodied in a logical graph or algebraical formula, and still be > one and the same proposition, we do not mean any existing individual object > but a type, a general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which > individuals conform" (CP 8.313, 1905 Jan 22). > > Taking these three passages together, any purportedly individual fact is > prescinded from the totality of reality; and because it has the structure of > a proposition, it can be represented by a proposition, which is a real > type--a general sign whose dynamical object is likewise general. That > proposition is true even if no one ever actually formulates it as a token, an > instance of the type, expressed in some humanly devised language or other > sign system such as Existential Graphs--an individual sign whose dynamical > object is either the general object of the type or an individual > instantiation of that general object. > > RM: JAS finally admitted the possibility of signs that are not replicas of > legisigns, but this was to say that they could not exist, opposing his > authority to that of Peirce on the question of the diagram. > > I have never denied the possibility of such signs, which is implicit in > Peirce's terminology--we can (at least theoretically) distinguish > replicas/instances of legisigns/types from other sinsigns/tokens (if there > are any). However, he never identifies a diagram as a sinsign/token that is > not a replica/instance of a legisign/type; on the contrary, he explicitly > mentions a diagram as a sign whose every embodiment "is one and the same > representamen" (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903)--again, every individual diagram as > a sinsign/token is a replica/instance of a general legisign/type. Once more, > I feel the need to quote the relevant portion of that passage in full. > > CSP: The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of > repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good > manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any > other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same > representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with > a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is > only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen > which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be > a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented. > > The last sentence effectively confirms my position that there are no singular > sinsigns/tokens, because anything that was "a unique embodiment, incapable of > repetition," would not be a sign at all. > > RM: But I note that he did not comment on the DNA case. > > Not specifically, because my response to it is no different from what I > already said about chemistry and the entire scientific enterprise. > > RM: It would be a considerable task to critique his remarks, which I once > again feel are an attempt at information saturation. So, I won't be doing > that, even if he cries scandal. > > As always, I am ultimately content to let everyone reading along evaluate the > presented evidence and arguments for themselves, as well as the cited and > quoted texts by Peirce, and then draw their own conclusions. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Fri, Nov 14, 2025 at 5:54 AM robert marty <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Gary, Ben, Jon, List, >> >> I am, of course, in complete agreement with Gary, who provides good examples >> borrowed from Peirce. >> >> No, Ben, that's not it at all! It's the opposite! I say, like Peirce, that >> there are signs that are not tokens, which also implies a type simply >> because we write "token." So you don't have to worry about signs that aren't >> tokens; scientific discovery proves it. However, as Peirce does, a >> distinction must be made between the Physical Sciences and the Psychic >> Sciences. >> >> Here is what Gemini has to say about it (I agree 100%). I use AI because it >> provides me with a high-quality answer in a matter of seconds, which I need >> to check. It saves me valuable time. Of course, this must be made very clear >> to the reader. >> >> Start of quote: The formulation of the laws of physics is an act of >> construction based on the discovery of regularity in nature. >> >> 1. Discovery (Observation/Experiment): The scientific community >> observes regularities (for example, apples always fall). >> 2. Construction (Modeling/Formalization): It then develops a >> theoretical model and a mathematical language (F = m g ) to describe, >> generalize, and predict these regularities. This process is subject to >> strict epistemological criteria (refutability, consistency, universality). >> 3. Validation (Consensus): The law thus constructed is >> validated by the scientific community through repeated experimentation and >> consensus within the dominant paradigm (see Thomas Kuhn). >> In short, laws exist in nature (discovery), but their formal, mathematical, >> and conceptual expression is a human and communal construction. (End of >> quote) >> >> So when apples fell, for example, in the Middle Ages, each falling apple was >> a sign