Stefan,
You miss Peirce's main point, it seems to me, in taking up his definition of
esthetics, and then moving on to beauty AS IF CSP took esthetics AS the science
of beauty and the beautiful.
It was Kant who took esthetics as the study of the beautiful. CSP was highly critical of this kind of stand.
In academic esthetics the Kantian view dominates. With CSP it leads nowhere
The definition you take up: esthetics as the science of the admirable in
itself, I take to be one of CSP's numerous working hypotheses. As something to
start with and mold after experimenting with it.
The idea that CSP held and cherished was not new. The famous poet John Keats (1795-1821)
expressed the idea in his poem: "Ode to a Grecian Urn":
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty, - that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know."
This is how Keats ends his poem.- The poem is well worth reading as a whole
Esp. note this:
" Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter; therefore, ye, soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endeared,
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone: (...)"
You say you cannot tell Matt, what beauty is. In that you join with CSP.
Neither could he!
CSP did not take as his starting point the differences between esthetics and
ethics. He took the similarities and resemblances as his starting point. - In
my view, it is only after these primary questions are given good-enough
(preliminary) answers, questions about differences might have a good-enough
Ground to continue.
Kirsti
Stefan Berwing [stefan.berw...@semiotikon.de] kirjoitti:
Matt,
thanks for the links! They made me dive into sound on youtube...
Peirce defines esthetics as the science of the admirable in itself.
Hmmm, what is admirable in itself? There are things of which i would say
they are admirable in itself but do others? What would my neighbors say
about a piece of the Einstürzende Neubauten (most of them are in their
70ies)? I believe most of them would say its terrible noise. Or just
take a look into Ecos History of Beauty?! I can't tell you what beauty
is, all i know is that history tells us it is changing. Even in my own
biography the feeling of it changes.
You used the stone garden and Birtwistle's stone as examples and then
you go on with the (d)evolution from law to chance. You used music as an
example to introduce order and chance. So lets expand this example and
look at serial, stochastic and statistical music. I can see beauty in
many of the products of these composition techniques. Also these
techniques can be expanded to the arrangement of colors, forms etc. So
something like a serial, stochastical or statistical esthetics sems to
be possible or thinkable.
But is something like serial, stochastic or statistical ethics possible?
What makes the good and the beautiful different? Isn't there a
difference between a "natural" devolution into chance and someone
choosing deliberatly to push the "red button"?
You see i'm avoiding answers by asking counterquestions ;)
Best
Stefan
> Stefan, list,
>
> Listen to and watch Birtwistle's Aleatoric Pebble. Is the sound and
> motion beautiful? (It's just over three minutes long):
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbtspU4aGx0
>
> Here's a picture of a Japanese garden:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kyoto-Ryoan-Ji_MG_4512.jpg
>
> Birtwistle quotes John Cage at 2:50 in the video, "It would be just as
> interesting where ever you put them." What do you think of Cage's
> statement? What if the world were evolving backwards, with laws
> evolving into chance? Would that be bad? Why? What does bad or ugly mean?
>
> Matt
>
>
> On 3/26/14, 4:27 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote:
>> Cathy, Gary,
>>
>> thanks for your very illuminating exchange. Reading it was a pleasure.
>>
>> Cathy you wrote at the und of your last post:
>>
>> "Yes but I think the matter is saved by a realist faith that the
>> ugly ones will turn out to introduce inconsistency if we try to live
>> by them, if only an inconsistency with the full range of sentiments
>> with which we have been endowed as evolved creatures"
>>
>> As far as i can see and understand right now this fits into Peirce
>> thought and hence is a good interpretation. You don't mention it
>> explicitly, but you also introduced the self-correction-hypothesis
>> through the backdoor by saying "will turn out" and by paralellizing
>> it with the peircean concept of truth:
>>
>> " I see this issue as isomorphic with well-worked out discussions
>> about Peirces concept of truth in logic. Some feel that defining
>> truth in terms of the opinion all will ultimately agree on leaves
>> things too open for false belief, but the Peircean answer is that it
>> is not nearly as easy to achieve universal agreement as this
>> objection might assume. "
>>
>> I believe this is also inline with Peirce. But if this is Peirce
>> position (we slowly approach truth and we also approach a better
>> world because the ugly aims turn out to be inconsistent) isn't he
>> then like Leibniz? This remembers me immediatly of Voltaires mocking
>> about Leibniz in his Candide. All possible evils happen to Candide
>> and almost till the end he believes his Master Pangloss that he is
>> living in the best oft all possible worlds. For Peirce we don't live
>> in the best of all possible worlds right now, but it will end with a
>> big hollywood-like happy end. I just can't buy this! In my opinion
>> this isn't "realist faith", this is christian faith. It's the
>> desperate praying " the lord is my sheperd, i shall not thirst...";
>> somehow it will all come out right in the end.
>>
>> I also don't see why ugly aims should be logically inconsistent. They
>> only become inconsistent because we secretly introduce ethical
>> propositions and not because they are not properly deduced from their
>> propositions. Peirce introduces this ethical proposition in his
>> quotes about "logic and the social principle" not that secretly:
>>
>> "This community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all
>> races of beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate
>> intellectual relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this
>> geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his
>> own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in
>> all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social
>> principle."
