Gary F, Frankin, Jeff K, Jeffrey D, list,
Actually I said that I didn't think that the method of opinion and the
method of the development of opinion (the a priori) are the same. I said
that the latter replaced the former in Peirce's mind and that I could
only speculate on why he didn't keep both. Now it seems to me the method
of opinion seems to be intermediate between the method of authority and
the method of the a priori. The method of opinion in Peirce's
description appears as the attempt of authority to cope with loss of
despotic means by influencing with speeches, and so on, the development
of opinion.
Gary F. has been calling the method of a priori the method of
concensus'. The method of consensus may be a species of it, but Peirce's
characterization of Hegel's use of the method of a priori
("inclinations") does not seem at all a characterization of the method
of consensus.
In a note added in 1893 (CP 5 Endnotes) to (CP 5.392) "The Fixation of
Ideas", Peirce classes Hegel's dialectic as belonging to the method of
inclinations, by which I think Peirce means the method of the _/a priori/_:
As for Hegel, who led Germany for a generation, he recognizes
clearly what he is about. He simply launches his boat into the
current of thought and allows himself to be carried wherever the
current leads. He himself calls his method _/dialectic/_, meaning
that a frank discussion of the difficulties to which any opinion
spontaneously gives rise will lead to modification after
modification until a tenable position is attained. This is a
distinct profession of faith in the method of inclinations.
Here's Peirce circa 1906, the method of a priori is now the method of
the fermentation of ideas, nearly bacchic:
CP 5.564. My paper of November 1877, setting out from the
proposition that the agitation of a question ceases when
satisfaction is attained with the settlement of belief, and then
only, goes on to consider how the conception of truth gradually
develops from that principle under the action of experience;
beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity, the most degraded
of all intellectual conditions; thence rising to the imposition of
beliefs by the authority of organized society; then to the idea of a
settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas; and
finally reaching the idea of truth as overwhelmingly forced upon the
mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality.
(From manuscript entitled: "Reflexions upon Pluralistic Pragmatism and
upon Cenopythagorean Pragmaticism." c. 1906, which, according to EP
2:543, "seems to have disappeared from Harvard's collection of Peirce's
papers.")
Best, Ben
On 5/4/2014 5:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben, Gary F, Franklin, Jeff K, Jeff D., List,
I have to completelyh agree with Ben and Gary F. in this matter. Take
a look also at this except (I've underlined the various methods Peirce
mentions:
CP 7.317. There is an important difference between the settlement
of opinion which results from investigation and every other such
settlement. It is that investigation will not fix one answer to a
question as well as another, but on the contrary it tends to
unsettle opinions at first, to change them and to confirm a
certain opinion which depends only on the nature of investigation
itself. _The method of producing fixity of belief by adhering
obstinately to one's belief_, tends only to fix such opinions as
each man already holds. _The method of persecution _tends only to
spread the opinions which happen to be approved by rulers; and
except so far as rulers are likely to adopt views of a certain
cast does not determine at all what opinions shall become settled.
_The method of public opinion_ tends to develop a particular body
of doctrine in every community. Some more widely spread and deeply
rooted conviction will gradually drive out the opposing opinions,
becoming itself in the strife somewhat modified by these. But
different communities, removed from mutual influence, will develop
very different bodies of doctrine, and in the same community there
will be a constant tendency to sporting which may at any time
carry the whole public. What we know of growth, in general, shows
that this will take place; and history confirms us [. . . ]
In the next paragraph Peirce states these three methods slightly
differently, but it's obvious that he's referring to the same methods.
There also is a sense of development through the three in this passage
("be succeeded" and "will yield in time".
CP 7.318. Thus no one of these methods can as a matter of fact
attain its end of settling opinions. Men's opinions will act upon
one another and _the method of obstinacy _will infallibly be
succeeded by _the method of persecution_ and this will yield in
time to the _method of public opinion_ and this produces no stable
result.
The fourth method is given not as that of science, but of /Investigation/.
CP 7.319 . _Investigation_ differs entirely from these methods in
that the nature of the final conclusion to which it leads is in
every case destined from the beginning, without reference to the
initial state of belief. Let any two minds investigate any
question independently and if they carry the process far enough
they will come to an agreement which no further investigation will
disturb.
It is clear that these four are earlier versions of those found in
"The Fixation of Belief." Nonetheles, all the additional material that
has been quoted today seems to me to help clarify what Peirce intended
by analyzing the three non-scientific methods, for example, why he
settled on the language he did in the "The Fixation of Belief" (for
one example, the method of persecution seems to be but a subdivision
of the method of authority, etc.)
