Ben, List: I would encourage you to undertake a bit of web-searching on this topic.
A huge body of biological and biochemical research exists on this topic, often under the general notion of "gene-for-gene" theory. This topic is of enormous economic importance for agriculture since it is widely exemplified in plant pathology in the form of a "predator-prey" relationship between plants and insects. The issue focuses on the difference between individual strains of species and their individual differences - the differences that make a difference. In otehr words, the difference between objects and objectives. Bottom line is relatively simple. It is a question of mutuality. Of community. Of biological harmony in an ecosystem. The putative "cause-effect" relationships must be viewed over the time span of generations and of chemical memory of both species; of information exchange among species, a sort of "tit-for-tat" emergence of relationships between species. As far as I am aware, the usual Aristotelian conceptualization of four sorts of causality is inappropriate for this form of relation among species. Or, do you have a philosophical view that infers that Aristotelian categories are relevant to this discussion? Frankly, in this case, I believe that facts are more informative than philosophical narratives. In my view, what Tori is saying is that biological causality within a community of organisms is vastly more perplex than philosophers are able to diagram or iconize (or semantically express.) BTW, I did a few scientific experiments in this area as an undergraduate and one of my colleagues developed a highly successful scientific career in this area. I personally find it to be a fascinating topic from several perspectives - mathematics, genetics, biochemistry, molecular biology, metaphysics, epistemology, ontology and logic. It is a substantial pragmatic issue, rather contrary to logical positivism, as a source of directed emergence of biological properties where the source of direction lies external to the identity of the organism. Cheers jerry On Mar 30, 2014, at 9:11 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Gary F., Tori, list, > I figure that the imperative might be generalizable to vegetable cases if one > considers evolution as quasi-mind. > > I'll give it a try: > A flower has evolved a certain scent only because it appeals to bees. In > evolution's quasi-mind, the objective has determined or influenced the scent > and represents the _general_ attracted bee in some sense - it's an indexical > legisign (instantiated in particular cases) of the general attracted bee AS > part of a universe of objects needed by the flowering plant and insofar as > that universe is determined by the bee being a part of it. Well, that's a > case of not so much an imperative as an invitative. But as long as the > outcome of the command or invitation is up in the air, they're more like each > other, both partaking of a kind of interrogative-imperative, than like a > matter-of-fact prescriptive recommendation or 'how-to'. > > Generally I'm willing to look at all the four causes as being like each other > at various levels. My remarks about the end - i.e. the final cause - as being > sometimes 'agent-like' are about its being like an efficient cause. I should > have made clearer in my on-list post that agent cause = efficient cause, same > idea, two phrases. > Tori, it seems like you're saying that, in biosemiosis, the final causes are > the real efficient causes and that the usual so-called efficient > causes aren't efficient causes at all. A key question is, does do you regard > the semiotic object as the source of semiotic determination? > Best, Ben > On 3/28/2014 8:12 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > >> [sent yesterday but, accidentally, not to the list] >> >> Ben, if I read this right, it shows that the object of a sign can be an >> objective, but only in the very special case of an intentional utterance in >> the imperative mood, such as the officer’s order. More generally, though, >> the “object” — depending on the analysis — can be an existing thing, or an >> idea, or a complex of objects which can be regarded as singular or plural, >> or it can be the whole universe from which those particular objects were >> selected for special attention, e.g. “the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation >> so far as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it”, which is the >> object of the sign “Hamlet was insane”. And I agree that biosemiotic >> processes, whether behavioral, developmental or evolutionary, are unlikely >> to confine themselves to the pattern of the imperative mood in linguistic >> utterances, which (as Peirce points out here) are effective only in the kind >> of system in which officers give conventional commands and expect them to be >> obeyed. I doubt that such systems exist at the biological level of semiosis, >> though they clearly do at the cultural level among social animals such as >> most primates. >> >> gary f. >> >> From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected] ] >> Sent: 27-Mar-14 2:01 PM >> To: [email protected] >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects, Objectives, Objectivity >> >>> Tori, Gary F., Jon, list, >>> In one of his "Ground arms!" examples, Peirce says, in, CP 8.178 (CP >>> editors: "Paragraphs 177-185 are from a long