Jeff, list,
I generally agree, except with the use of the word 'separation' instead
of 'non-establishment' in some sense - that is, we just need to remember
that idioscopic principles and findings do not establish cenoscopic or
mathematical principles or findings. I just don't think that, as you put
it, Peirce "does not follow his architectonic plan in many of his
essays." He just doesn't keep various inquiries in separate silos in
those regards in which there is no need to. Yes, as you say, he is
"careful to restrict the kinds of inputs that he is willing to allow
into the philosophical inquiries" but "restriction of inputs" is vague.
The restriction is of what _/bases for conclusions/_ are suitable for
philosophy, and, as you go on to say, "his arguments are based on the
architectonic considerations."
CP 7.581 (in Lecture XI) involves a distinction between inductions in
physiology and 'internal' hypotheses about the "human" soul from "facts
of nature," which sounds like empirical psychology. However, the MS of
Lecture X (W 1:488-90), to which Peirce refers, does it make it seem
that he is discussing the logical, not the psychological, conception of
the self. However this early way (1866) of distinguishing inductive
inquiries from hypothetical inquiries seems different from his later
work, in which he does not distinguish special sciences and philosophy
(or more specifically physiology and logic) as tending to draw inductive
conclusions and hypothetical conclusions, respectively, and in which he
focuses not on a rivalry among inference modes but on how they belong
together in a recursive cycle.
Best, Ben
On 6/1/2014 8:03 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Ben, List,
1. I do not mean to imply that Peirce is recommending that we hold
off on inquiry in the special sciences until our theories in the
normative sciences and metaphysics are complete. Special scientists
should do their thing and philosophers should do theirs
simultaneously, as has typically been the practice. For those rare
individuals who, like Peirce, are actively engaged in both kinds of
inquiry, the recommendation is to abstract from the observations,
tests and results gathered in the special sciences--at least for the
purposes of trying to develop hypotheses in the normative sciences
concerning what is necessary for a sign to signify, or for an argument
to be valid--or what have you. Ultimately, the conclusions we draw in
the normative sciences and in metaphysics are tested in, in some
sense, as we put our experimental methods to the test in the special
sciences and then try to critique the successes and failures of the
methods.
I recognize that Peirce does not follow his architectonic plan in many
of his essays. Rather, the questions--philosophical, physical,
biological, psychological, etc.--seem to be mixed together. Having
said that, I do believe he is careful to restrict the kinds of inputs
that he is willing to allow into the philosophical inquiries. As
such, I believe that his arguments are based on the architectonic
considerations. As we know, the architectonic plan is part of the
science of review--and is formulated explicitly only after he has put
together much of his philosophical picture.
There are many who disagree with Peirce on these issues concerning the
separation between philosophical inquiry and inquiry in the special
sciences, but I happen to agree with him. Consider, for instance, the
work of some of those who use the "X-phi" label to characterize what
they are up. They recommend using the methods of psychology and
sociology for the sake of articulating the data for philosophical
theorizing. I think this is a wrongheaded way of collecting the kinds
of observations we need and for correcting for any observational errors.
2. In support of the point I was trying to make about separating
between a logical conception of the self, and the biological
explanations that are based on autopoesis, I was referring to CP
7.581. Here is the passage I had in mind:
"Let us take care that we do not confound these two separate inquiries
in reference to the soul. The
hypothetic explanation will inform us of the causes or necessary
antecedents of the
phenomena of human life. These phenomena may be regarded internally or
externally.
Regarded internally they require an internal explanation by internal
necessary antecedents, that is by premisses; and this explanation was
given in the last lecture. If they are regarded externally or
physically they require a physical explanation by physical
antecedents, and this inquiry must be turned over unreservedly to
the physiologists. They will find the truth of the matter, and we may
rest satisfied that no
explanation which is based squarely upon legitimate hypothesis from
the facts of nature, can possibly conflict with a purely inductive
explanation of man."
I referred to that passage simply because I happen to be working on
those sections this weekend--so they are fresh in my mind. There are
other places where he makes the point more clearly.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
*Sent:* Sunday, June 01, 2014 12:42 PM
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* Re: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on
Mind, self, and person
List, I did it again, I hit 'send' too soon, sorry. I've added some
text in red between asterisks at the end of my post. - Best, Ben
Gary, Jeff, Søren, Charles, list,
Actually my view seems to diverge from Jeff's, at least as he has
expressed it in the past.
