Søren, Gary R., list,
Søren, you wrote,
But logic is semiotics? And semiosis is a process of relations and
therefore quite a lot self-organizing through an evolution of meaning?
I'd say that it's with semiotics and semioses, as with statistics and
stochastic processes. There are material statistics, biostatistics,
etc., and the study of stochastic processes at those levels; e.g.,
chemical dynamics is stochastic. Then there is the general statistical
study of stochastic processes more or less in the abstract - involving
particular examples and applications, but not dedicated to any special
class or 'domain' (as people sometimes like to say) of phenomena. I've
also seen stochastic processes listed among the things considered in
probability theory, which is a pretty high level of generality.
Peirce placed his discussion of statistical reasoning in the section on
induction in critical logic in the 1902 Carnegie application. (In his
time, reference to a subject simply as 'statistics' could be taken as a
reference to accounts of human matters, like biography and history). As
part of cenoscopic
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/cenoscopy.html philosophy,
general statistics is a study of positive phenomena in general, not this
or that special class of phenomena. Questions OF general statistics are
not resolved by special experiments; rather such statistics may point
out when special experiments need to be done, how to design them, etc.
As part of his philosophical logic, general statistics is part of logic
as formal semiotic. He generally pursues the study of semiosis at the
cenoscopic level, though he uses examples often from human life, and
sometimes from a broader pool of phenomena. He considers evolution of
meaning at various levels of abstract generality within philosophy. The
closest to an idioscopic sense of 'evolution' is in his metaphysics,
wherein evolution has three modes, tychasm, anancasm, and agapasm.
One could argue that, from a Peircean standpoint, decision processes and
information processes (communication and control) would have the same
variety of levels of study in terms of abstract generality as stochastic
processes have. I know little about the study of self-organization, but
I don't know why there shouldn't be a cenoscopic study of
self-organization, as long as it is a study that rests mathematics and
some philosophy, concerns observations within the range of everybody's
normal range of experience during most of their waking time, and does
not, of itself, treat of the kinds of questions that require special
experiences or special experiments to resolve, even if it ought to be
applied in treating of such questions.
Best, Ben
On 6/1/2014 3:49 PM, Søren Brier wrote:
But logic is semiotics? And semiosis is a process of relations and
therefore quite a lot self-organizing through an evolution of meaning?
Søren
Jeff, Søren, Charles list,
I agree with your succinct analysis of this matter of the evolution
of the self through self-control, Jeff, and especially your very
well-stated conclusion that "there is much to be said for trying to
avoid importing assumptions into the normative sciences that will
tend to bias our inquiry." This point has been made any number of
times on the list over the years--for recent example, by Ben Udell in
certain posts related to Peirce's Classification of the Sciences--but
it bears repeating. However, I'm currently on vacation so I won't say
more just now.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700
*** *** *** ***
Jeffrey Brian Downard 06/01/14 10:51 AM
Søren, Charles and list,
The argument Peirce gives about the logical conception of the self
in "Question Concerning Certain Faculties" is about the development
of the self. In his later works, Peirce makes it clear that the
example of a child developing a logical conception of self is meant
to help us explore what is requisite for the evolution of the self
and the related capacities for self control more generally. (CP,
7.381-4)
The story we might tell in the special sciences of physics,
chemistry, biology and psychology about the development of
self-organizing and autopoietic systems shouldn't be used in a
normative theory of logic as a basis for developing our logical
hypotheses. In time, we'll want to reconcile the account of the
self developed in our logical theory with the accounts given in the
special sciences, but we should be wary of getting the cart before
the horse. (CP, 7.581)
We could, of course, disagree with Peirce on this point, and there
are many who do. For my part, however, I think there is much to be
said for trying to avoid importing assumptions into the normative
sciences that will tend to bias our inquiry.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________
From: Søren Brier [sb....@cbs.dk ]
Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 5:52 AM
To: charles murray; Peirce List
Subject: SV: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on
Mind, self, and person
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