manuscript, undated, in >>> Widener IB3a. The references in it indicate that this manuscript is part of >>> a letter, but the extant part contains neither salutation nor signature.") - >>> [....] The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the sign. For >>> the Object of "Napoleon" is the Universe of Existence so far as it is >>> determined by the fact of Napoleon being a Member of it. The Object of the >>> sentence "Hamlet was insane" is the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so >>> far as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it. The Object of the >>> Command "Ground arms!" is the immediately subsequent action of the soldiers >>> so far as it is affected by the molition expressed in the command. It >>> cannot be understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's >>> relation to the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object >>> is in the Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that >>> moment. Or since the obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of >>> his expectation. At any rate, it determines the Sign although it is to be >>> created by the Sign by the circumstance that its Universe is relative to >>> the momentary state of mind of the officer. >>> >>> (Note on "molition": in CP 8.303 Peirce says: "[...] what I call _Molition >>> _, which is volition minus all desire and purpose, the mere consciousness >>> of _exertion _ of any kind.") >>> There, an end or objective can, through a mind, act like an agent; it is an >>> object in a universe of things desired or expected. Although it >>> is an end, through a mind it works as a beginning, a source, of semiotic >>> and indeed actual determination. One might suppose that in an evolutionary >>> context, something similar could happen with vegetable-level organisms; >>> there the evolutionary process is a quasi-mind through which a general and >>> telical object exerts its influence, instantiated in particular cases with >>> particular objects. I would distinguish _telos _, culmination, as desired >>> object, from entelechy as expected object, but that's just me. >>> Peirce's other "Ground arms" examples involve the resultant action as the >>> sign's interpretant rather than as the sign's object. I take this to be not >>> an inconsistency but a reflection of a difference of perspective; the >>> resultant action by the soldiers is the command's interpretant (dynamic or >>> energetic) from the perspective of the soldiers. >>> From a letter dated April 1, 1909 to William James CP 8.315, from the >>> William James collection, >>> >>> [....] When the captain of infantry gives the word "Ground arms!" the >>> dynamic Interpretant is in the thump of the muskets on the ground, or >>> rather it is the Act of their Minds. [....] >>> >>> In CP 5.473, from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])," c. 1906. >>> >>> [....] Suppose, for example, an officer of a squad or company of infantry >>> gives the word of command, "Ground arms!" This order is, of course, a sign. >>> That thing which causes a sign as such is called the _object _ (according >>> to the usage of speech, the "real," but more accurately, the _existent _ >>> object) represented by the sign: the sign is determined to some species of >>> correspondence with that object. In the present case, the object the >>> command represents is the will of the officer that the butts of the muskets >>> be brought down to the ground. Nevertheless, the action of his will upon >>> the sign is not simply dyadic [....] >>> >>> In CP 5.475, again from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])," c. 1906. >>> [....] If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do >>> so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further >>> effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant. >>> The effort may be a muscular one, as it is in the case of the command to >>> ground arms; but it is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner World, >>> a mental effort. It never can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, >>> since it is a single act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. >>> [....] >>> From the start with Aristotle, a form of a thing was a cause of it simply >>> because it was its form; a natural end likewise; but in the modern >>> perspective this means that even thermodynamic decay is an end and a cause >>> in some Aristotelian sense, and people tend to regard as a final cause >>> something more agentlike, as we see happening via minds and evolution. >>> There is, however, nothing in mental life as we know it to suggest a level >>> where ALL objects, as sources of determination, are really ends or >>> objectives, given that people deal freely with genuinely mechanical causes >>> and others' wills as causes, as well as with special ends whose influence >>> is channeled through desire, expectation, etc., and people generally know >>> the difference(s). Why should we suppose that evolution, as quasi-mind, has >>> taken a narrower path than that with organisms generally? It seems like >>> you're bringing in a pure telicism to compete with pure materialism and >>> mechanism. >>> Best, Ben >>> On 3/27/2014 9:09 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: >>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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