without type, which was not a token, and I don't understand how >> anyone can deny that. >> >> On the other hand, in the psychic sciences, now known as the humanities and >> social sciences, we must proceed differently. Gemini again: >> >> Start of quote: The constructivist approach is often favored because the >> objects of study are not inert natural phenomena, but human, social, and >> cultural phenomena. >> >> 1. The Object is Socially Constructed: Unlike a physical law >> that would exist even without humans, concepts such as social class, nation, >> gender, or unemployment are categories that societies and researchers >> themselves have created to give meaning to reality. >> >> Example: The concept of the "nuclear family" is not a universal law, but a >> historical and sociological construct that varies across cultures and eras. >> >> 2. Interaction Changes the Object: The very act of studying a >> social phenomenon can change it. For example, if a study reveals that >> certain practices are considered undesirable, the people being studied may >> change their behavior, creating a reactivity effect (or Hawthorne effect*). >> >> 3. The Role of Paradigms: The theories and methods used >> (Marxism, functionalism, cognitive psychology, etc.) are interpretive >> frameworks (paradigms) that guide what is considered "discoverable." The >> interpretation of the same phenomenon (for example, delinquency) will be >> radically different depending on the interpretive framework chosen.. >> >> Discovery in the Humanities and Social Sciences: However, the discovery >> approach is not absent. It manifests itself in the search for regularities >> or underlying mechanisms: >> >> 1. Statistical Regularities: In sociology and economics, >> researchers seek to discover correlationsor statistical laws that describe >> the aggregate behavior of groups (laws of supply and demand, demographic >> trends, suicide rates linked to isolation, etc.). >> 2. Cognitive Mechanisms: In psychology and social neuroscience, >> the goal is to discover universal mechanisms that govern human cognition, >> emotions, or judgment biases (e.g., memory functioning or learning >> mechanisms). >> 3. Invariants: Some anthropologists and linguists seek >> invariant structures in all human cultures and languages, which would be >> akin to discovering fundamental laws (such as the hypothesis of universal >> grammar). >> >> Conclusion: In the social sciences and humanities, it could be said that >> researchers discover regularities and correlations in human behavior, but >> that they must then construct the concepts, theories, and models to explain >> them. It is a continuous process of interpretive modeling of social >> realities that are themselves constantly evolving. >> >> *The Hawthorne effect refers to the responsiveness of subjects in an >> experiment when they become aware that they are the focus of a study. It is >> a methodological bias in which the act of observation itself influences the >> measured results. (End of quote) >> >> In the social sciences and humanities, for example, particular objects of >> knowledge are social facts which, according to Emile Durkheim, must be >> viewed and treated as things in order to make sociology a positive science. >> Therefore, before being taken up by sociologists (or ethnologists), before >> any abduction concerning them has been formulated, these facts are sinsigns >> without type. >> >> JAS finally admitted the possibility of signs that are not replicas of >> legisigns, but this was to say that they could not exist, opposing his >> authority to that of Peirce on the question of the diagram. But I note that >> he did not comment on the DNA case. It would be a considerable task to >> critique his remarks, which I once again feel are an attempt at information >> saturation. So, I won't be doing that, even if he cries scandal. I prefer to >> take the time to finalize a paper on Mathematical Exactitude, which, by >> rigorously and clearly framing the kind of debates we are having here, will >> serve as a reference for me as I take up the scientific commitment that >> Peirce expresses in a letter to Francis C. Russell dated September 23, >> 1894: >> >> My special business is to bring mathematical exacti <>tude, - I mean modern >> mathematical exactitude into philosophy, - and to apply the ideas of >> mathematics in philosophy [...] I don't mean to shackle anybody with any >> condition other than that they shall work at the rendering of philosophy >> mathematically exact and scientifically founded on positive experience of >> some kind. (NEM IV: 12, 1894). >> >> Regards, >> >> Robert Marty >> >> Honorary Professor; PhD Mathematics, PhD Philosophy >> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty >> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty> >> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ >> >> Le ven. 14 nov. 2025 à 06:12, Gary Richmond <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>> Jon, Ben, >>> >>> You are both quite right that 'token' corresponds to 'sinsign' and not to >>> 'replica'. I have to be more careful in the future to hold that >>> correspondence firmly in mind as I had earlier fully agreed with it. >>> >>> So what happened? Perhaps I would have caught it -- rethought it -- if I >>> hadn't rushed to send my post before heading off to the theater this >>> evening. But no excuses! Just another reason for me to spend a day or two >>> reviewing other posts and fully thinking things through thoroughly in order >>> to avoid making such a blunder. >>> >>> At the moment I'm working on a post regarding Peirce's changing >>> terminology, and so this gaffe on my behalf is especially disturbing. >>> Although my post is principally concerned with the general change in >>> terminology more than any particular change (although there will be, >>> necessarily, examples), the question of the challenge that Peirce's >>> changing terminology presents to students of Peirce's logic as semeiotic, >>> especially in semeiotic grammar, seems to me to be an important one to >>> address. >>> >>> Meanwhile, your catching this error of mine is a major wake up call for me, >>> so thank you both. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R > From: Ulysses <upascal AT gmail.com <http://gmail.com/>> > To: peirce-l AT list.iu.edu <http://list.iu.edu/>, Benjamin Udell <baudell AT > gmail.com <http://gmail.com/>> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign Tokens and Sign Types (was Peirce's Categorial > Involution, and Contemporary Peirce Scholarship) > Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 23:38:38 +0100 > I think the important point that Edwina raises is that Peirce’s flavor or > realism is much more evolutionary than platonic realism. If, in line with > tychism and synechism, there is a continuity between singular/chance-driven > events and laws or that “matter is effete mind”, then the line between tokens > and types is not absolute. > > While I am not convinced that a chemist discovering a fact is an example of a > token without a type, it is worth considering in more detail. I understand > this to be a case where the chemist discovers an instance of a general > physical law. In this case, it is a sinsign instance of a legisign. However, > the novel formulation of the fact (in symbolic language) as no longer a mere > fact but as evidence of a law by the scientific community is an interesting > case in itself, especially because the discovery may only partially > illuminate the underlying physical tendency. Thus, the *codification* of a > law in human language, while also being a legsign, is different than the > underlying chemical law. Through a scientific community, the content of the > symbol might grow to approximate the underlying tendency more completely. > This complicates the relationship between “token” and “type” because the fact > is an instance of two different but related types— one that is “real” and one > that “exists” (and evolves) to approximate the real. While it was always an > instance of the former in real sense, it could not have always been an > instance of the latter, as that type didn’t exist yet. > > This is further complicated by Pierce’s hypothesis of an evolutionary > universe. If the laws of the universe evolve, does this suggest that at some > level of analysis physical “laws” themselves can be in a causal relationship > with one another? Do laws compete and adapt like species? For example can > universal constants like gravity or the speed of light be different and, if > not, is their stability/time symmetry a purely mathematically deduced outcome > of an absolute principle, or is it the outcome of some evolutionary process > that weeded out less stable possibilities? I think Peirce would entertain the > latter or find a continuity between both positions. > > Given this, I think the question of whether a physical law is a “sinsign” or > a “legisign” is less black and white, or at least not fully predetermined by > apriori principles. While a physical law’s dominant character is that of a > law or thirdness, the law at one moment in its evolutionary history might > still be in a causal relationship with other laws and thus exhibit some > characteristics of secondness. > > This does not answer JAS question directly, but it points to the possibility > that types themselves might evolve, the there might be moments between when > the type is fully formed and when instances don’t have a proper type. For > example in speciation, the proto members of a species are between two > species. Or in a machine learning algorithm, the first elements are sorted > randomly and their membership to a group emerges through the classification > process. Especially in bad or unscientific classifications, some things (or > noise) might be forced to be a member of a type despite not being a member of > a “real” type and in these cases, before the spurious type is fully developed > as used as a classification system, you could have instances that are non > members of that “type”. Of course this begs the question of what are real vs > spurious types, and even if some things don’t belong to certain types they > may still belong to others. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
