I agree with Gary R's sense of this but would stress that it is precisely in the context of a perceived sign that creative analysis can and perhaps should appear. This is the premise of 'triadic philosophy' and the only way I can see to arrive at measurable results - which I would see as the aim of pragmaticism.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 10:19 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > John, > > You wrote: > > I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of > firsts as unclassified "feels". This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among > other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as "ineffable". > I don't see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as > real from our experience, but I don't think we ever experience them > directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to > them, but* I think some version of representationalism is correct. In > fact I think that this is required if all thought is via signs (emphasis > added).* > > Your last sentences are, I think, key towards resolving this issue. My > point would be that those direct 'feels' are *not* thoughts, that they > are unanalyzed experiences of qualities. The analysis--should it happen at > all--happens after the fact. > > An example: I remember once being in an apple orchard on one of the autumn > days when the wind briskly moves stratocumulus clouds across the sky, > creating all sorts of rapidly changing shadows on the earth. Upon > reflection I analyzed the colors of the apples as I'd experienced them as > bright red, dark red, cherry red, almost purple, almost black, etc., the > last 'color' experience ('almost black') being the most remarkable for me. > > Indeed, in the totality of my phaneron I recall that I wasn't even > experiencing 'colors' as such so that my sense of them was just what it > was, and that experience could only be (inadequately and partially) > analyzed *after the fact* as experience of firsts as qualities, at times > changing so very rapidly and melding into other hues so subtly that I > couldn't have analyzed them--couldn't have found descriptive adjectives to > name the colors--had I tried (the only reason that I had tried at all was > that the 'black'-red apple sensation shocked me into a moment of analysis). > At such moments of pure experience nothing is being represented at all. I > wouldn't and couldn't think of all those hues as having color-names as they > were experienced and, in some cases, even upon reflection I couldn't (that > color between 'almost purple' and 'almost black' doesn't have a name for > me). > > So, all thought is via signs, but the experience of a quality is not a > thought. So, I do not see why you say that you "don't think we ever > experience them (qualities, firsts) directly." Isn't my example one of the > direct experience of qualities before analysis? > > Best, > > Gary R. > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 12:03 PM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Edwina, >> >> I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of >> firsts as unclassified "feels". This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among >> other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as "ineffable". >> I don't see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as >> real from our experience, but I don't think we ever experience them >> directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to >> them, but I think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact I >> think that this is required if all thought is via signs. >> >> >> >> I agree that Stephen and I have been talking past each other. We had a >> short exchange privately that I am content with. >> >> >> >> John >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] >> *Sent:* August 3, 2014 10:00 PM >> *To:* Stephen C. Rose; John Collier >> *Cc:* Peirce List >> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the >> basis for >> >> >> >> Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and >> since you don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is >> confusing. Yes - we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and >> Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure >> feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move >> into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of >> differentiation of the Self from this other source. Secondness is that >> direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from >> the heat. >> >> >> >> No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you >> outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some >> semiosic expreiences are just like that but that's not always the case for >> a sign. >> >> >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> >> *From:* Stephen C. Rose <[email protected]> >> >> *To:* John Collier <[email protected]> >> >> *Cc:* Peirce List <[email protected]> >> >> *Sent:* Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM >> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the >> basis for >> >> >> >> Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may >> seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do not emerge of their own >> accord. I associate a triad with three stages and see the sign as what >> exists at every stage but which moves from vagueness (penumbra) through >> some sort of index to some form of expression or action. I certainly made >> no assumptions of the sort you note. I find that reaction surprising. Sorry! >> >> >> *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* >> >> >> >> On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 2:09 PM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: >> >> The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a >> matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra >> which I infer from direct experience. >> >> >> I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so >> stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience >> is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. >> >> Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not >> mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including >> things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers >> to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real >> I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly >> all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing >> is something you take to be fundamental to reality. >> >> >> Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure >> firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience >> directly. >> >> John >> >> ---------- >> >> Professor John Collier >> [email protected] >> Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South >> Africa >> T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 >> Http://web.ncf.ca/collier >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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