>>
>> "That logic rigidly requires, before all else, that no determinate
>> fact, nothing which can happen to a mans self, should be of more
>> consequence to him than everything else. He who would not sacrifice
>> his own soul to save the whole world, is illogical in all his
>> inferences, collectively. So the social principle is rooted
>> intrinsically in logic."
>>
>> Others on the list have argued that this is not circular and i agree
>> on that. People who are able to think logically should conclude that
>> self-sacfrifice can be nescecarry. And people who are willing to
>> sacrifice themselfes have the ability to become truly logical
>> thinkers. But the important point is, that in both cases the
>> self-sacrifice is the ethical principle. In the first case you
>> conclude so, in the second you have already commited yourself to it.
>> As a result the ill logic is then only a consequence of not acting on
>> this principle.
>>
>> I don't argue that it should not be the principle, i only don't see
>> why it is necessarily the principle. And also i don't see why
>> self-correction thesis should work on issues of ethics. If mankind
>> had the ability to destroy the whole universe, this destruction is a
>> real possibility and i see no reason why and how self-correction
>> should or could change something about it (that it didn't happen
>> during the cold war to our planet was just luck (s. Stanislaw
>> Petrow)). So, if total destruction was possible why should not one
>> person get for this goal and reach it?
>>
>> Please prove me wrong, it would make sleep much better ;)
>>
>> Best
>> Stefan
>>
>>
>> On 24. März 2014 01:38:29 MEZ, Catherine Legg <cl...@waikato.ac.nz>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Gary,
>>
>> Here is the promised follow-up on your very rich post. Please see
>> comments inline below.
>>
>> *From:*Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com
>> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>]
>> *Sent:* Thursday, 20 March 2014 12:56 p.m.
>> *To:* Catherine Legg
>> *Cc:* Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 4, The
>> Normative Science of Logic
>>
>> Cathy, list,
>>
>> I've enjoyed reading all your recent posts in this thread, Cathy,
>> and have thoughts on certain points you made in several of them.
>> But, for now, just a remark or two (and some longish Peirce
>> quotations) on your comments regarding the post of mine which you
>> responded to. You quoted me:
>>
>> *GR: &arriving at the summum bonum for philosophical science
>> is itself a deliberate and self-controlled process leading to
>> a particular kind of habit formation; and that as "a
>> deliberate, or self-controlled habit is precisely a belief,"
>> a belief in the reasonable in itself can bridge the gap
>> between phenomenology and the (other) normative sciences,
>> especially logic as semiotic. *
>>
>> Then you wrote:
>>
>> *Thats good, but I would say there is also a subtle
>> feeling->belief bridging process going on too across these
>> three sciences.*
>>
>> **
>>
>> *Somehow a pleasant feeling of harmoniousness in aesthetics
>> modulates into the categorical imperative which turns away
>> from the inherent ugliness of hypocrisy in ethics, which
>> modulates into the desire to further the truth in logic. *
>>
>> I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "a subtle feeling -> belief
>> bridging process (so please explicate that, if you will), but I
>> think you may be on to something here.
>>
>> > What I was struggling to put into words was the way in which the
>> so-called noncognitive and cognitive - usually taken to be an
>> unbridgeable dualism in mainstream analytic philosophy might
>> modulate one into the other synechistically within Peirces
>> philosophy, as we traverse the three normative sciences. How
>> exactly that might happen. And also the question of how such
>> insights might **motivate** us, to do good ethically, and to try
>> to be as logical as possible.
>>
>> Yet, Peirce's use of 'kalos' suggests that the feeling may not
>> necessarily be "pleasant" nor "harmonious"--it must simply be
>> integrally "what it is." In addition, Peirce's interpretation of
>> Kant's categorical imperative is complex, to say the least.
>> Perhaps this passage brings that double problematic into relief.
>> Peirce writes, regarding the "esthetically good":
>>
>> * . . . In the light of the doctrine of categories I should
>> say that an object, to be esthetically good, must have a
>> multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a
>> positive simple immediate quality to their totality; and
>> _whatever does this is, in so far, esthetically good, no
>> matter what the particular quality of the total may be_/./ If
>> that quality be such as to nauseate us, to scare us, or
>> otherwise to disturb us to the point of throwing us out of
>> the mood of esthetic enjoyment, out of the mood of simply
>> contemplating the embodiment of the quality.. .*.
>>
>> Now there is some question as to whether Peirce continued to hold
>> to this view (kalos), and one contributor to this list earlier
>> this year suggested that Peirce's reading of Schiller led him to
>> a view of an esthetic summum bonum closer to what you've written;
>> that is, one which valorizes a higher, more "harmonious" (as you
>> wrote) character.
>>
>> > I wasnt necessarily in favour of this higher harmony , just
>> working through the possibilities in my mind.
