Ben, List, 1. I do not mean to imply that Peirce is recommending that we hold off on inquiry in the special sciences until our theories in the normative sciences and metaphysics are complete. Special scientists should do their thing and philosophers should do theirs simultaneously, as has typically been the practice. For those rare individuals who, like Peirce, are actively engaged in both kinds of inquiry, the recommendation is to abstract from the observations, tests and results gathered in the special sciences--at least for the purposes of trying to develop hypotheses in the normative sciences concerning what is necessary for a sign to signify, or for an argument to be valid--or what have you. Ultimately, the conclusions we draw in the normative sciences and in metaphysics are tested in, in some sense, as we put our experimental methods to the test in the special sciences and then try to critique the successes and failures of the methods.
I recognize that Peirce does not follow his architectonic plan in many of his essays. Rather, the questions--philosophical, physical, biological, psychological, etc.--seem to be mixed together. Having said that, I do believe he is careful to restrict the kinds of inputs that he is willing to allow into the philosophical inquiries. As such, I believe that his arguments are based on the architectonic considerations. As we know, the architectonic plan is part of the science of review--and is formulated explicitly only after he has put together much of his philosophical picture. There are many who disagree with Peirce on these issues concerning the separation between philosophical inquiry and inquiry in the special sciences, but I happen to agree with him. Consider, for instance, the work of some of those who use the "X-phi" label to characterize what they are up. They recommend using the methods of psychology and sociology for the sake of articulating the data for philosophical theorizing. I think this is a wrongheaded way of collecting the kinds of observations we need and for correcting for any observational errors. 2. In support of the point I was trying to make about separating between a logical conception of the self, and the biological explanations that are based on autopoesis, I was referring to CP 7.581. Here is the passage I had in mind: "Let us take care that we do not confound these two separate inquiries in reference to the soul. The hypothetic explanation will inform us of the causes or necessary antecedents of the phenomena of human life. These phenomena may be regarded internally or externally. Regarded internally they require an internal explanation by internal necessary antecedents, that is by premisses; and this explanation was given in the last lecture. If they are regarded externally or physically they require a physical explanation by physical antecedents, and this inquiry must be turned over unreservedly to the physiologists. They will find the truth of the matter, and we may rest satisfied that no explanation which is based squarely upon legitimate hypothesis from the facts of nature, can possibly conflict with a purely inductive explanation of man." I referred to that passage simply because I happen to be working on those sections this weekend--so they are fresh in my mind. There are other places where he makes the point more clearly. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 12:42 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and person List, I did it again, I hit 'send' too soon, sorry. I've added some text in red between asterisks at the end of my post. - Best, Ben Gary, Jeff, Søren, Charles, list, Actually my view seems to diverge from Jeff's, at least as he has expressed it in the past. In my peirce-l response sent March 26, 2014, http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12301/focus=12327 Jeff had asked: [JBD QUOTE] [...] I'd like to raise the following question. To what extent should we bracket metaphysical questions about the reality of the purposes that seem to govern biological, chemical, physical processes? T.L. Short seemed to think it worth the while to get those questions on the table at the very start of his discussion of Peirce's semiotics. I will admit that it makes sense to canvass all of the possibilities as we start to classify different kinds of representamens and relations and then build explanations of the growth of semiotic systems. After all, we wouldn't want to leave important classes out of our explanations. Having said that, shouldn't we bracket the metaphysical questions out of a concern that in our eagerness to give answers to these questions we might bias the normative inquiry? [END QUOTE] My reply included the following: [BU QUOTE] Tom seems to minimize the importance of a Comtean classification. I don't do that, but rather than bracketing I'd just try to keep track of what is a general principle (say, in normatives) and what is a special example (say, in metaphysics). For my part I don't trust generalizations at any level enough to completely bracket particulars; one's general ideas may be biased just as one's special cases may be. I remember working at inputting contract info (including financial terms, payment amounts, etc.) at a publishing house decades ago. They brought the electronic system online in order to test it against the trusted old hand-written system; what they found was that the old hand-written system itself was messed up; so they kept running the two systems for comparison against each other for some period, trying to get the true picture sooner or later. [END QUOTE] I'd just add that, yes, one should have studied metaphysics before getting too metaphysical about idioscopic (physical, chemical, biological, psychological) processes. But we can't be awaiting some date when metaphysical inquiry is sufficiently advanced in order to apply it in idioscopy, or to seek idioscopic instantiations of metaphysical principles in order to shed light on those principles. As Peirce pointed out, no matter the sorry state of metaphysics as a discipline, still people inevitably apply metaphysics, well or badly. It is as with mathematics. Hamilton worked out the nontrivial math of conical refraction and predicted conical refraction as an optical phenomenon. It had never previously been observed, but he was right. Peirce's point would be that the phenomenon of conical refraction does not prove the math, it just proves the applicability of the math to the special-scientific case. *If conical refraction in crystals had not been observed as Hamilton predicted, this would rightly have created doubt about the understanding on which it was based - either the crystallography, or the optics, or the mathematics, or some combination, would have had to be wrong. It wouldn't flatly disprove the math, but it would lead some to double-check it along with the other premisses of the prediction. (This pertains to my earlier point about running two 'systems' at once to test them against each other).* *Jeff, I checked CP 7.581 but I didn't see its applicability to the question. Did you mean some other passage?* Best, Ben On 6/1/2014 1:06 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Jeff, Søren, Charles list, I agree with your succinct analysis of this matter of the evolution of the self through self-control, Jeff, and especially your very well-stated conclusion that "there is much to be said for trying to avoid importing assumptions into the normative sciences that will tend to bias our inquiry." This point has been made any number of times on the list over the years--for recent example, by Ben Udell in certain posts related to Peirce's Classification of the Sciences--but it bears repeating. However, I'm currently on vacation so I won't say more just now. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York E202-O 718 482-5700 *** *** *** *** Jeffrey Brian Downard 06/01/14 10:51 AM Søren, Charles and list, The argument Peirce gives about the logical conception of the self in "Question Concerning Certain Faculties" is about the development of the self. In his later works, Peirce makes it clear that the example of a child developing a logical conception of self is meant to help us explore what is requisite for the evolution of the self and the related capacities for self control more generally. (CP, 7.381-4) The story we might tell in the special sciences of physics, chemistry, biology and psychology about the development of self-organizing and autopoietic systems shouldn't be used in a normative theory of logic as a basis for developing our logical hypotheses. In time, we'll want to reconcile the account of the self developed in our logical theory with the accounts given in the special sciences, but we should be wary of getting the cart before the horse. (CP, 7.581) We could, of course, disagree with Peirce on this point, and there are many who do. For my part, however, I think there is much to be said for trying to avoid importing assumptions into the normative sciences that will tend to bias our inquiry. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Søren Brier [sb....@cbs.dk<mailto:sb....@cbs.dk> ] Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 5:52 AM To: charles murray; Peirce List Subject: SV: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and person
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