[sent yesterday but, accidentally, not to the list]
Ben, if I read this right, it shows that the object of a sign can be an objective, but only in the very special case of an intentional utterance in the imperative mood, such as the officer’s order. More generally, though, the “object” — depending on the analysis — can be an existing thing, or an idea, or a complex of objects which can be regarded as singular or plural, or it can be the whole universe from which those particular objects were selected for special attention, e.g. “the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it”, which is the object of the sign “Hamlet was insane”. And I agree that biosemiotic processes, whether behavioral, developmental or evolutionary, are unlikely to confine themselves to the pattern of the imperative mood in linguistic utterances, which (as Peirce points out here) are effective only in the kind of system in which officers give conventional commands and expect them to be obeyed. I doubt that such systems exist at the biological level of semiosis, though they clearly do at the cultural level among social animals such as most primates. gary f. From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 27-Mar-14 2:01 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects, Objectives, Objectivity Tori, Gary F., Jon, list, In one of his "Ground arms!" examples, Peirce says, in, CP 8.178 (CP editors: "Paragraphs 177-185 are from a long manuscript, undated, in Widener IB3a. The references in it indicate that this manuscript is part of a letter, but the extant part contains neither salutation nor signature.") - [....] The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the sign. For the Object of "Napoleon" is the Universe of Existence so far as it is determined by the fact of Napoleon being a Member of it. The Object of the sentence "Hamlet was insane" is the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it. The Object of the Command "Ground arms!" is the immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far as it is affected by the molition expressed in the command. It cannot be understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's relation to the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object is in the Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or since the obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. At any rate, it determines the Sign although it is to be created by the Sign by the circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind of the officer. (Note on "molition": in CP 8.303 Peirce says: "[...] what I call _Molition_, which is volition minus all desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of _exertion_ of any kind.") There, an end or objective can, through a mind, act like an agent; it is an object in a universe of things desired or expected. Although it is an end, through a mind it works as a beginning, a source, of semiotic and indeed actual determination. One might suppose that in an evolutionary context, something similar could happen with vegetable-level organisms; there the evolutionary process is a quasi-mind through which a general and telical object exerts its influence, instantiated in particular cases with particular objects. I would distinguish _telos_, culmination, as desired object, from entelechy as expected object, but that's just me. Peirce's other "Ground arms" examples involve the resultant action as the sign's interpretant rather than as the sign's object. I take this to be not an inconsistency but a reflection of a difference of perspective; the resultant action by the soldiers is the command's interpretant (dynamic or energetic) from the perspective of the soldiers. >From a letter dated April 1, 1909 to William James CP 8.315, from the William >James collection, [....] When the captain of infantry gives the word "Ground arms!" the dynamic Interpretant is in the thump of the muskets on the ground, or rather it is the Act of their Minds. [....] In CP 5.473, from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])," c. 1906. [....] Suppose, for example, an officer of a squad or company of infantry gives the word of command, "Ground arms!" This order is, of course, a sign. That thing which causes a sign as such is called the _object_ (according to the usage of speech, the "real," but more accurately, the _existent_ object) represented by the sign: the sign is determined to some species of correspondence with that object. In the present case, the object the command represents is the will of the officer that the butts of the muskets be brought down to the ground. Nevertheless, the action of his will upon the sign is not simply dyadic [....] In CP 5.475, again from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])," c. 1906. [....] If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant. The effort may be a muscular one, as it is in the case of the command to ground arms; but it is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner World, a mental effort. It never can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since it is a single act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. [....] >From the start with Aristotle, a form of a thing was a cause of it simply >because it was its form; a natural end likewise; but in the modern perspective >this means that even thermodynamic decay is an end and a cause in some >Aristotelian sense, and people tend to regard as a final cause something more >agentlike, as we see happening via minds and evolution. There is, however, >nothing in mental life as we know it to suggest a level where ALL objects, as >sources of determination, are really ends or objectives, given that people >deal freely with genuinely mechanical causes and others' wills as causes, as >well as with special ends whose influence is channeled through desire, >expectation, etc., and people generally know the difference(s). Why should we >suppose that evolution, as quasi-mind, has taken a narrower path than that >with organisms generally? It seems like you're bringing in a pure telicism to >compete with pure materialism and mechanism. Best, Ben
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