Ben, Gary F, Franklin, Jeff K, Jeff D., List,
I have to completelyh agree with Ben and Gary F. in this matter. Take a
look also at this except (I've underlined the various methods Peirce
mentions:
CP 7.317. There is an important difference between the settlement of
opinion which results from investigation and every other such settlement.
It is that investigation will not fix one answer to a question as well as
another, but on the contrary it tends to unsettle opinions at first, to
change them and to confirm a certain opinion which depends only on the
nature of investigation itself. *The method of producing fixity of belief
by adhering obstinately to one's belief*, tends only to fix such opinions
as each man already holds. *The method of persecution *tends only to spread
the opinions which happen to be approved by rulers; and except so far as
rulers are likely to adopt views of a certain cast does not determine at
all what opinions shall become settled. *The method of public opinion* tends
to develop a particular body of doctrine in every community. Some more
widely spread and deeply rooted conviction will gradually drive out the
opposing opinions, becoming itself in the strife somewhat modified by
these. But different communities, removed from mutual influence, will
develop very different bodies of doctrine, and in the same community there
will be a constant tendency to sporting which may at any time carry the
whole public. What we know of growth, in general, shows that this will take
place; and history confirms us [. . . ]
In the next paragraph Peirce states these three methods slightly
differently, but it's obvious that he's referring to the same methods.
There also is a sense of development through the three in this passage ("be
succeeded" and "will yield in time".
CP 7.318. Thus no one of these methods can as a matter of fact attain its
end of settling opinions. Men's opinions will act upon one another and *the
method of obstinacy *will infallibly be succeeded by *the method of
persecution* and this will yield in time to the *method of public opinion* and
this produces no stable result.
The fourth method is given not as that of science, but of *Investigation*.
CP 7.319 . *Investigation* differs entirely from these methods in that the
nature of the final conclusion to which it leads is in every case destined
from the beginning, without reference to the initial state of belief. Let
any two minds investigate any question independently and if they carry the
process far enough they will come to an agreement which no further
investigation will disturb.
It is clear that these four are earlier versions of those found in "The
Fixation of Belief." Nonetheles, all the additional material that has been
quoted today seems to me to help clarify what Peirce intended by analyzing
the three non-scientific methods, for example, why he settled on the
language he did in the "The Fixation of Belief" (for one example, the
method of persecution seems to be but a subdivision of the method of
authority, etc.)
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote:
> Frank, list,
>
> Peirce characterizes the method of opinion in MS 173 "Logic, Truth, and
> the Settlement of Opinion" (Winter-Spring 1872) in a paragraph appearing in
> CP 7.324 and W 3:15. It appears that, by the time he wrote "The Fixation of
> Belief," Peirce had settled on _*replacing*_ the method of opinion with
> the method of _*a priori*_. The two methods do differ somewhat. I can
> only guess as to why he didn't keep both. Joe's transcription breaks the
> pertinent paragraph into four.
> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms179.htm
>
> The only justification for reasoning is that it settles doubts, and when
> doubt finally ceases, no matter how, the end of reasoning is attained. Let
> a man resolve never to change his existing opinions, let him obstinately
> shut his eyes to all evidence against them, and if his will is strong
> enough so that he actually does not waver in his faith, he has no motive
> for reasoning at all, and it would be absurd for him to do it. That is
> method number one for attaining the end of reasoning, and it is a method
> which has been much practised and highly approved, especially by people
> whose experience has been that reasoning only leads from doubt to doubt.
> There is no valid objection to this procedure if it only succeeds. It is
> true it is utterly irrational; that is to say, it is foolish from the point
> of view of those who do reason. But to assume that point of view is to beg
> the question. In fact, however, it does not succeed; and the first cause of
> failure is that different people have different opinions and the man who
> sees this begins to feel uncertain.
>
> It is therefore desirable to produce unanimity of opinion and this
> gives rise to method number two, which is to force people by fire and sword
> to adopt one belief, to massacre all who dissent from it and burn their
> books. This way of bringing about a catholic consent has proved highly
> successful for centuries in some cases, but it is not practicable in our
> days.
>
> A modification of this is method number three, to cultivate a
> public opinion by oratory and preaching and by fostering certain sentiments
> and passions in the minds of the young. This method is the most generally
> successful in our day.
>
> The fourth and last method is that of reasoning. It will never be
> adopted when any of the others will succeed and it has itself been
> successful only in certain spheres of thought. Nevertheless those who
> reason think that it must be successful in the end, and so it would if all
> men could reason. There is this to be said in favor of it. He who reasons
> will regard the opinions of the majority of mankind with contemptuous
> indifference; they will not in the least disturb his opinions. He will also
> neglect the beliefs of those who are not informed, and among the small
> residue he may fairly expect some unanimity on many questions.
>
> In MS 181 (also Winter-Spring 1872, W 3:18-20) Peirce's third method is
> the natural development of opinion, more like the method of a prior.
> http://cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms181.htm:
>
> The cause of the failure of persecution suggests a third means of
> settling opinions. This is by the natural development of opinion. In other
> words not to try to cure the disease of error, but pursue an expectant
> treatment. There is a natural course in the growth of opinions. The history
> of philosophy the great example. Bring morality into question & you will
> see a determination not to question or discuss it which shows the force of
> this method. Traditional belief remains undisturbed until one community
> comes in contact with another. Then it is seen that the result is quite
> accidental & dependent on surrounding circumstances and initial conditions
> and belief gets all unsettled.
>
> Best, Ben
>
>
> On 5/4/2014 3:41 PM, Frank Ransom wrote:
>
> List,
>
> Reading through the posts, I've noticed that no one has mentioned the
> fifth method Peirce identified. Quoting from Liszka's *A General
> Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce*:
>
> "In this last case, authority must give way to the method of public
> opinion. In this method, the fixing of belief is established not by
> imposing a set of beliefs on members of a community but by getting them to
> enthusiastically adopt a set of beliefs of their own accord. Under this
> method it is still possible to control the community's beliefs, but it must
> be done in a way that appeals to the population other than through force or
> intimidation, that is, out of self-interest or commonly held sentiments,
> fears, or hatreds (cf. CP 7.325). But this turns out to be a rather
> unstable basis of establishing belief, precisely because the appeal is to
> sentiments, appearances, and opinions that are not firmly established. This
> method has a tendency to create sweeping and rapid changes but ones that do
> not persist as circumstances or public mood changes (cf. CP 7.318).
>
> Since some list members have been making much of the four methods and
> how to properly justify the distinction of the four from each other, I felt
> it would be well to mention this other method. In general, it is probably
> best to think of method in the more general sense in which Peirce uses that
> term, as having to do with a procedure for knowing a thing, and that the
> notion of method used in "Fixation of Belief" and identification of four
> such methods is aimed at the specific purpose of identifying in general,
> not methods, but the kinds of methods by which belief might become fixed.
> Peirce's list of five kinds of method strikes me as somewhat arbitrary and
> more a matter of Peirce's observations than a thorough-going systematic
> approach. I do believe that a systematic approach should be possible for
> distinguishing the kinds, that there are likley more kinds, and the
> categories might prove helpful in such an approach. It's just not clear at
> all to me yet how it should be accomplished, and I am reticent to turn to
> Kant for suggestions.
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
>
>
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