In my peirce-l response sent March 26, 2014,
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12301/focus=12327
Jeff had asked:
[JBD QUOTE] [...] I'd like to raise the following question. To
what extent should we bracket metaphysical questions about the
reality of the purposes that seem to govern biological, chemical,
physical processes? T.L. Short seemed to think it worth the while
to get those questions on the table at the very start of his
discussion of Peirce's semiotics. I will admit that it makes
sense to canvass all of the possibilities as we start to classify
different kinds of representamens and relations and then build
explanations of the growth of semiotic systems. After all, we
wouldn't want to leave important classes out of our explanations.
Having said that, shouldn't we bracket the metaphysical questions
out of a concern that in our eagerness to give answers to these
questions we might bias the normative inquiry? [END QUOTE]
My reply included the following:
[BU QUOTE] Tom seems to minimize the importance of a Comtean
classification. I don't do that, but rather than bracketing I'd
just try to keep track of what is a general principle (say, in
normatives) and what is a special example (say, in metaphysics).
For my part I don't trust generalizations at any level enough to
completely bracket particulars; one's general ideas may be biased
just as one's special cases may be. I remember working at
inputting contract info (including financial terms, payment
amounts, etc.) at a publishing house decades ago. They brought the
electronic system online in order to test it against the trusted
old hand-written system; what they found was that the old
hand-written system itself was messed up; so they kept running the
two systems for comparison against each other for some period,
trying to get the true picture sooner or later. [END QUOTE]
I'd just add that, yes, one should have studied metaphysics before
getting too metaphysical about idioscopic (physical, chemical,
biological, psychological) processes. But we can't be awaiting some
date when metaphysical inquiry is sufficiently advanced in order to
apply it in idioscopy, or to seek idioscopic instantiations of
metaphysical principles in order to shed light on those principles. As
Peirce pointed out, no matter the sorry state of metaphysics as a
discipline, still people inevitably apply metaphysics, well or badly.
It is as with mathematics. Hamilton worked out the nontrivial math of
conical refraction and predicted conical refraction as an optical
phenomenon. It had never previously been observed, but he was right.
Peirce's point would be that the phenomenon of conical refraction does
not prove the math, it just proves the applicability of the math to
the special-scientific case. *If conical refraction in crystals had
not been observed as Hamilton predicted, this would rightly have
created doubt about the understanding on which it was based - either
the crystallography, or the optics, or the mathematics, or some
combination, would have had to be wrong. It wouldn't flatly disprove
the math, but it would lead some to double-check it along with the
other premisses of the prediction. (This pertains to my earlier point
about running two 'systems' at once to test them against each other).*
*Jeff, I checked CP 7.581 but I didn't see its applicability to the
question. Did you mean some other passage?*
Best, Ben
On 6/1/2014 1:06 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jeff, Søren, Charles list,
I agree with your succinct analysis of this matter of the evolution
of the self through self-control, Jeff, and especially your very
well-stated conclusion that "there is much to be said for trying to
avoid importing assumptions into the normative sciences that will
tend to bias our inquiry." This point has been made any number of
times on the list over the years--for recent example, by Ben Udell in
certain posts related to Peirce's Classification of the Sciences--but
it bears repeating. However, I'm currently on vacation so I won't say
more just now.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700
*** *** *** ***
Jeffrey Brian Downard 06/01/14 10:51 AM
Søren, Charles and list,
The argument Peirce gives about the logical conception of the self
in "Question Concerning Certain Faculties" is about the development
of the self. In his later works, Peirce makes it clear that the
example of a child developing a logical conception of self is meant
to help us explore what is requisite for the evolution of the self
and the related capacities for self control more generally. (CP,
7.381-4)
The story we might tell in the special sciences of physics,
chemistry, biology and psychology about the development of
self-organizing and autopoietic systems shouldn't be used in a
normative theory of logic as a basis for developing our logical
hypotheses. In time, we'll want to reconcile the account of the
self developed in our logical theory with the accounts given in the
special sciences, but we should be wary of getting the cart before
the horse. (CP, 7.581)
We could, of course, disagree with Peirce on this point, and there
are many who do. For my part, however, I think there is much to be
said for trying to avoid importing assumptions into the normative
sciences that will tend to bias our inquiry.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________
From: Søren Brier [sb....@cbs.dk ]
Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 5:52 AM
To: charles murray; Peirce List
Subject: SV: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on
Mind, self, and person
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