Tori, Gary F., Jon, list,
In one of his "Ground arms!" examples, Peirce says, in, CP 8.178 (CP
editors: "Paragraphs 177-185 are from a long manuscript, undated, in
Widener IB3a. The references in it indicate that this manuscript is part
of a letter, but the extant part contains neither salutation nor
signature.") -
[....] The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the
sign. For the Object of "Napoleon" is the Universe of Existence so
far as it is determined by the fact of Napoleon being a Member of
it. The Object of the sentence "Hamlet was insane" is the Universe
of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being
a part of it. The Object of the Command "Ground arms!" is the
immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far as it is
affected by the molition expressed in the command. It cannot be
understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's
relation to the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the
Object is in the Universe of things desired by the Commanding
Captain at that moment. Or since the obedience is fully expected, it
is in the Universe of his expectation. At any rate, it determines
the Sign although it is to be created by the Sign by the
circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of
mind of the officer.
(Note on "molition": in CP 8.303 Peirce says: "[...] what I call
_/Molition/_, which is volition minus all desire and purpose, the mere
consciousness of _/exertion/_ of any kind.")
There, an end or objective can, through a mind, act like an agent; it is
an object in a universe of things desired or expected. Although it is an
end, through a mind it works as a beginning, a source, of semiotic and
indeed actual determination. One might suppose that in an evolutionary
context, something similar could happen with vegetable-level organisms;
there the evolutionary process is a quasi-mind through which a general
and telical object exerts its influence, instantiated in particular
cases with particular objects. I would distinguish _/telos/_,
culmination, as desired object, from entelechy as expected object, but
that's just me.
Peirce's other "Ground arms" examples involve the resultant action as
the sign's interpretant rather than as the sign's object. I take this to
be not an inconsistency but a reflection of a difference of perspective;
the resultant action by the soldiers is the command's interpretant
(dynamic or energetic) from the perspective of the soldiers.
From a letter dated April 1, 1909 to William James CP 8.315, from the
William James collection,
[....] When the captain of infantry gives the word "Ground arms!"
the dynamic Interpretant is in the thump of the muskets on the
ground, or rather it is the Act of their Minds. [....]
In CP 5.473, from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])," c. 1906.
[....] Suppose, for example, an officer of a squad or company of
infantry gives the word of command, "Ground arms!" This order is, of
course, a sign. That thing which causes a sign as such is called the
_/object/_ (according to the usage of speech, the "real," but more
accurately, the _/existent/_ object) represented by the sign: the
sign is determined to some species of correspondence with that
object. In the present case, the object the command represents is
the will of the officer that the butts of the muskets be brought
down to the ground. Nevertheless, the action of his will upon the
sign is not simply dyadic [....]
In CP 5.475, again from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])," c. 1906.
[....] If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it
will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and
such further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the
energetic interpretant. The effort may be a muscular one, as it is
in the case of the command to ground arms; but it is much more
usually an exertion upon the Inner World, a mental effort. It never
can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since it is a single
act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. [....]
From the start with Aristotle, a form of a thing was a cause of it
simply because it was its form; a natural end likewise; but in the
modern perspective this means that even thermodynamic decay is an end
and a cause in some Aristotelian sense, and people tend to regard as a
final cause something more agentlike, as we see happening via minds and
evolution. There is, however, nothing in mental life as we know it to
suggest a level where ALL objects, as sources of determination, are
really ends or objectives, given that people deal freely with genuinely
mechanical causes and others' wills as causes, as well as with special
ends whose influence is channeled through desire, expectation, etc., and
people generally know the difference(s). Why should we suppose that
evolution, as quasi-mind, has taken a narrower path than that with
organisms generally? It seems like you're bringing in a pure telicism to
compete with pure materialism and mechanism.
Best, Ben
On 3/27/2014 9:09 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Tori,
Your paper seems to be based on a misreading of Peirce which assumes
that in his semiotic, the object component of the triadic sign
relation is "thought of either as a material thing or as an idea"
(omitting events, processes, facts etc., which can all be objects of
Peircean signs). As near as I can make out, your solution to this
pseudo-problem is to make all reference self-reference, i.e. to
eliminate Secondness from sign relations. But you can’t have a genuine
Thirdness without genuine Secondness.
If you think I’ve "reversed my opinion" on this issue, you must have
missed my reply to your most recent message about it, so I’ve pasted
that in below (along with your message).
gary f.
*From:* VN A [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of * VN Alexander
*Sent:* 26-Mar-14 4:41 PM
Jon,
I make the argument in "Creativity: Self-Referential Mistaking, Not
Negating" that "object" in the triad should be thought of as an
objective of the interpreting system. I give a number of reasons why
the "object" should not be thought of either as a material thing or
as an idea. This may not be so obvious in human semiosis, but
biosemiotics doesn't work unless the object is defined as the
objective.
If I recall correctly there was quite a bit of resistance to my
theory from several listers, esp Gary F (who has since reversed his
opinion, I believe.) In that paper I also relate the object to the
intentional object and to the emergent whole.
You can view the paper here
http://www.academia.edu/2109842/Creativity_Self-Referential_Mistaking_Not_Negating
or here
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/232702090_Creativity_Self-Referential_Mistaking_Not_Negating
Tori
________________________
*From:* Gary Fuhrman [mailto:[email protected]]
*Sent:* 19-Mar-14 1:04 PM
*To:* 'VN Alexander'
*Subject:* RE: [biosemiotics:5428] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
Tori,
It didn’t occur to me at the time that by the "objective" of a
process, you meant the process itself! I guess that does make a kind
of sense, since self-maintenance is obviously a /recursive/ process.
But it’s also likely to cause confusion, it seems to me, to refer to
a dynamic process as an "objective". It would be like referring to a
race as the finish line.
In the case of a "gene" which is an indexical /sinsign/ , I would
regard its dynamic object as /the previous iteration/ of the
recursive process. Looking at it as a /legisign/ , as the /type/ of
that gene, I could say that the process in general (including future
iterations) is its /object/ . But I still wouldn’t call that its
"objective" because, to me, the "objective" of a currently running
process can /only/ be /in futuro./ — Or rather, the only kind of
process which can have an objective /actually represented before it
runs/ is a consciously intended, planned process. That’s what makes
it consciously intentional, the fact that we can say what its
objective is. I don’t think the self-maintenance of most organisms
is planned in that way.
gary f.
*From: * VN A [mailto:[email protected] ] *On Behalf Of * VN
Alexander
*Sent:* 19-Mar-14 11:42 AM
*To:* Gary Fuhrman
*Subject:* Re: [biosemiotics:5428] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
Gary,
Maybe I misremember our exchange on the list some months ago, but
didn't you reject my idea that the "object" in the triadic sign
relation be thought of as the objective of self-maintenace?
Below you assert my argument exactly.
Its dynamic object can only be the dynamic process which
produced it
Tori
_________________________________
Victoria N. Alexander, PhD
www.dactylfoundation.org <http://www.dactylfoundation.org>
www.biologistsmistress.com <http://www.biologistsmistress.com>
On Mar 19, 2014, at 9:26 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
DNA molecule can be regarded as an indexical sinsign (which is a
replica of a legisign); but its *object* is certainly not a cell.
Its dynamic object can only be the dynamic process which produced
it, which is of the /type/ that generates DNA molecules of a
structure which includes that gene. And like the gene, that
process can only make sense (or exist) in its context, which
includes both its (cellular) environment and the evolutionary
history of that /type/ of process. It’s indexical because it has a
real (causal) relation to that object, which determines it to
determine its interpretant (say, a protein).
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