Dear All,
I just want o add, that by calling the terms habit and mind problematic, I didnt want to say that it is not good using them. I just think for me it is a good idea trying to avoid terms that derive of human traits for speaking of nonhuman situations. That is just because they arouse hunches like that of anthropomorphism, superstition, Sheldrakeian theory on one hand, and on the other the hunch of diminishing the value of humanness. All this is not helpful while being in the analyzing state. Later it may be ok, when it is about comparing everything with each other. So, while at first trying to analyze semioses, I would try to replace "habit" with "function", "mind" with "reflexive system", "self referential" with "reciprocal" or something like that (because for psychologists, "self" has a narrower meaning than eg. for mathematicians). Well, that is just a proposal or to tell how I would try to avoid misunderstandings. Later one can compare eg. the reflexive system human mind with reflexivity in inanimate nature, and ask whether there is something in inanimate nature comparable with human mind, and thus can be called "mind" as well. Or about plants. But eg. using "mind, habit, self" from the start might sound like a presumption, though it probably isnt, and triggers objections.
Best,
Helmut
Dear Tori, Gary, List,
I think that the terms "habit" and "mind" are problematic, because their extensions are not clear. For example, according to Peircean tychism the natural laws are habits of the universal mind. Some others wont agree to that. I dont know. I would say, what we might call a habitual semiosis, I rather would call something functionally repeating: A system aka solenoid aka ongoing semiosis. The three categorial parts of a system I call behaviour (1), function element (2), and structure (3). So I would replace "habit" with "function": An object or objective (category 2) is a reconfirmation of a function. An interpretant is the change of a function, or a new part of structure. I think there are two main kinds of systems: active and reflective ones. The human mind is a reflecting system. Whether in physiosemiosis (active systems) also some mind is involved, I think is a question of belief or term definition.
Best,
Helmut
Gary F,
I guess you missed this:
"Of course, then we have to talk about how learning occurs within this cycle of self-confirmation. That involves biopoiesis not biosemiosis, per se."
And as Jon Awbrey notes several times in his posts, this talk of object=objective brings up the Meno question. Jon provided the links to posts going back years on that.
This confirms that you are trying to banish Secondness from the semiotic universe,
That's a bizarre thing to say.
Tori
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Victoria N. Alexander, PhD
On Mar 28, 2014, at 11:11 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Tori,I don’t see how you (or anyone in the sciences) can actually believe that “All responses to something as a sign tend to reconfirm a mental habit.” You’re saying that there is no such thing as a surprise or a habit-change as a response to it, i.e. no possibility of learning any new habits. This confirms that you are trying to banish Secondness from the semiotic universe, to do away with “Obsistence” as Peirce sometimes called it, emphasizing the root meaning of the prefix “ob-” as “against”.gary f.Gary F, Ben, John D, Jon A, AllJ Deely and J Awbrey very briefly, YES!Gary F. Ben, Clearly in all biosemiotic processes the object must be understood as "objective" in the sense that the response to something as a sign tends to reconfirm a (useful) habit. We need to understand mental processes in a similar way. All responses to something as a sign tend to reconfirm a mental habit. Self-confirmation is thus the "objective" of all semiotic processes, insofar as responses (interpretants) tend to increase the likelihood of that mental habit occurring again.Jon Awbrey writesIn the case of creatures like ourselves, it is possible to regard our conscious contents as representing our body’s theory of what is likely to deserve our mind’s attention. If that theory is a good one, then we may live to be conscious of another day.In other words, you take the "mentalism" out of the term "objective" and you understand it in terms of the reconfirmation of a tendency. Of course, then we have to talk about how learning occurs within this cycle of self-confirmation. That involves biopoiesis not biosemiosis, per se.Ben writes:From the start with Aristotle, a form of a thing was a cause of it simply because it was its form; a natural end likewise; but in the modern perspective this means that even thermodynamic decay is an end and a cause in some Aristotelian sense, and people tend to regard as a final cause something more agentlike, as we see happening via minds and evolution. There is, however, nothing in mental life as we know it to suggest a level where ALL objects, as sources of determination, are really ends or objectives, given that people deal freely with genuinely mechanical causes and others' wills as causes, as well as with special ends whose influence is channeled through desire, expectation, etc., and people generally know the difference(s). Why should we suppose that evolution, as quasi-mind, has taken a narrower path than that with organisms generally? It seems like you're bringing in a pure telicism to compete with pure materialism and mechanism.
I do not accept the, to me, purely rhetorical argument that "thermodynamic decay is an end." At best, decay is "like" an end because it's a tendency. There the comparison stops. Decay is unlike "end" in the sense of purpose or objective, which, in every case of purpose, is to maintain the dynamic identity of the complex system, not dissolve it.people tend to regard as a final cause something more agentlike, as we see happening via minds
As I noted above, this conception of mentalism is probably mistaken. Thoughts are also physical tendencies and habits.Tori
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