>>
>> In any event, Peirce, the present line of thinking leads Peirce
>> to conclude in the same vein:
>>
>> *. . . that there is no such thing as positive esthetic
>> badness; and since by goodness we chiefly in this discussion
>> mean merely the absence of badness, or faultlessness, there
>> will be no such thing as esthetic goodness. All there will be
>> will be various esthetic qualities; that is, simple qualities
>> of totalities not capable of full embodiment in the parts,
>> which qualities may be more decided and strong in one case
>> than in another.. . . My notion would be that there are
>> innumerable varieties of esthetic quality, but no purely
>> esthetic grade of excellence. ** CP 5.132 *
>>
>> > This is a very deep quote! Thanks for sharing it!!
>>
>> > The last sentence makes a lot of sense to me just insofar as one
>> would expect the concept of overall good NOT to be defined
>> until we get into Ethics.
>>
>> Then, immediately after writing this he remarks a propos the
>> categorical imperative.
>>
>> * But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an
>> ultimate end of action, at that instant a categorical
>> imperative pronounces for or against it. Kant, as you know,
>> proposes to allow that categorical imperative to stand
>> unchallenged -- an eternal pronouncement. His position is in
>> extreme disfavor now, and not without reason. . . . _The
>> whole question is whether or not this categorical imperative
>> be beyond control._ If this voice of conscience is
>> unsupported by ulterior reasons, is it not simply an
>> insistent irrational howl. . .? . . . If we cannot disregard
>> conscience, all homilies and moral maxims are perfectly idle.
>> _But if it can be disregarded, it is, in one sense, not
>> beyond control. It leaves us free to control ourselves. _So
>> then, it appears to me that any aim whatever which can be
>> consistently pursued becomes, as soon as it is unfalteringly
>> adopted, beyond all possible criticism, except the quite
>> impertinent criticism of outsiders. An aim which cannot be
>> adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot
>> properly be called an ultimate aim at all. _The only moral
>> evil is not to have an ultimate aim._ CP 5.133 *
>>
>> > WOW! Peirce is such a powerful thinker.
>>
>> Hm. That last sentence was at first difficult for me to swallow
>> since it would seem to allow for all sorts of even ugly "ultimate
>> aims."
>>
>> > Yes but I think the matter is saved by a realist faith that
>> the ugly ones will turn out to introduce inconsistency if we try
>> to live by them, if only an inconsistency with the full range of
>> sentiments with which we have been endowed as evolved creatures.
>>
>> >I see this issue as isomorphic with well-worked out discussions
>> about Peirces concept of truth in logic. Some feel that defining
>> truth in terms of the opinion all will ultimately agree on leaves
>> things too open for false belief, but the Peircean answer is that
>> it is not nearly as easy to achieve universal agreement as this
>> objection might assume.
>>
>> Fortunately, turning now to ethics, Peirce immediately follows
>> this by considering what "the nature of an ultimate aim" might be:
>>
>> >
>>
>> *** Accordingly the problem of ethics is to ascertain what
>> end is possible. . . . _[Now consider] the nature of an
>> absolute aim, which is what would be pursued under all
>> possible circumstances _-- that is, even though the
>> contingent facts ascertained by special sciences were
>> entirely different from what they [presently] are. Nor, on
>> the other hand, must the definition of such aim be reduced to
>> a mere formalism. **CP 5.13*4
>>
>> What follows is a discussion of the implications of "all this"
>> for pragmatism, something which it would be premature to get into
>> just yet. In any event, Peirce concludes:
>>
>> * . . . [that] it is incumbent upon us to inquire what an
>> ultimate aim, capable of being pursued in an indefinitely
>> prolonged course of action, can be. CP 5.135*
>>
>> He then deduces that the characters of such an ultimate aim are
>> as follows:
>>
>> *. . . In order that the aim should be immutable under all
>> circumstances, without which it will not be an ultimate aim,
>> _it is requisite that it should accord with a free
>> development of the agent's own esthetic quality_. *
>>
>> **
>>
>> *> i.e. personality, I would say - CL*
>>
>> **
>>
>> *At the same time it is requisite that _it should not
>> ultimately tend to be disturbed by the reactions upon the
>> agent of that outward world which is supposed in the very
>> idea of action_. It is plain that these two conditions can be
>> fulfilled at once only if it happens that the esthetic
>> quality toward which the agent's free development tends and
>> that of the ultimate action of experience upon him are parts
>> of one esthetic total. . . . . . [Thus] the rule of ethics
>> will be to adhere to the only possible absolute aim, and to
>> hope that it will prove attainable. . . CP 5.136 *
>>
>> Yet, all of this only clears the ground for the consideration of
>> logical goodness--which will also be in one essential sense,
>> scientific goodness--and which we know Peirce held to be "the
>> reasonable in itself." Unfortunately, I haven't yet gotten to how
>> one arrives at that, let alone what you asked concerning how I
>> imagine that esthetics, ethics, and logic as semeiotic work
>> together to, perhaps, even "self-regulate." While I hope to get
>> to this, I hope that this bit of clearing the grounds for that
>> discussion has been helpful.
>>
>> > Thanks for a fab post, Gary!
>>
>> Cathy
>>
>>
>> --
>> Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail
>> gesendet.
>
>
> --
> Matt
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