Frank, list,
Peirce characterizes the method of opinion in MS 173 "Logic, Truth, and
the Settlement of Opinion" (Winter-Spring 1872) in a paragraph appearing
in CP 7.324 and W 3:15. It appears that, by the time he wrote "The
Fixation of Belief," Peirce had settled on _/replacing/_ the method of
opinion with the method of _/a priori/_. The two methods do differ
somewhat. I can only guess as to why he didn't keep both. Joe's
transcription breaks the pertinent paragraph into four.
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms179.htm
The only justification for reasoning is that it settles doubts,
and when doubt finally ceases, no matter how, the end of reasoning
is attained. Let a man resolve never to change his existing
opinions, let him obstinately shut his eyes to all evidence against
them, and if his will is strong enough so that he actually does not
waver in his faith, he has no motive for reasoning at all, and it
would be absurd for him to do it. That is method number one for
attaining the end of reasoning, and it is a method which has been
much practised and highly approved, especially by people whose
experience has been that reasoning only leads from doubt to doubt.
There is no valid objection to this procedure if it only succeeds.
It is true it is utterly irrational; that is to say, it is foolish
from the point of view of those who do reason. But to assume that
point of view is to beg the question. In fact, however, it does not
succeed; and the first cause of failure is that different people
have different opinions and the man who sees this begins to feel
uncertain.
It is therefore desirable to produce unanimity of opinion
and this gives rise to method number two, which is to force people
by fire and sword to adopt one belief, to massacre all who dissent
from it and burn their books. This way of bringing about a catholic
consent has proved highly successful for centuries in some cases,
but it is not practicable in our days.
A modification of this is method number three, to cultivate
a public opinion by oratory and preaching and by fostering certain
sentiments and passions in the minds of the young. This method is
the most generally successful in our day.
The fourth and last method is that of reasoning. It will
never be adopted when any of the others will succeed and it has
itself been successful only in certain spheres of thought.
Nevertheless those who reason think that it must be successful in
the end, and so it would if all men could reason. There is this to
be said in favor of it. He who reasons will regard the opinions of
the majority of mankind with contemptuous indifference; they will
not in the least disturb his opinions. He will also neglect the
beliefs of those who are not informed, and among the small residue
he may fairly expect some unanimity on many questions.
In MS 181 (also Winter-Spring 1872, W 3:18-20) Peirce's third method is
the natural development of opinion, more like the method of a prior.
http://cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms181.htm:
The cause of the failure of persecution suggests a third
means of settling opinions. This is by the natural development of
opinion. In other words not to try to cure the disease of error, but
pursue an expectant treatment. There is a natural course in the
growth of opinions. The history of philosophy the great example.
Bring morality into question & you will see a determination not to
question or discuss it which shows the force of this method.
Traditional belief remains undisturbed until one community comes in
contact with another. Then it is seen that the result is quite
accidental & dependent on surrounding circumstances and initial
conditions and belief gets all unsettled.
Best, Ben
On 5/4/2014 3:41 PM, Frank Ransom wrote:
List,
Reading through the posts, I've noticed that no one has mentioned the
fifth method Peirce identified. Quoting from Liszka's /A General
Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce/:
"In this last case, authority must give way to the method of public
opinion. In this method, the fixing of belief is established not by
imposing a set of beliefs on members of a community but by getting
them to enthusiastically adopt a set of beliefs of their own accord.
Under this method it is still possible to control the community's
beliefs, but it must be done in a way that appeals to the population
other than through force or intimidation, that is, out of
self-interest or commonly held sentiments, fears, or hatreds (cf. CP
7.325). But this turns out to be a rather unstable basis of
establishing belief, precisely because the appeal is to sentiments,
appearances, and opinions that are not firmly established. This method
has a tendency to create sweeping and rapid changes but ones that do
not persist as circumstances or public mood changes (cf. CP 7.318).
Since some list members have been making much of the four methods and
how to properly justify the distinction of the four from each other, I
felt it would be well to mention this other method. In general, it is
probably best to think of method in the more general sense in which
Peirce uses that term, as having to do with a procedure for knowing a
thing, and that the notion of method used in "Fixation of Belief" and
identification of four such methods is aimed at the specific purpose
of identifying in general, not methods, but the kinds of methods by
which belief might become fixed. Peirce's list of five kinds of method
strikes me as somewhat arbitrary and more a matter of Peirce's
observations than a thorough-going systematic approach. I do believe
that a systematic approach should be possible for distinguishing the
kinds, that there are likley more kinds, and the categories might
prove helpful in such an approach. It's just not clear at all to me
yet how it should be accomplished, and I am reticent to turn to Kant
for suggestions.
-- Franklin
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