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Frank, list,
Peirce characterizes the method of opinion in MS 173 "Logic,
Truth, and the Settlement of Opinion" (Winter-Spring 1872) in a
paragraph appearing in CP 7.324 and W 3:15. It appears that, by
the time he wrote "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce had settled on
_/replacing/_ the method of opinion with the method of _/a
priori/_. The two methods do differ somewhat. I can only guess as
to why he didn't keep both. Joe's transcription breaks the
pertinent paragraph into four.
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms179.htm
The only justification for reasoning is that it settles
doubts, and when doubt finally ceases, no matter how, the end
of reasoning is attained. Let a man resolve never to change
his existing opinions, let him obstinately shut his eyes to
all evidence against them, and if his will is strong enough so
that he actually does not waver in his faith, he has no motive
for reasoning at all, and it would be absurd for him to do it.
That is method number one for attaining the end of reasoning,
and it is a method which has been much practised and highly
approved, especially by people whose experience has been that
reasoning only leads from doubt to doubt. There is no valid
objection to this procedure if it only succeeds. It is true it
is utterly irrational; that is to say, it is foolish from the
point of view of those who do reason. But to assume that point
of view is to beg the question. In fact, however, it does not
succeed; and the first cause of failure is that different
people have different opinions and the man who sees this
begins to feel uncertain.
It is therefore desirable to produce unanimity of
opinion and this gives rise to method number two, which is to
force people by fire and sword to adopt one belief, to
massacre all who dissent from it and burn their books. This
way of bringing about a catholic consent has proved highly
successful for centuries in some cases, but it is not
practicable in our days.
A modification of this is method number three, to
cultivate a public opinion by oratory and preaching and by
fostering certain sentiments and passions in the minds of the
young. This method is the most generally successful in our day.
The fourth and last method is that of reasoning. It
will never be adopted when any of the others will succeed and
it has itself been successful only in certain spheres of
thought. Nevertheless those who reason think that it must be
successful in the end, and so it would if all men could
reason. There is this to be said in favor of it. He who
reasons will regard the opinions of the majority of mankind
with contemptuous indifference; they will not in the least
disturb his opinions. He will also neglect the beliefs of
those who are not informed, and among the small residue he may
fairly expect some unanimity on many questions.
In MS 181 (also Winter-Spring 1872, W 3:18-20) Peirce's third
method is the natural development of opinion, more like the method
of a prior. http://cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms181.htm:
The cause of the failure of persecution suggests a
third means of settling opinions. This is by the natural
development of opinion. In other words not to try to cure the
disease of error, but pursue an expectant treatment. There is
a natural course in the growth of opinions. The history of
philosophy the great example. Bring morality into question &
you will see a determination not to question or discuss it
which shows the force of this method. Traditional belief
remains undisturbed until one community comes in contact with
another. Then it is seen that the result is quite accidental &
dependent on surrounding circumstances and initial conditions
and belief gets all unsettled.
Best, Ben
On 5/4/2014 3:41 PM, Frank Ransom wrote:
List,
Reading through the posts, I've noticed that no one has mentioned
the fifth method Peirce identified. Quoting from Liszka's /A
General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce/:
"In this last case, authority must give way to the method of
public opinion. In this method, the fixing of belief is
established not by imposing a set of beliefs on members of a
community but by getting them to enthusiastically adopt a set of
beliefs of their own accord. Under this method it is still
possible to control the community's beliefs, but it must be done
in a way that appeals to the population other than through force
or intimidation, that is, out of self-interest or commonly held
sentiments, fears, or hatreds (cf. CP 7.325). But this turns out
to be a rather unstable basis of establishing belief, precisely
because the appeal is to sentiments, appearances, and opinions
that are not firmly established. This method has a tendency to
create sweeping and rapid changes but ones that do not persist as
circumstances or public mood changes (cf. CP 7.318).
Since some list members have been making much of the four methods
and how to properly justify the distinction of the four from each
other, I felt it would be well to mention this other method. In
general, it is probably best to think of method in the more
general sense in which Peirce uses that term, as having to do
with a procedure for knowing a thing, and that the notion of
method used in "Fixation of Belief" and identification of four
such methods is aimed at the specific purpose of identifying in
general, not methods, but the kinds of methods by which belief
might become fixed. Peirce's list of five kinds of method strikes
me as somewhat arbitrary and more a matter of Peirce's
observations than a thorough-going systematic approach. I do
believe that a systematic approach should be possible for
distinguishing the kinds, that there are likley more kinds, and
the categories might prove helpful in such an approach. It's just
not clear at all to me yet how it should be accomplished, and I
am reticent to turn to Kant for suggestions.
-- Franklin
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