All, Correction, and just to be as clear possible, when I wrote:
the idea of "a deliberate, or self-controlled" process leading to the belief in an esthetic summum bonum of "the reasonable in itself," is in a sense, if not derived from at least a gift of *logica utens*, and provides here one example of the consequence of these three sciences acting upon each other *in scientific practice*. I erroneously wrote logica utens when I meant to write logica docens. What I wast trying to convey is that the "gift" of logica *docens* to esthetic (should my abduction be correct) is not at all the esthetic summum bonum itself, but merely the notion of "a deliberate or self-controlled" process allowing one to arrive at it (just reflect on the logical moves Peirce makes to arrive at ti). Since I discovered my erratum, I've thought that I suppose one could argue that a logica utens is sufficient for such a self-controlled process. So, now I'm not so certain. Best. Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 4:57 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>wrote: > Kees, Matt, Cathy, Gary F., list, > > Kees, first I want to thank you for your warm, generous, and wholly > unexpected endorsement of my moderating of peirce-l. Perhaps you'd gotten a > sense along the way that a good part of my work happens off-list as well as > on. In any case, I agree with you that the list has been very active since > the start of the seminar such that I find that what I consider to be one of > my primary duties as list moderator, namely, reading all posts, has proved > extremely time consuming recently. On the other hand, I'm delighted by the > extent of interest shown in the seminar as evidenced by the high volume of > postings, and I would encourage all, but especially those who have not yet > participated in the seminar, to do so. > > I also agree with Gary F. that you got "to the heart" of the relationship > between feeling and esthetics" in this post, so I'd like to reflect on > Matt's *other* question and your response to it. Matt wrote, and you > commented: > > *MF: "If the esthetic ideal is "that which is objectively admirable > without any ulterior reason", "without any reason for being admirable > beyond its inherent character," since we have no outside standard to judge > this admirability by how can we even recognize it so to deliberately aim > our actions at it?"* > > > > *CdW: I think the way to go about addressing this question is to go back > to what I said above: that we cannot derive the subsequent sciences from > the sciences they are grounded in. Just as phaneroscopy cannot tell us what > esthetics will be like, esthetics cannot tell us what ethics will be like. > It befalls to the science of ethics to try to answer this question, and it > does so by introducing such outside standards; they do not somehow evolve > from esthetics but are alien to it.* > > > In his message in response to yours Gary writes: > > *GF: Esthetics is just the science that ethics has to appeal to > for its idea of "good", so that logic can have an ethical grounding for its > normative judgment of reasoning. We might say that just as phaneroscopy > observes the phaneron and asks, "What are its indecomposable elements?", > esthetics looks at the phaneron and asks, "What could possibly be good > about it (or about any ingredient of it)?"* > > > To reiterate the salient point: phanersocopy asks "What are the phaneron's > indecomposable elements" and theoretical esthetics asks, "What good--*for > science*--is there in these indecomposable elements." > > > I purposefully emphasized "for science" as this is central to a question > Cathy asked me earlier this week pertaining to the relations of the three > normative sciences to each other. She quoted me: > > > *GR: "...arriving at the summum bonum for philosophical science is itself a > deliberate and self-controlled process leading to a particular kind of > habit formation; and that as "a deliberate, or self-controlled habit is > precisely a belief," a belief in the reasonable in itself can bridge the > gap between phenomenology and the (other) normative sciences, especially > logic as semiotic." (emphasis added to original post)* > > > > And a short while later she concluded her post by commenting on a remark > I made near the close of my post she was responding to: > > > *CL: I'm looking forward to hearing more about how you think the three > sciences might work together and even 'self-regulate' when you get the > chance.* > > > So, finally I'll try to bring together the several key ideas continued in > the above quotations in an abduction regarding the relationship of the > three normative sciences to each. I have tended to take Peirce at his word > when he remarked that the divisions of his classification of the sciences > are almost all trichotomies and, I would add, I see most, if not all, in > *genuine > *trichotomic relation as well. This seems to me to be the case here. > > > It seems to me that theoretical esthetics is not seeking the "good in > itself" *simply*, but the good *for cenoscopic science*. If the three > normative sciences are in genuine triadic relation, while, as Kees wrote, > *"** we cannot derive the subsequent sciences from the sciences they are > grounded in"* (in the sense of their principles), there remains the > possibility of vectorial movement through the three, so that in a sense the > idea of "a deliberate, or self-controlled" process leading to the belief in > an esthetic summum bonum of "the reasonable in itself," is in a sense, if > not derived from at least a gift of *logica utens*, and provides here one > example of the consequence of these three sciences acting upon each other *in > scientific practice*. > > > Best, > > > Gary R. > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 11:55 AM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> I think Kees gets to the heart of the relationship between feeling and >> esthetics here. >> >> >> >> I think we should also need to bear in mind that *Peirce's* "esthetics" >> has nothing to do with the development of taste, be it literary, artistic, >> culinary or whatever. Taste is indeed always contingent on embodiment and >> usually on cultural context too. >> Esthetics is just the science that ethics has to appeal to for *its*idea of >> "good", so that logic can have an ethical grounding for its >> normative judgment of reasoning. We might say that just as phaneroscopy >> observes the phaneron and asks, "What are its indecomposable elements?", >> esthetics looks at the phaneron and asks, "What could possibly be good >> about it (or about any ingredient of it)?" >> >> >> >> gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Cornelis de Waal [mailto:cdw...