Gary F, Ben, John D, Jon A, All J Deely and J Awbrey very briefly, YES!
Gary F. Ben, Clearly in all biosemiotic processes the object must be understood as "objective" in the sense that the response to something as a sign tends to reconfirm a (useful) habit. We need to understand mental processes in a similar way. All responses to something as a sign tend to reconfirm a mental habit. Self-confirmation is thus the "objective" of all semiotic processes, insofar as responses (interpretants) tend to increase the likelihood of that mental habit occurring again. Jon Awbrey writes > In the case of creatures like ourselves, it is possible to regard our > conscious contents as representing our body’s theory of what is likely to > deserve our mind’s attention. If that theory is a good one, then we may live > to be conscious of another day. In other words, you take the "mentalism" out of the term "objective" and you understand it in terms of the reconfirmation of a tendency. Of course, then we have to talk about how learning occurs within this cycle of self-confirmation. That involves biopoiesis not biosemiosis, per se. Ben writes: >> From the start with Aristotle, a form of a thing was a cause of it simply >> because it was its form; a natural end likewise; but in the modern >> perspective this means that even thermodynamic decay is an end and a cause >> in some Aristotelian sense, and people tend to regard as a final cause >> something more agentlike, as we see happening via minds and evolution. There >> is, however, nothing in mental life as we know it to suggest a level where >> ALL objects, as sources of determination, are really ends or objectives, >> given that people deal freely with genuinely mechanical causes and others' >> wills as causes, as well as with special ends whose influence is channeled >> through desire, expectation, etc., and people generally know the >> difference(s). Why should we suppose that evolution, as quasi-mind, has >> taken a narrower path than that with organisms generally? It seems like >> you're bringing in a pure telicism to compete with pure materialism and >> mechanism. >> I do not accept the, to me, purely rhetorical argument that "thermodynamic decay is an end." At best, decay is "like" an end because it's a tendency. There the comparison stops. Decay is unlike "end" in the sense of purpose or objective, which, in every case of purpose, is to maintain the dynamic identity of the complex system, not dissolve it. >> people tend to regard as a final cause something more agentlike, as we see >> happening via minds >> As I noted above, this conception of mentalism is probably mistaken. Thoughts are also physical tendencies and habits. Tori _________________________________ Victoria N. Alexander, PhD www.dactylfoundation.org www.biologistsmistress.com On Mar 28, 2014, at 8:12 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > [sent yesterday but, accidentally, not to the list] > > Ben, if I read this right, it shows that the object of a sign can be an > objective, but only in the very special case of an intentional utterance in > the imperative mood, such as the officer’s order. More generally, though, the > “object” — depending on the analysis — can be an existing thing, or an idea, > or a complex of objects which can be regarded as singular or plural, orit can > be the whole universe from which those particular objects were selected for > special attention, e.g. “the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it > is determined by Hamlet being a part of it”, which is the object of the sign > “Hamlet was insane”. And I agree that biosemiotic processes, whether > behavioral, developmental or evolutionary, are unlikely to confine themselves > to the pattern of the imperative mood in linguistic utterances, which (as > Peirce points out here) are effective only in the kind of system in which > officers give conventional commands and expect them to be obeyed. I doubt > that such systems exist at the biological level of semiosis, though they > clearly do at the cultural level among social animals such as most primates. > > gary f. > > From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 27-Mar-14 2:01 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects, Objectives, Objectivity > > Tori, Gary F., Jon, list, > > In one of his "Ground arms!" examples, Peirce says, in, CP 8.178 (CP editors: > "Paragraphs 177-185 are from a long manuscript, undated, in Widener IB3a. The > references in it indicate that this manuscript is part of a letter, but the > extant part contains neither salutation nor signature.") - > > [....] The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the sign. For > the Object of "Napoleon" is the Universe of Existence so far as it is > determined by the fact of Napoleon being a Member of it. The Object of the > sentence "Hamlet was insane" is the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far > as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it. The Object of the Command > "Ground arms!" is the immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far as > it is affected by the molition expressed in the command. It cannot be > understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's relation to the > rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object is in the > Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or since > the obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. At > any rate, it determines the Sign although it is to be created by the Sign by > the circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind > of the officer. > > (Note on "molition": in CP 8.303 Peirce says: "[...] what I call _Molition_, > which is volition minus all desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of > _exertion_ of any kind.") > > There, an end or objective can, through a mind, act like an agent; it is an > object in a universe of things desired or expected. Although it is an end, > through a mind it works as a beginning, a source, of semiotic and indeed > actual determination. One might suppose that in an evolutionary context, > something similar could happen with vegetable-level organisms; there the > evolutionary process is a quasi-mind through which a general and telical > object exerts its influence, instantiated in particular cases with particular > objects. I would distinguish _telos_, culmination, as desired object, from > entelechy as expected object, but that's just me. > > Peirce's other "Ground arms" examples involve the resultant action as the > sign's interpretant rather than as the sign's object. I take this to be not > an inconsistency but a reflection of a difference of perspective; the > resultant action by the soldiers is the command's interpretant (dynamic or > energetic) from the perspective of the soldiers. > > From a letter dated April 1, 1909 to William James CP 8.315, from the William > James collection, > > [....] When the captain of infantry gives the word "Ground arms!" the dynamic > Interpretant is in the thump of the muskets on the ground, or rather it is > the Act of their Minds. [....] > > In CP 5.473, from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])," c. 1906. > > [....] Suppose, for example, an officer of a squad or company of infantry > gives the word of command, "Ground arms!" This order is, of course, a sign. > That thing which causes a sign as such is called the _object_ (according to > the usage of speech, the "real," but more accurately, the _existent_ object) > represented by the sign: the sign is determined to some species of > correspondence with that object. In the present case, the object the command > represents is the will of the officer that the butts of the muskets be > brought down to the ground. Nevertheless, the action of his will upon the > sign is not simply dyadic [....] > > In CP 5.475, again from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])," c. 1906. > > [....] If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do > so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further > effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant. > The effort may be a muscular one, as it is in the case of the command to > ground arms; but it is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner World, a > mental effort. It never can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since > it is a single act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. [....] > > From the start with Aristotle, a form of a thing was a cause of it simply > because it was its form; a natural end likewise; but in the modern > perspective this means that even thermodynamic decay is an end and a cause in > some Aristotelian sense, and people tend to regard as a final cause something > more agentlike, as we see happening via minds and evolution. There is, > however, nothing in mental life as we know it to suggest a level where ALL > objects, as sources of determination, are really ends or objectives, given > that people deal freely with genuinely mechanical causes and others' wills as > causes, as well as with special ends whose influence is channeled through > desire, expectation, etc., and people generally know the difference(s). Why > should we suppose that evolution, as quasi-mind, has taken a narrower path > than that with organisms generally? It seems like you're bringing in a pure > telicism to compete with pure materialism and mechanism. > > Best, Ben > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More > athttp://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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