@iupui.edu] >> *Sent:* 22-Mar-14 9:11 AM >> *To:* Matt Faunce; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 4, The Normative >> Science of Logic >> >> >> >> Dear Matt, Cathy, List >> >> >> >> >> >> It is sure hard to keep up with this list, especially since there are now >> various parallel threads, and I'm very much impressed with Gary Richmond >> who seems to on the ball pretty much every day. The moderation of this list >> surely got into good hands. >> >> >> >> I want to pick up on some aspects of Matt's questions, as others have >> done also, and say something more about Peirce's criticism of Sigwart in >> connection with Peirce's esthetics, a discipline about which Peirce says >> relatively little. >> >> >> >> When you look at Peirce's division of the sciences, esthetics follows >> immediately after phaneroscopy and precedes ethics and logic, which follow >> it in that order. It seems to me, though, that in Peirce's scheme of things >> the higher sciences cannot be derived from the more basic ones. And Peirce >> does not go that route either. Instead he argues backward from what he >> believes logic should be, to what this requires in terms of a more basic >> and also broader discipline he identifies as ethics, which in a similar >> vein requires certain other things to be settled before it can do its job >> and that fall outside its purview, which brings Peirce to what he terms >> esthetics, and esthetics, finally, is constrained by the results of >> phaneroscopy. The argument he gives is rather neat and hinges on, or is >> inspired by, his doctrine of the categories. >> >> >> >> This means, though, that when discussing esthetics this should take place >> within the context of what Peirce takes logic to be, which is the >> enterprise of distinguishing good from bad reasoning, where the former is >> defined as any reasoning such that the truth of the premises gives us some >> assurance that the conclusion be true as well. This may run from an >> airtight deductive argument to a very tentative abduction. >> >> >> >> By taking this course, Peirce rejects the idea, he ascribes to Sigwart, >> that logic be grounded in psychology. Psychology, which Peirce takes to be >> a descriptive science, can tell us how people do reason, what they do feel >> when they see something that appears obvious to them etc., but it cannot >> tell us how people should reason. Sigwart argued, at least in Peirce's >> reading of him, that a certain feeling of necessity accompanies certain >> arguments and that it is this feeling that enables us to distinguish a >> necessary argument from one that is, say, a very compelling abductive >> argument. Now feeling, both at the individual and the collective level, has >> proven to be an unreliable guide to logic, in that bad arguments can >> nonetheless elicit very strong feelings that the conclusion is inescapable. >> In fact there is a whole discipline, called rhetoric, which seems to be >> specifically designed to giving people strong feelings that certain bad >> arguments are strong ones. Hence, I think that, justifiably or not, >> Sigwart exemplifies for Peirce a route he thinks should not be taken, >> namely to develop logic through a study the actual operations of the mind, >> de facto making it a descriptive enterprise. >> >> >> >> Now Matt asks whether perhaps ultimately our instinctive "immediate >> feelings of necessity" conform to the same esthetic ideals that Peirce's >> logic ultimately conforms to, adding that it might be possible to say that >> that logic is grounded in something like a final feeling of necessity >> experienced at the end of inquiry. These are good questions. >> >> >> >> I think approaching the issue from this angle exposes an interesting >> misconception, or an equivocation if you like. For Peirce what makes an >> argument a good one has everything to do with the relationship of the >> premises to the conclusion, and that of itself has nothing to do with what >> anyone thinks or feels about this connection. I'm confining myself here to >> this "feeling of necessity." When in an introductory logic class you >> introduce a valid syllogism to your students and some feel it makes no >> sense, others feel it is convincing without knowing why, and yet others >> feel the conclusion inescapable, all those feelings do not matter; what >> matters is that the form of the argument is such that the conclusion is >> inescapable. Now it seems to me that if this is true, then one would need >> to add some sustained argument to make the point that somehow those >> feelings, which are not relevant for determining the validity of an >> argument when the final opinion has not been reached, suddenly become the >> deciding factor to determine the validity of that argument once the final >> opinion is reached. I'm not sure what such an argument could look like, >> especially since any attempt to analyze a (simple) feeling requires one to >> replace it with a structure of claims, which causes one to rely on the >> relationship between premises and conclusions, suggesting that the analysis >> of this relationship is more basic in terms of grounding than any feeling >> thatmight be elicited by being exposed to an argument. Briefly put, Peirce >> takes this approach to be a wrong one and his discussion of ethics and >> esthetics is his attempt to seek an alternative. >> >> >> >> Before signing off, as the house is waking up, one brief comment on >> another question of Matt, which I'll quote whole: >> >> >> >> "If the esthetic ideal is "that which is objectively admirable without >> any ulterior reason", "without any reason for being admirable beyond its >> inherent character," since we have no outside standard to judge this >> admirability by how can we even recognize it so to deliberately aim our >> actions at it?" >> >> >> >> I think the way to go about addressing this question is to go back to >> what I said above: that we cannot derive the subsequent sciencesfrom the >> sciences they are grounded in. Just as phaneroscopy cannot tell uswhat >> esthetics will be like, esthetics cannot tell us what ethics will be like. >> It befalls to the science of ethics to try to answer this question, and it >> does so by introducing such outside standards; they do not somehow evolve >> from esthetics but are alien to it. >> >> >> >> Cheers, >> >> >> >> Kees >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> C > >
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